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ACCOUNTABILITY AND LEGITIMACY IN TRANSBOUNDARY NETWORKED  
FOREST GOVERNANCE: A CASE STUDY OF THE ROUNDTABLE ON  
THE CROWN OF THE CONTINENT 
 
 
Using a social constructivist ontology to examine key debates and areas of inquiry vis-à-
vis the democratic nature of transboundary forest governance, this research examines the case of 
the Roundtable on the Crown of the Continent, an instance of networked governance. Part I 
builds up to an examination of the movement toward conceptualizing transboundary networked 
governance, exploring the claim that government has given way to governance, blurring the lines 
between public and private, and moving beyond its antecedent models—systems theory and 
complexity, corporatism, state-in-society, new public management and privatization, inter alia—
to reflect a more complicated and inherently collaborative relationship between state, society, 
and market-based actors.  
The dissertation project, then, investigates several key questions. At a basic level, it asks, 
what does networked governance look like, and in the case of the Crown Roundtable, how might 
these arrangements be adaptive given the absence of an overarching forests treaty? Looking 
deeper into the implications of networked governance, the project then moves to an investigation 
of the ways that these processes become legitimate modes of governing and how they allow 
actors to hold each other accountable. 
 Evidence in the Crown Roundtable suggests that the state is simply one actor among 




ensure that governance retains its democratic qualities? The second part (chapters 4, 5, 6, 7) 
builds from the initial observations in the first part (chapters 1, 2, and 3) that state boundaries in 
the Crown of the Continent are transected by landscape identities and norms. It examines the 
implications for maintaining democracy in governance. Given the lack of institutions (such as the 
juridical, legal, and electoral channels) available at the domestic level, how can actors be held 
accountable? What do shifts toward a flattened and fragmented forest governance landscape 
represent in terms of both the ability of diverse actors to relate to one another and also for the 
participants to see NG as a worthwhile process to engage? In answering these questions, Part II 
examines whether NG architectures are able to incorporate channels for accountability while 
simultaneously drawing upon a broad base of participation and maintaining social legitimacy. 
Finally, the dissertation concludes with thoughts on institutional design. In so doing, it hopefully 
contributes to an understanding of how to build collaborative networked arrangements that are 
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In the face of the failure to achieve a binding treaty at the global level pertaining to the 
management of forests, two important trends have emerged. Forest management has become 
more decentralized, coupled with the increasing involvement of civil society. Instead of a single 
overarching treaty, a collection of forest governance arrangements has emerged. It is an 
amalgamation of biodiversity-related trade agreements, certification and eco-labeling, non-
binding reporting and planning agreements, among others. Here we can identify three distinct 
governance logics: hierarchies, markets and networks. In recent years, networked arrangements 
have become particularly prominent. They have been largely overlooked by scholars of global 
forest governance who have focused on hierarchical arrangements (such as REDD+) and market 
arrangements (like forest certification schemes). This dissertation project fills this void by 
focusing on networked forest governance arrangements, presenting a detailed case study of one 
particular instance.  
In its examination of networked governance, the project enhances knowledge both by 
providing an accurate depiction of the forest governance landscape. The first three chapters are 
concerned with conceptualizing networked forest governance. Why have networked 
arrangements become part of the global forest governance landscape and what does this mean in 
terms of how governance is accomplished? What advantages do they provide over other forms of 
forest governance? 
Chapter one paints a picture of the global forest governance landscape, with an overview 
of the types of arrangements in place. Global forest governance mechanisms range from carbon 




from the biodiversity conservation regimes. These arrangements are broad and varied, creating a 
complicated landscape of arrangements to address issues in forest management. To help make 
sense of these seemingly disjointed elements, the chapter puts forth a typology. This parses 
elements of the regime complex into three types: hierarchies, markets, and networked 
governance.  
Chapter two presents the logic of networked governance, showing how it represents a 
departure from the other two modes of governing. In hierarchical architectures, there is a clear 
chain of command, and an a priori set of rules; relationships are rank-ordered in relation to a 
central authority. Interactions in markets are based on established systems of exchange where 
similar units are used as currency to induce behavioral change toward a particular management 
goal. Transactions are generally conducted on a voluntary basis, and linkages between actors 
shift with consumption patterns. In networked architectures, by contrast, we see diffuse patterns 
of authority that overlap public and private spheres, multi-directional flows of information and 
resources. Furthermore, the sustained linkages between actors are often based on repeated 
interactions and social capital. As government has given way to governance, states are no longer 
the sole players in international relations. In other words, the lines between public and private are 
blurred. Moving beyond the antecedent models, which include language of “new public 
management,” privatization, and polycentricism, a networked governance framework reflects a 
more complex relationship between states, civil society, and market-based actors. 
Chapter three provides the case background. The study focuses on the Roundtable on the 
Crown of the Continent (the Crown Roundtable), a transboundary collaborative “network of 
networks” situated in a forested ecosystem between the United States and Canada. The chapter 




the research questions. It then situates the Crown of the Continent landscape as a social-
ecological system, laying out the physical and human dimensions of the study site. The third 
portion of the chapter covers the Crown Roundtable: who is involved and what its activities are, 
concluding with a discussion of how it illustrates the advantages of networked forest governance. 
At a closer level, the chapter explores how networked forest governance plays out in a particular 
time and place. It suggests the ways networked governance is flexible and adaptive, two key 
components to address complexity in forest management. 
The following chapters investigate the implications of these shifts for networked forest 
governance. Its flexibility may be an asset in some regards, in particular being an attractive 
alternative to a legally binding treaty. However, its open-ended nature may open it up to 
weaknesses in other areas. For example, I ask, what does the movement toward governance 
networks represent for the rule-making authority of non-state actors? Is it even possible to have 
democratically accountable transboundary linkages? How does a governance network come to be 
accepted as a legitimate arrangement? Chapter four begins by presenting critiques of networked 
governance, and the ways that informal arrangements can sidestep traditional legal mechanisms 
for recourse at the international level. It sets up the theoretical background for legitimacy and 
accountability, paving the way for the analyses in chapters five and six. While existing work 
highlights the working parts of networked governance (the structure) much less is known about 
its dimensions (the processes), in particular the ways that it might or might not adhere to the 
standards we usually associate with democracy. Chapters five and six form the root of the 
investigation, using the Roundtable case to flesh out what legitimacy and accountability look like 




Chapter five explores the dimensions of civic engagement, looking at what draws 
participants into the process and keeps them engaged. Without a formal, binding obligation what 
is the basis for accepting the Crown Roundtable? In other words, the chapter asks what the 
mechanisms and processes are that contribute to its legitimacy. I examine participants’ 
perceptions of the suitability of networked forest governance using transcript data collected from 
in-depth interviews and participant observation.  Ultimately, the narratives show that by building 
trust, a shared set of norms and a common identity, a transboundary space can come to be 
accepted as a legitimate arena for deliberative engagement.  
Chapter six builds on these findings to examine how these characteristics lend themselves 
to social ties of accountability. A mixed methods approach is used to tease out the structure and 
nature of the working relationships in the Roundtable. Social network analysis is used to 
graphically display the ties between individuals. Qualitative evidence from interviews and 
participant observation lend deeper insight into the nature of the ties. Three network subtypes are 
modeled (information-sharing, problem-solving, and influence), showing varying levels of 
engagement depending on the purpose of the network. The analysis reveals stronger ties in the 
information sharing network, with an important role for brokers, or connecting individuals who 
bridge otherwise unconnected communities. Supporting interview data corroborate this role. In 
sum, the investigation reveals a rich tapestry of engagement, from the community level to the 
international space. The notion of the ‘accountability deficit’ is ultimately rejected, through a 
move toward a civil society that crosses between jurisdictions.  
Finally, chapter seven concludes by offering institutional design recommendations for 
networked arrangements. In managing forests across borders, governance networks provide a 




conservation and also for implementing it. These sustained linkages create a rich context for 
collaboration, with shared norms, and common identity, and a sense of trust, creating a deeply 
textured background for conservation that makes it possible to achieve objectives across the 
larger landscape scale in an unprecedented scale. Hopefully, the lessons learned in the case study 
lend toward addressing problems associated with environmental change, contributing back to a 
body of literature on the broader implications for good governance and the potential for 





































1.1 The Global Forest Regime Complex  
The world’s forests provide many benefits. They are home for much of the planet’s 
biodiversity, hosting plants and animals that make up a rich tapestry of cultural heritage, 
medicinal uses, and aesthetic beauty. They are home for many species of wildlife as well as for 
human settlements. Forests are important for hydrologic cycles; healthy forested ecosystems 
provide clean water, and prevent soil erosion and flooding. Pressing forest conservation 
challenges surrounding the increasing demand for water, land, and energy resources coupled 
with socioeconomic pressures related to making a transition from a natural-resource economy to 
a knowledge- and amenity-based economy pose governance puzzles for managers, conservation 
practitioners, and landowners (Chambers et al. 2010). Many of these challenges cross 
jurisdictional boundaries. Maintaining healthy forested ecosystems is important on a planetary 
scale. What happens in one forest is not just important for the immediate vicinity. The decisions 
local communities make about forest management have global implications.  
Forests have been called the “world’s lungs” because they process, or respire, carbon 
dioxide into breathable oxygenated air. Respiration is important for maintaining air quality, and 
also for global carbon cycling dynamics. More broadly, forests provide a range of ecosystem 
services. Forests are increasingly recognized for their role in mitigating climate change. They are 
important for carbon sequestration but they are also a source of emissions when it comes to land 
conversion and burning. Forest management has recently risen to a high priority area of concern 
in the arena of climate governance. Even though it is in our interest to maintain these landscapes 




should manage forests. Given the interconnected nature of forests, past attempts have aimed to 
design global-level forest treaties to govern how forests are used. However, to date, there is no 
binding global-level treaty regarding forest management. 
At the 1992 United Nations Conference for Environment and Development in Rio de 
Janeiro, Brazil, countries were concerned with rapid rates of deforestation related to 
development. Forests were being cleared, slashed and burned for settlement expansion, 
agricultural production, and for the extraction of timber resources. The opening of the global 
economy coupled with rapid economic growth and production meant that the demand for 
resources in one place could result in rapid change and degradation in a far-removed location. 
Deforestation was happening at alarming rates in developed countries as they scrambled to meet 
the needs of global supply chains. Developed and developing countries alike recognized the need 
to address deforestation at the global level. In fact, the problem of global deforestation may have 
been one of the most-used calls to environmental action in the early 1990s. As satellite imagery 
and remote sensing technology became more widely used and available, deforestation became a 
highly visible problem. Images of denuded landscapes that have been slashed and burned in 
order to cultivate crops, expand human settlements, and graze cattle were abundant. They 
motivated many countries to advocate for stronger global-level sustainable forest management.  
The Rio Earth Summit was the first time forests had received this level of attention on the 
global scale. The conference hosted a large amount of growth in multilateral treaties, with over 
40% of the multilateral environmental treaties at the time (Sand 2001). Sustainable forest 
management was a topic of concern on par with other issue areas like wildlife species 
conservation, whaling, and fisheries protection. The initiatives that emerged at the conference 




however, were crafted with the aim of creating an overarching forest treaty that would govern 
major aspects of how forests are managed. In other words, there was a hope at the time that states 
would agree to a centralized set of arrangements would govern forests. Ultimately, though, states 
failed to reach a binding agreement to stop deforestation.   
The United States initially took the lead in putting forward a global convention, but 
because there was an overall lack of support, the most that states could agree on was the Non-
legally Binding Authoritative Statement of Principles for a Global Consensus on the 
Management, Conservation, and Sustainable Development of All Types of Forests—“The Forest 
Principles” (Davenport 2005, 105). The failure to reach a global forest convention has been 
called “the most notorious failure in international agenda-setting” (Sand 2001, 40). The Forest 
Principles outlined general notions of forest sustainability and highlighted that the ways they are 
managed are important for the worldwide collective interest, but did not put forward binding 
commitments. This blend of arrangements is sometimes referred to as a “regime complex” 
(Glück et al. 2010; Keohane and Victor 2011). It may be helpful here to highlight some of its 
major elements. 
The global forest regime complex progressed from early attempts to create a single 
overarching framework, to more flexible arrangements. Early arrangements include The United 
Nations Environment Program’s Strategy on Forests, UN Forum on Forests, UN Forest 
Principles, National Forest Plans, the Montreal Process Criteria and Indicators, and FAO 
monitoring. While these mechanisms do not constitute an overarching binding treaty in the sense 
of having one system of rule-making, they do rely upon clearly set rules and guidelines for 
oversight. The UN Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD) 




banking to incentivize forest conservation (Boyd 2011). A list and brief remarks for other major 
global forest governance mechanisms is provided in Table 1.1 below. 
 
Table 1.1 Major components of the global forest governance regime complex. 
Mechanism	   Remarks	  
Carbon	  finance	  schemes	   Decisions	  made	  in	  carbon	  markets	  directly	  affect	  forest	  management.	  In	  carbon	  finance	  schemes,	  
primary	  and	  secondary	  forests	  can	  serve	  as	  storage	  "banks"	  in	  the	  global	  carbon	  cycle.	  
Climate	  regime	   Climate	  regime	  "dual	  effectiveness"	  turns	  the	  focus	  on	  capturing	  the	  benefits	  of	  reduced	  
emissions	  by	  conserving	  forested	  landscapes.	  A	  primary	  example	  is	  the	  United	  Nations	  Framework	  
Convention	  on	  Climate	  Change's	  (UNFCCC)	  Reducing	  Emissions	  through	  Deforestation	  and	  
Degradation	  arrangement	  (REDD+).	  	  
Community	  management	   Local	  decisions	  about	  forests	  also	  make	  up	  an	  important	  component.	  Sustainable	  forest	  
management	  is	  dependent	  upon	  choices	  made	  about	  land	  management.	  Since	  ownership	  and	  
property	  rights	  are	  often	  granted	  at	  the	  local	  level,	  community	  management	  cannot	  be	  left	  out	  
when	  considering	  global	  forest	  governance.	  
Corporate	  Social	  
Responsibility	  (CSR)	  
The	  industry-­‐led	  movement	  toward	  sustainable	  business	  practices	  comprises	  a	  large	  portion	  of	  
market-­‐driven	  forest	  governance.	  The	  voluntary	  choices,	  for	  example,	  that	  corporations	  make	  
about	  sourcing	  supplies	  for	  their	  manufacturing	  processes	  have	  direct	  implications	  for	  how	  forests	  
are	  managed.	  
Criteria	  and	  Indicators	  (C	  
&	  I)	  Processes	  
C	  &	  I	  reporting	  initiatives	  are	  voluntary,	  state-­‐led	  processes	  aimed	  at	  sharing	  national-­‐level	  
sustainability	  reports.	  The	  information	  is	  produced	  through	  the	  collaborative	  efforts	  of	  federal,	  
state,	  and	  local	  agencies;	  universities	  and	  scientific	  communities;	  civil	  society;	  and	  private	  
landowners.	  	  
FAO	  Monitoring	   The	  UN	  Food	  and	  Agriculture	  Organization	  provides	  country-­‐specific	  information	  on	  forest	  cover	  in	  
technical	  reports,	  planning	  documents,	  and	  field	  manuals.	  These	  programs	  fill	  gaps	  where	  states	  




ITTO	  standards	  are	  designed	  to	  cover	  trade	  in	  timber	  products	  between	  consumer	  and	  producer	  
countries.	  Other	  programs	  provide	  financial	  assistance	  to	  relieve	  trade	  pressures	  on	  tropical	  
countries.	  Assistance	  programs	  are	  supplemented	  by	  technical	  reporting	  aimed	  at	  holding	  the	  
woods	  products	  industry	  accountable	  to	  guidelines	  in	  sustainable	  forest	  management.	  
Labeling	  programs	   The	  Forest	  Stewardship	  Council	  (FSC),	  Sustainable	  Forestry	  Initiative	  (SFI),	  and	  Canadian	  Standards	  
Association	  are	  examples	  of	  voluntary	  non-­‐state,	  market-­‐driven	  programs	  designed	  to	  govern	  the	  
production	  of	  goods	  from	  forests.	  Certification	  schemes	  guarantee	  that	  forests	  are	  managed	  to	  
particular	  standards,	  and	  often	  provide	  additional	  oversight	  along	  the	  production	  and	  supply	  
chain.	  
National	  Forest	  Plans	   Individual	  states	  have	  drafted	  national	  forest	  plans.	  These	  documents	  take	  stock	  of	  forest	  
resources	  and	  plan	  for	  future	  needs.	  
Private	  forest	  ownership	   A	  number	  of	  tools	  are	  available	  to	  private	  landowners,	  including	  conservation	  easements,	  




At	  the	  large	  landscape	  level,	  collaborative	  arrangements	  bring	  together	  actors	  from	  government,	  
markets	  &	  industry,	  science,	  and	  civil	  society.	  These	  arrangements	  possibly	  represent	  the	  newest	  
tool	  in	  the	  suite	  of	  global	  forest	  governance	  mechanisms.	  	  
UN	  Institutions:	  UN	  Forum	  
on	  Forests	  and	  the	  Forest	  
Principles	  
The	  UN	  Forum	  on	  Forests	  is	  a	  venue	  for	  all	  UN	  member	  states	  to	  work	  toward	  meeting	  the	  
commitments	  set	  forth	  in	  the	  Rio	  Declaration	  on	  Environment	  and	  Development,	  Chapter	  11	  of	  
Agenda	  21,	  and	  the	  Forest	  Principles.	  The	  Forest	  Principles	  refers	  to	  a	  non-­‐legally	  binding	  
instrument	  for	  sustainable	  forest	  management	  set	  up	  at	  the	  United	  Nations	  Conference	  on	  
Environment	  and	  Development.	  
WTO	  Trade-­‐Related	  
Aspects	  of	  Intellectual	  
Property	  Rights	  
Agreement	  and	  the	  
Convention	  on	  
Biodiversity	  	  
The	  World	  Trade	  Organization's	  agreement,	  Trade-­‐Related	  Aspects	  of	  Intellectual	  Property	  Rights	  
(TRIPS),	  protects	  certain	  elements	  of	  knowledge	  related	  to	  genetic	  resources.	  The	  Convention	  on	  
Biological	  Diversity	  (CBD),	  a	  multilateral	  treaty	  protecting	  ecosystems,	  species,	  and	  genetic	  





Many of the governance arrangements listed above involve scaling down from the global 
level. National forest plans, community management plans, and landscape-scale conservation 
bring general principles of sustainable forest management to the more local level. This makes it 
possible to bring in a host of actors to help with monitoring and on-the-ground management 
actions. It makes quite a bit of sense to scale efforts down. Making decisions about forest 
resources brings in a wide host of stakeholders; it is a complex undertaking. Forests encompass 
numerous issue areas as they are home to plants, animals and also communities of people. Local 
circumstances vary from one location to another, making it difficult to establish one set of 
guidelines for managing forests in all places. For these and other reasons, decentralized 
governance has become increasingly attractive. Making decisions at the local level makes it 
possible to consider the needs in a particular place while empowering the people who live there 
to be involved in making decisions about their community. 
Non-state actors have been called the “custodians” of community interests (Sand 2001). 
In terms of forest conservation, this rings true. Community management has been a rising trend 
in recent years. There are numerous examples of success around the world. When considered 
together, these projects have the ability to make a difference in terms of forest cover at the global 
level (Pagdee, Kim, and Daugherty 2006). Community forest management brings in local actors 
both in terms of decision-making and distributing the benefits of forest resources (Bixler 2014). 
Bringing in community-based actors is not just important for forest management. Civil society 
has been a particularly important component in environmental governance more generally 
(Berkes 2010). Recent years have witnessed the relocation of authority up, down, and around the 
state. Moving away from a purely state-centered conceptualization of world politics, James 




centers of authority, “multi-centric” governance draws attention to the role of non-state actors. In 
a multi-centric system, transnational civil society is a source of governing authority. Others have 
referred to this trend as polycentricity (Ostrom 2010), fragmentation (Zelli and van Asselt 
2011a), or multi-level governance (Betsill and Bulkeley 2006). These approaches all highlight 
the same general trend, that authority is diffused throughout a host of actors. Civil society is 
connected across borders in a realm of politics that weaves around, above, below, and through 
the state (Keane 2003; Rosenau 2002).  
To bring this phenomenon back to global forest governance, we can see evidence of the 
importance of civil society in carbon accounting schemes in the climate regime complex. As an 
example, Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation (REDD and REDD+) brings 
in an explicit recognition of the importance of community involvement for forest processes. 
Originally set up to be implemented by national governments, REDD programs increasingly rely 
upon community governance. While REDD is a global level undertaking, it leverages national, 
regional, and local resources. REDD projects are able to reduce emissions that come from 
deforestation by involving local communities and regions in management projects (Boyd 2011).  
The way we view forests has implications for how they are managed. Framing forest 
resources as nationally owned (or state property) leads to a different set of policies than seeing 
them as global commons. It can seem like there is an endless array of mechanisms designed to 
address forest conservation issues. From monitoring guidelines, certification programs, carryover 
effects from the biodiversity and climate regimes, to measures that private landowners and 
corporations voluntarily choose to adopt, the wide variation between types is impressive. The 
regime complex is also very decentralized, meaning there is no single overarching treaty or 




authority that pop up in place of a single governing body depend to a large degree on non-state 
actors. The loose nature of the regime complex, coupled with the rise of civil society, paints a 
complex picture and raises questions about how global forest governance is being accomplished.  
In the absence of a formal, legally-binding treaty regarding forest management at the 
global level, the “evolving forests regime” (Humphreys 1999) has been characterized as 
“fragmented” (Zelli and van Asselt 2011a), but still serves as a source of order, including spill-
over from international legal instruments in other areas,1 soft international law such as the Forest 
Principles or Agenda 21. Earlier on, there were some important elements missing: the gaps 
included full valuation of forest goods and services, addressing the underlying causes of 
deforestation, and resolving the contentious relationship between trade and the environment 
(Humphreys 1999). Over time, civil society actors stepped in to address these gaps (Visseren-
Hamakers and Glasbergen 2007). To make sense of the emergent regime complex, we can look 
at the plethora of ways global forest governance is being accomplished.  
 
1.2 Using a Logics of Governance Approach in Examining the Forest Regime Complex  
Each form of governance involves a host of different actors. It is important to de-couple 
the actors from the fundamental logics under which they operate. That is to say, the mode of 
governing may tell us more than a survey of the actors involved.  If we were to examine the 
global forest governance landscape only in terms of the actors, we may end up with most 
arrangements lumped into one category as the majority involve private actors from both markets 
and civil society as well as government officials. A more analytically fruitful way of parsing out 
instances of global forest governance, then, is found in looking at their logics.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




Scholarship on transnational networks has tended to make a dualistic distinction between 
traditional and “new” governance, perhaps out of a need to explain the increased involvement of 
civil society. Distinguishing between purely public governance and hybrid governance on the 
basis of the actors involved is not particularly useful; it is common to have actors from multiple 
sectors.2 Public-private hybrid modes of governing are becoming the new norm. That is to say, 
both public and private actors are engaging in global forest governance. An analytical scheme 
that parses out modes of governing in a more meaningful way is needed, while recognizing a 
multiplicity of actors will almost always be involved. We should pay closer attention to the logic 
of the governance architecture, which entails a concern for where authority is placed, the type of 
resources exchanged, and the nature of the relationships between actors. 
Major developments in the forests regime following the 1992 Rio Earth Summit highlight 
a progression from early attempts at hierarchical mechanisms, to the incorporation of private 
entities and market-based arrangements and ultimately toward networked arrangements that 
blend elements from each of the former logics but also add a vibrant role for civil society. The 
following subsections provide richer background into the development of selected arrangements, 
painting the picture of a regime complex that has evolved over the past twenty years to address 
the complex social demands placed on forests that are front-and-center, though interwoven with 
ecological limits and realities. 
It may be true that global environmental governance, and especially the global forests 
regime complex, is characterized by fragmentation. Governance arrangements can be seemingly 
disjointed, but clear patterns of order can be found when we look closer. We can typologize 
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arrangements in terms of their governing logics. In other words, we can separate them by the 
way that authority is configured. In the simplest sense, we can arrange them according to how 
decisions are made and how actors work with one another. Here I present three ways of doing 
this: (1) separating top-down chain of command arrangements (hierarchies) from (2) transactions 
based on currency (markets), and (3) those based on diffuse patterns where no single actor holds 
sway over the others nor are decisions made in a way that is based on the exchange of resources 
(networks).  
Making the tripartite distinction of hierarchies, markets, and networks does two things. 
First, it recognizes that patterns of authority are fractured, bifurcated, and overlapping at the 
global level. Second, it also proposes a meaningful way of distinguishing between the patterns of 
this fragmentation. Countering the assertion that global forest governance is a “non regime” 
(Pattberg 2005), we can identify a regime complex, even though it may be a fragmented one 
(Glück et al. 2010). Table 1.2 illustrates the major distinctions between the three patterns of 
steering with an eye out for showing their basic configuration, their advantages, and the 












Table 1.2 The Basic Configuration, Advantages, and Challenges for Each of the Three 
Governance Patterns.	  
 Hierarchical Market-based Networked 
Configuration -Centralized authority 








-Private transactions on 
an at-will basis 
-Linkages shift with 
supply and demand of 
goods and services 
(episodic relationships) 
-Economic valuation 
placed on exchange of 
resources 
-Dispersed authority 





flows of information 
-Strong linkages across 
units 
Advantages -Clear basis of authority to 
dissolve potential disputes2 
-Strong linkages within units 





-Fungible units of 
exchange 
-Cooperation stems from 
the pursuit of individual 
gains 
-Can ease tensions 
between actors 
-Flexible, adaptive 








Challenges -All actors do not have equal 
input 
-Not always suitable for a 
democratic system 





-Requires a stable 
currency 
-Capital gains can 
eclipse policy objectives 
-Lack of clear dispute 
resolution 
-Managers face 
difficult objective of 
balancing objectives 




Ladder See-saw Braided rug 
Sources: 1 Simon 1962; 2 Polodny and Page 1998; 3 Ansell, Sondorp, and Stevens 2012. 
 
A governance logic framework allows us to make sense of the plethora of arrangements 
that have come about across the global forest governance landscape. Following this mode of 
analysis, forest governance arrangements can be separated into three major categories. We can 
distinguish between them on the basis of following a hierarchical design, market arrangement, or 
a pattern of networked governance. Figure 1.1 organizes elements of the forests regime complex 







Figure 1.1 Overlapping Architectures: The diagram depicts the forests regime complex, 
placing various mechanisms within the three categories.  
 
1.2.1 Hierarchical Arrangements  
 
In hierarchical architectures, there is a clear chain of command, and a pre-established set 
of rules. Hierarchical patterns of order are derived from centralized authority, pre-established 
rules-based interactions, and are generally associated with uneven distributions of power. This 
means that decisions are made at the top of a chain of command, and are passed down along a 
rank order. When it is unclear what course of action to take, the final decision rests with the top-
ranking official or organization. With regard to distribution of power, hierarchies are designed so 
that not all actors have equal resources or capabilities, in order to concentrate them in places they 




 Hierarchical patterns of authority have been described as “near-decomposable,” meaning 
that units or centers of authority resemble each other (Simon 1962). Units in a hierarchical 
system have a central command, and a coordinated system of control that places one entity or 
actor in a primary position as ultimate decider. This often means that ties within groups are 
stronger than those between separate groups or organizations. To put it another way, a strong 
sense of internal obligation can keep organizations from collaborating with others (Ansell and 
Gash 2008). In hierarchical arrangements, authority is organized in a vertical pattern, and the 
actors tend to be drawn from within a single sector (Hill and Lynn 2005). 
Examples from the forests regime complex. While an overarching forestry mechanism 
may not exist, there are some elements of hierarchy in the global forests regime complex. The 
United Nations institutions such as the Forum on Forests (UNFF), the Forest Principles, 
monitoring done by the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the Non-Legally Binding 
Instrument on All Types of Forests (NLBI), and the United Nations Environment Program 
(UNEP) Strategy on Forests ask states to set guidelines for monitoring and implementation. 
These mechanisms, while they do not bind states to report to a singular global agency, are still 
reliant upon a hierarchical pattern of governing. Each of these institutions establishes a central 
secretariat that states report to, though they still depend on states to maintain control over forest 
resources. The notion that each state possesses individual sovereignty provides the basis for legal 
authority for creating and enforcing rules within their political jurisdictions.  
First, the Forest Principles call on governments to recognize the importance of forests. 
The opening language acknowledges that there are differences between forest types, that values 
ascribed to forests and social interests can vary in each state, but that in all cases, it is important 




“Forest resources and forest lands should be sustainably managed to meet the social, economic, 
ecological, cultural, and spiritual needs of present and future generations” (Forest Principles 
1992, 2b). The specific mechanisms are not spelled out for ensuring these goals are met. 
However, there is an emphasis on states to put national policies and strategies in place to 
strengthen the management and conservation of forests. The Principles leave the specifics to 
each state to work out. 
The UNEP strategy on forests puts forth guidelines for forest monitoring, reporting, and 
verification. It places specific guidelines for the type of information required, and asks states to 
report accordingly. While it places requirements on states, it also provides the resources to help 
them accomplish these goals. It outlines four focal areas: knowledge, vision, enabling conditions, 
and finance (United Nations Environment Program 2011). The first two components have more 
to do with designing and carrying out forest management while the second two speak more to the 
ability of states to implement and complete projects. In other words, the UNEP strategy 
recognizes that states are individually sovereign units capable of doing their own forest 
monitoring. However, there is an acknowledgement that in order to do the work, some states may 
require assistance in the design and use of policy instruments. They may also require help in the 
form of funding for projects.  
National Forest Programs (NFPs) are another example of a hierarchical instrument. NFPs 
are in place in more than 130 countries (FAO 2014). They vary by country, but generally put 
forth guidelines for implementing sustainable forest management. They tie specific measures to 
the implementation of international commitments put forth by international agreements like the 
Forest Principles or the NLBI, for example (FAO 2014). While they are largely country-specific, 




bilateral cooperation, especially in the case of donor and recipient countries. Generally speaking, 
though, NFPs fit with hierarchical elements of the forests regime because they require reporting 
to a higher up in a chain of command, and are enforced on the individual authority of separate 
sovereign states. 
Critiques of hierarchical arrangements. Hierarchical elements do provide a strong 
normative framework including principles and policies. However, they are often imbued with 
little or no legal status, meaning that states can chose to ignore them. This formalized pattern of 
organization has fallen short in the global forests regime complex for two major reasons. First, 
an overarching treaty does not exist because state sovereignty has proven an insurmountable 
obstacle. Second, where there are elements of hierarchy, they tend to (a) be inattentive to the 
complexities of forest management, ignoring the interconnectedness of ecosystems and the social 
demands placed upon them; and (b) be ineffective in meeting reporting requirements 
(Gulbrandsen 2004; Humphreys 2006; Jedd 2012). 
An overarching treaty regarding forest management may demand too much of states, 
binding them to obligatory courses of action to which they are unwilling to commit. It is difficult 
enough at the national level to find agreement or areas of common ground on land management. 
Forest management is an area of natural resource governance that is intricately bound up in 
matters of land use, human settlements, and property ownership. In the United States, for 
example, the Forest Service faces the challenge of managing lands for multiple uses as well as 
filling other roles such as fire prevention. With these multiple and sometimes competing goals, it 
is often difficult for the agency to set overarching management guidelines at the federal level. 
Instead, in the United States there has been an outgrowth of local initiatives and community 




world (Pagdee, Kim, and Daugherty 2006). When scaled up to the international level, the 
obstacles related to achieving national management guidelines serve as a fairly clear example of 
the hurdles facing an overarching treaty. However, there are other explanations for the absence 
of a forest treaty. Some suggest that there was a lack of willingness to finance the development 
mechanisms required to implement a forest treaty (Haug and Gupta 2012).  
While the first area of critique has more to do with the inability to reach a treaty 
agreement, the second area pertains to finding shortcomings in the elements of hierarchy that do 
exist. When they are in place, hierarchical arrangements sometimes fail to deliver on their 
promises (United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization 2012). States have simply chosen 
not to prioritize the reporting process. As it is not legally required that they produce and share 
information on their forests, reporting agreements often go unfulfilled.  
 
1.2.2 Market Arrangements 
	  
Market-based governance has become a prominent alternative to hierarchical 
arrangements. With regard to forests, governance through market arrangements is based on the 
ability to shift toward more sustainable practices. In other words, particular goals can be 
achieved by changing practices based on consumer decisions. Participation in market-based 
arrangements is voluntary. Individuals and organizations can choose whether they want to take 
part. Sometimes, they can even negotiate the terms of their participation. Exchange between 
consumers and producers involves tradable units or currency, meaning that anyone can enter the 
scheme if they have, or can generate, the capital. The only requisite for participation is having 




centrally located. Because transactions are conducted on a voluntary basis, linkages between 
actors shift with changing circumstances and consumption patterns. 
In terms of feasibility, market-based architectures comprise realistic options that fit well 
in the global economy. Proponents argue that market-based governance works well because it 
operates outside the system of the very states that are often unwilling to make binding 
commitments (Cashore, Auld, and Newsom 2003; Cashore and Bernstein 2004). Certification 
programs for voluntary codes of conduct enhance market arrangements. These are flexible 
mechanisms that allow corporate entities to make changes in their business practices in a more 
uniform manner. Universal standards provide a backing statement, and can lend a strong sense of 
oversight that sustainability measures are followed. ISO 140001 is an example of a market-based 
standards program that allows corporations to voluntarily adhere to a set of practices deemed 
acceptable by an outside certifying body. 
Examples of market-based arrangements in the global forests regime complex. Earlier on 
in the development of the global forests regime complex, there were some important elements 
missing. The gaps included full valuation or forest goods and services, addressing the underlying 
causes of deforestation, and resolving the contentious relationship between trade and the 
environment (Humphreys 1999). Over time, a suite of new governance mechanisms has emerged 
to address these gaps. These market mechanisms range from certification schemes for 
sustainable forest management to carbon markets where forest management objectives can be 
achieved through the use of tradable carbon units.  
First, forest management certification schemes allow consumers to make decisions about 
the types of practices they will support with their purchasing decisions. Sustainably harvested 




timber was grown were sustainably managed. An example of a certification scheme is the 
labeling done by the Forests Stewardship Council (FSC). FSC certification has come to be 
known as the industry standard for sustainably harvested products. The management 
requirements sometimes go beyond what states call for, working around the state in a fashion 
that has been branded in its own right, “non-state market-driven governance” (Cashore and 
Bernstein 2004; Cashore 2002). Where states may not set forth guidelines, certification schemes 
accomplish their goals through voluntary means. Certification schemes depend upon consumers 
to make choices, sometimes to pay more for a certified product, to support sustainable 
management practices. 
 Second, carbon finance schemes can also have effects on forests. Efforts to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions include market arrangements that place monetary values on forest 
resources. Forests have the potential to store vast amounts of carbon through respiration. The 
link between carbon finance schemes and forest governance is made through the use of forests as 
carbon sinks. Carbon markets become instruments of forest governance when they put standards 
in place for how forests should be managed. Under parts of the REDD+, program, for example, 
credits are given for managing forests in ways that reduce emissions from deforestation (Phelps, 
Webb, and Agrawal 2010). More specifically, donor countries offer payments to countries for 
enhancing carbon stocks by protecting forests (Ibid). Payments for carbon storage can result in 
the maintenance of forested areas that may otherwise be threatened by development. In this 
sense, portions of the climate governance regime can have significant “co-benefits,” or 
unintended beneficial consequences (Brown, Seymour, and Peskett 2008). Carbon market 
schemes designed to address climate change can have significant effects on forest management 




In particular, expanding forested areas (afforestation and reforestation) has become an 
increasingly common approach to creating carbon credits (Peters-Stanley, Hamilton, and Yin 
2012). 
 Payments for ecosystem services (PES) programs are another market mechanism. By 
quantifying the benefits that are derived from forested ecosystems, PES programs provide 
incentives to conserve forest resources (Jack, Kousky, and Sims 2008). PES programs are made 
up of voluntary transactions where a defined ecosystem service is purchased by a buyer from a 
provider (Wunder 2005). In the case of forest governance, this usually has to do with land use 
decisions; for example, owners can receive payments for keeping their land forested. In some 
ways, PES accomplishes what formal policies do not. They allow for a more direct integration of 
scientific information with decision-making (Daily et al. 2009). This fits with what the “Coase 
Theorem” suggests: that property rights can initially be set by the state, but that optimal social 
outcomes are achieved through bargaining and trading (Muradian et al. 2010). This suggests that 
formal state regulation may not be the only or best channel for achieving forest outcomes.  
Critiques of market-based arrangements. Market arrangements are not without their 
flaws. First, they have been said to oversimplify forest management. Reducing forest 
management decisions to basic cost-benefit choices can overlook the intrinsic values of forests 
than cannot be measured in dollar amounts. Especially with regard to the climate change regime, 
this can be to the point of transforming trees into units of carbon. Market governance may 
advance the commodification of forests as tradable resources, viewing forests and the 
components in them as roughly equivalent despite differences in national context, ownership, or 




managed as tradable units that are separable from the communities of people who either depend 
on natural resources for their livelihoods or call forests home (Humphreys 2006).  
On a related note, market schemes may put certain groups at a disadvantage. The fact that 
poorer communities can be bypassed in these arrangements (Newell 2005) makes them 
questionable as universal or stand-alone solutions to the gap in hierarchical forest governance. 
Investigating market governance makes up an important area of inquiry, asking how non-state 
actors can come to be seen as authoritative governors. Taking this further, we can ask how these 
processes are legitimated (Auld and Gulbrandsen 2010); that is, we can look at whether market-
based governance can retain democratic qualities outside of the modes traditionally associated 
with the state. 
A shortcoming of market arrangements is that they may not be all that effective in 
stopping deforestation. The past has shown that market forces have failed to halt deforestation 
and often have the opposite effect. The growing demand for timber products, agricultural land, 
and space for human settlements has resulted in reduced forest cover (Humphreys 2006). The 
commodification of forests has troubling ethical and practical implications. For example, putting 
a price on forest resources can detract from their religious or spiritual values, separating 
resources from the communities in which they are embedded (Liverman 2004). Furthermore, 
PES arrangements for forests have been shown to be less effective than command and control 
arrangements (Handberg and Angelsen 2015). As an added challenge, only about ten percent of 
the world’s forests are privately owned, so even if market mechanisms were to work flawlessly, 
the effect might be small as private owners do not manage that large a portion of the world’s 





1.2.3 Networked Governance  
	  
In networked architectures, we see diffuse patterns of authority that overlap the public 
and private spheres. Networked governance is fundamentally different from hierarchies and 
markets because it has multiple centers of authority. It has been called “pluricentric” in contrast 
to the “multicentric” configuration found in markets or the “unicentric” form found in hierarchy 
(VanKersbergen and VanWaarden 2004). In this sense, it has become common to refer to a 
“horizontal” configuration of authority in networked governance. This brings multiple actors 
onto the same playing field.  
In terms of inclusion, networks offer civil society an entrée to decision-making processes 
that were previously under sole jurisdiction of the state. Because networked arrangements link up 
non-state actors in a common space, individuals are able to share information and strategies that 
also allow them to engage in more traditional modes of governing. Networked arrangements 
prompt states and international organizations to take the concerns of non-state actors seriously. 
They can be seen as an innovation in the face of the failures of state-led governance (Benner, 
Reinicke, and Witte 2004).  
Networked governance represents a significant shift from “hierarchical control to 
horizontal coordination” (Kenis and Schneider 1991, 15). This can also be thought of as a lateral 
pattern of exchange (Powell 1990), implying that authority patterns are flattened. This flattened 
landscape hosts flows of information and resources. Information and resources flow in multiple 
and overlapping directions across connections between individuals and organizations. These 
connections, or linkages, form the basis of the ability to do work under this mode of governance. 
Linkages between actors are often based on repeated interactions and are enhanced by the social 




collaboration. In terms of decision-making, these arrangements allow for more equal input from 
a diversity of interests. Wrapped up in this notion of trust is that it is shared across private and 
public actors (Gerlak and Heikkila 2006).  
Networked governance goes beyond bringing together the public and private sectors in 
partnerships. It fundamentally retools the configuration of authority, diffusing it over a wide 
swath of actors and scales, lending flexibility to address challenges where they arise. The diffuse 
configuration of authority allows for collaborative relationships to blossom. Markets offer the 
flexibility that comes with bringing diverse actors together, but it is not their strong suit to pursue 
longer-term goals. Networked governance is fundamentally different from hierarchies because it 
has multiple centers of authority. Networked governance, then, can be seen as a “middle way,” 
bringing together diverse actors and interests. 
Examples of networked governance in the global forests regime complex. After the Rio 
Summit, separate groups of states came together to adopt sets of Criteria and Indicators (C & I) 
for sustainable forest management. The first instance of this type of non-binding international 
agreements is the Montréal Process. In 1994, Canada drew together eleven other countries3 in 
order to develop a common mode of evaluating forest sustainability. Under the C & I model, 
sustainable forestry is defined using seven criteria that range from conserving biological 
diversity to maintaining and enhancing long-term multiple socio-economic benefits (National 
Report on Sustainable Forests: 2010, 1-4). There are nine other ongoing C & I processes, with 
more than 150 states participating alongside NGOs (FAO 2008). While the particular indicators 
vary based on forest type, the same general goal of reporting on sustainability across seven 
criteria remains. While it is generally a state-led process, C & I reporting depends upon the 
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contribution of local groups, international NGOs, universities, and other entities. It is a voluntary 
process that is driven by the desire to know more about the overall condition of forests rather 
than creating binding management protocols. In other words, it is about making information 
available, rather than requiring particular actions.  
The International Tropical Timber Trade Organization (ITTO) brought countries together 
in 1990 to set goals for sustainably managing the world’s tropical forests. The ITTO definition of 
sustainable forest management is built around a steady supply of forest products and services 
without placing undue strain on future production. The balance here is on meeting the needs of 
the forest product sector today without compromising these resources in the future. In order to 
achieve this aim, ITTO programs provide planning for tropical countries to be able to engage in 
logging that does not deplete entire forests, forest restoration, community management, fire 
prevention, and reporting on forest conditions (ITTO 2014). An evaluation in the year 2000 
found that while the ITTO member countries had made significant advances in forming and 
adopting policies that further the original aims, there was significantly less progress made in 
implementing them. Here it has become clear that the aims of the programs cannot be 
accomplished without the help of NGOs and local user groups.  
Place-based transboundary conservation is perhaps the newest example of networked 
forest governance. Networked governance at the landscape level represents both scaling up and 
scaling down. It is a move away from the global-level Forest Principles and far-reaching 
international agreements on sustainability reporting. It involves scaling up in that it asks smaller 
conservation efforts to gear their work toward the larger landscape level. The Roundtable on the 
Crown of the Continent (discussed in chapter three) is an example of place-based transboundary 




than one hundred participating organizations from the public and private sectors, the Crown 
Roundtable has built an impressive foundation for connecting a wide variety of interests in one 
of the most intact and pristine landscapes in Northern America (McKinney 2011b; Prato and 
Fagre 2007). As a “network of networks,” the Roundtable traverses various scales. On this 
landscape, smaller private groups such as the Blackfoot Challenge and the Water Matters Society 
of Alberta have already brought divergent interests together in their communities, and are now 
considering how their interests fit within the larger geographical, ecological and political scales.	  
Critiques of networked governance. Networked governance is flexible in that it does not 
require participants to adhere to a particular course of action. Also, needs can be addressed at 
various levels, depending on the particular problem at hand. In this sense, it provides flexibility 
in participation and scale. These are both important elements for addressing complex challenges 
in forest governance. However, networked governance has some drawbacks. First, while the 
voluntary nature of NG can draw in actors who may not otherwise participate in a transboundary 
process, this may prove too loose. The flexibility of networked governance can sometimes mean 
that actors will opt out if they feel that requirements become too stringent. It may not necessarily, 
then, be a strong suit of networked governance to pursue longer-term goals.  
The “pluricentricity” in NG hints that there may be some coordination congruent with the 
pursuit of broader, longer-term goals.4 However, because there are multiple centers of authority, 
it can be difficult to determine who is responsible when things go wrong. It can be unclear which 
of the various jurisdictional levels is the most appropriate for solving problems. As national, 
state/provincial, municipal, and private lands make up the varied ownership and management 
jurisdictions, the need to coordinate across borders is integral to governing at the ecosystem 
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level. While it is true these variegated ownership patterns pose management challenges; 
“jurisdictional fragmentation” makes for complications in that management at the landscape 
level requires cross-agency collaboration (Prato and Fagre 2010). 
 
1.3 Concluding Thoughts  
Hierarchical mechanisms and market mechanisms are prominent and still-evolving 
features of the global forest governance landscape; they will continue to be important for the 
forests regime. However, in the twenty years following the Rio Earth Summit, global forest 
governance arrangements have become more decentralized. Civil society has played an 
increasingly central role in carrying out these arrangements. Recognizing the rise of civil society 
is valuable, but it is also important to look at the patterns of organization in governance 
arrangements. Given the decentralized nature of the global forests regime complex, it is 
important that all actors are committed and engaged over the long run. If governance is about 
understanding the changing role of the state in the movement from hierarchical modes of 
organization to a “flatter,” informal networks of societal actors (Jordan 2008), this empirical 
work lends to our understanding of larger trends. As a process, networked governance draws 
actors in as governors, granting one another the authority to set directions rather than following 
pre-set guidelines.  As we observe shifts away from hierarchically ordered regimes (e.g. ozone 
depletion) governance may draw closer resemblance to the forestry regime complex, which is 
disaggregated and relies upon a blend of public and private actors along with a new 
configuration of authority.  
Networked architectures are becoming more common, but they are currently 




newer, there are a few gaps in our understanding about how it contributes to the larger global 
forest governance landscape. NG may provide a “third way” around the shortcomings in markets 
and hierarchies. Their advantages, coupled with the lack of a binding multilateral treaty on the 
management of forests, make them likely to become critical for the provision of forest 
governance. With this in mind, the dissertation fills a lacuna in the forest governance scholarship 
where it has tended to neglect networked governance. The remaining chapters in Part I present a 
framework for looking at networked forest governance, and lay out the background of the Crown 































CHAPTER TWO: The Promise and Pitfalls of Networked Forest Governance 
 
	  
2.1 Introduction  
In the multi-centric international system, networked governance is particularly 
noteworthy: Rosenau (2000, 229) notes, “While a number of dynamics have contributed to the 
diminution of state capacities, certainly one of the most important of these has been the shifting 
balance between hierarchical and network forms of organization, between vertical and horizontal 
flows of authority.” To understand networked governance, at a basic level, is to acknowledge the 
importance of civil society actors. As globalization has proceeded, it has become difficult for 
states to provide solutions for cross-border social and ecological challenges. The chapter presents 
a framework for understanding the ways that civil society takes part in governance.  
Beyond the inclusion of non-state actors, there are shifting dynamics surrounding 
authority. The networked governance framework acknowledges a fundamentally different logic 
of interaction, which is rooted in the fragmented nature of authority above and around states. In a 
globalized world, with no higher authority than the state, various sub-state and non-state actors 
have risen to the surface to fill functions that states are unable or unwilling to do. As an 
alternative to legally binding treaties, networked forest governance arrangements are informal 
and participation is voluntary. In the provision of forest governance, these networked 
arrangements provide a degree of flexibility that allows arrangements to adapt to the complexity 
inherent in forest management. 
 To conceptualize networked forest governance, the chapter first presents a definition of 
networks. Not all networks govern; networks as structures are different from the activity of 
networked governance. These discussions are then situated in the context of forest governance. I 




section covers how various literatures in political science have discussed precursor trends to 
networked governance, showing a progression in the literature from the inclusion of advocacy 
groups to seeing civil society as a vibrant component of governance. I then introduce the 
ontological assumptions of the study with an emphasis on the fit of a networked governance 
framework with a social constructivist approach.  
 The chapter concludes with an examination of the promise and pitfalls of networked 
forest governance. The promise lies in its potential to fill the gaps and shortcomings left by 
traditional governance arrangements. When we look at networked forest governance as an 
approach to managing complex social-ecological systems, we see that its flexibility lends to its 
overall adaptiveness. However, the same features that make it flexible and adaptive may 
complicate the democratic quality of the governance arrangements. The conclusion highlights 
complications specifically related to accountability and legitimacy. 
 
2.2 Conceptualizing Networked Forest Governance  
Networks are arrangements of connected entities. They consist of positions, or nodes, and 
links, also called ties. Nodes are the basic units or parts of the network, and the ties are the 
connections between them (Knoke and Yang 2008; Thorelli 1986). The network is a useful 
concept across disciplines: from thinking about living organisms on Earth as a large genetic 
network to the individual-level nervous system, or the World Wide Web with its pages linked to 
others (Barabasi and Albert 1999). Network research studies these entities and their linkages; for 
example, we might ask the number of constituent parts or how closely they are connected.  





In the social sciences, a network can be defined as a “set of actors connected by a set of 
ties” (Borgatti and Foster 2003; Parker 2007, 116). More specifically in political science, 
networks refer to “two or more organizations involved in long-term relationships” (Thorelli 
1986, 37). When we are looking at patterns of human organization, then, the components of 
networks are people and their relationships. Here, the nodes and links are individuals or 
organizations and the ways they are connected. Graphic displays are useful to show how people 
and communities are linked together. Surveys, interviews, and document analysis can be used to 
collect information about how actors are connected, with what frequency and for what purpose 
(Cross et al. 2009).5  
 
2.2.1 Not all Networks Govern: Distinguishing Networks from Networked Governance  
In pulling together public and private resources in a way that can mediate competing 
ecological needs with social demands (Connolly et al. 2014), networked governance is a mode of 
social steering in its own right. Steering in networks can be done through engaging in 
deliberative processes, setting common goals, and working toward outcomes. However, some 
networks are not designed or equipped to take on these tasks. For this reason, we can say that not 
all networks govern. We can think about the two as being a noun-verb pair, where “network” 
describes an entity and “networked governance” refers to a process.   
Looking at networks solely as structures fits with a reductionist ontology that views 
phenomena in terms of their constituent parts. However, under a networked governance 
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framework we are more interested in the qualities of these relationships.6 To borrow from the 
realm of computing, networks might represent the hardware while networked governance (NG) 
is more akin to the coding that forms the basis for how software programs work. Another 
metaphor is a highway system.  The basic network is the configuration of the roads. NG goes 
beyond the road network to look at the vehicles traveling on it. An NG approach would ask who 
has access, what types of vehicles they are driving, where people can go, and what entrances 
and/or exits are or are not available. In other words, the NG framework pays attention to the 
underlying interactions that are taking place and the way that authority is configured.  
Networked governance can be defined as “multiple actors, often spanning sectors and 
scale, working together to influence the creation, implementation, and monitoring of public 
policies” (Koliba, Meek, and Zia 2010, 85). It is generally made up of informal arrangements: 
various stakeholders are linked together in a way that is collaborative rather than hierarchical. In 
the Crown Roundtable, which is presented in more detail in chapter three, a variety of actors 
come together from the public and private sector to create and set goals for conservation on the 
landscape. These goals are carried out in on-the-ground projects funded by the Roundtable, in the 
work done by individual organizations, and by the members that return to their agencies. In this 
way, the Roundtable engages in governance activities. 
Networked governance represents more than the arrangement or configuration of actors. 
A governance network is defined as “a more or less formal association whose members retain 
their independence of action while agreeing to work together on common enterprises that 
produce collective goods” (Ansell, Sondorp, and Stevens 2012). This notion can be scaled up 
beyond the domestic level. A global governance network is “a network whose members come 
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from (but do not necessarily represent) different nations or are themselves transnational 
institutions” (Ansell, Sondorp, and Stevens 2012). Here we add the component of working across 
borders, but still with the acknowledgement that governance, or steering, is taking place. Table 
2.1 separates the concept of networks from networked governance, highlighting some of the 
differences and illustrating that not all networks are designed to govern. 
 
Table 2.1 Parsing the Differences between Networks and Networked Governance.	  
 Networks Networked Governance 
Ontological units  Organizational structure, individuals 
or groups as fundamental units 
Logic of order, ordering principles 
Focus of inquiry; modes of 
investigating 
Structure; Ties between entities, 
accountability patterns 
Process and pattern; Basis of 
legitimacy, potential to be 
democratically accountable, “good 
governance” 
Key axioms/postulates Organizations can accomplish more 
when they work together; the whole 
is greater than the sum of its parts  
Spheres of authority; multiple and 
overlapping centers of authority 
create complex, interdependent webs 
Research methods Organizational mapping, 
quantitative survey, social network 
analysis 
Qualitative interviews, focus groups, 
participant observation, social 
network analysis 
 
Despite its built-in flexibility, networked governance requires a certain degree of 
coordination and planning. It is more than the constellation of actors in a network. Governance 
involves “authoritatively allocating resources and exercising control and coordination” (Rhodes 
1996, 653). Networked governance by definition implies that some sort of steering or control is 
taking place (Kooiman 2003; Peters and Pierre 1998). In other words, it is not enough for a 
network to simply exist on its own. Its participants must be actively engaged in the process of 
vision setting, shaping behaviors, and accomplishing goals. Networked governance can be 
viewed along “a continuum of systems of governing in which state and non-state actors can play 





policy-making process at both the strategic and operational levels” (Bulkeley 2005; Klenk et al. 
2013, 162).  
The type of steering in NG is different than in other forms of governance. Formal 
arrangements, or binding treaties at the international level, are not the only sources of order 
(Fierke 2010; Onuf 2013; Onuf and Klink 1989; Risse 2004; Rosenau 2002). Membership in 
governance networks spans beyond political officials. Non-state entities, formerly conceived of 
as “the governed,” can become governors themselves (Avant, Finnemore, and Sell 2010). In 
tandem with the recognition of the importance of non-state actors is the acknowledgement that 
information, norms, identities, and discourse constitute rules of behavior. These multiple forms 
of authority, as much as the actors themselves,7 matter a great deal (Andonova, Betsill, and 
Bulkeley 2009). NG is not simply a constellation of actors, but the spaces in which they interact 
and the patterns of their relationships.  
 
2.2.2 Networked Forest Governance 
Norms, identities, and the configuration of authority are important components in terms 
of forest management, making NG a suitable framework for evaluating elements of the forest 
governance regime that are often overlooked. Borrowing elements from the broader literature on 
networked governance, we can define networked forest governance. Networked forest 
governance is built upon the lateral linkages across a multiplicity of actors—state agencies, 
NGOs, citizen advocacy groups, and national governments, among others—that hinge on norms 
of trust and a shared purpose and identity, for the purpose of making decisions or informing 
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decision-making procedures. Transnational forest governance is inherently multi-level and 
focuses on the “nexus” approach to resource conservation, linking multiple ecosystem 
components into one mode of governance. In other words, networked forest governance is 
concerned with more than trees; it also addresses broader land use concerns, water quantity and 
quality, extractive energy practices, and patterns of agricultural production (Hoff et al. 2012).  
 
2.3 Networked Governance in Political Science  
 Discussions in political science have built toward networked governance in various ways. 
While it most clearly emerged as a focus in international relations in the early 1990s with the rise 
of constructivism, the theoretical roots of the networked governance approach can be found in 
other literatures in political science. Precursor approaches embraced the complexity in policy 
formation. They proposed the state does not stand apart from civil society; non-state groups play 
an important role in governance. Scholars of comparative politics, for example, used the 
language of corporatism to show how interest groups become governing agents by linking up 
with the state to design and implement policy (Schattschneider 1975). Systems-based approaches 
attempted to integrate interest groups into the policy process, without making society an external 
variable. In more recent comparative politics scholarship, the state-in-society approach, 
articulated by Joel Migdal acknowledges its debt to earlier scholars’ willingness to embrace 
complexity and pushes us closer toward the networked governance framework with its references 
to public-private ties and even transboundary linkages. The blurring of the line between the 
public and the private is noteworthy, as it is in this space that new mechanisms (e.g. social 
relationships) are built. Migdal (2003, 6) asserts that social relationships create “a strong 




Other literatures also consider the ways public and private actors are linked. NG is 
addressed in policy and public administration work. Kooiman (2003, 105) mentions the 
following approaches: competitive pluralism, state corporatism, group sub-government, 
corporate pluralism, iron triangles, sector corporatism, issue networks, and policy communities. 
These precursor approaches share skepticism of rational choice, suggesting that statism, 
structuralism, and neorealism do not embrace the contingent and contextual nature of social and 
political interactions. In the pursuit of parsimony, these older approaches render analyses 
incapable of accurately depicting outcomes, without providing space for a concern or capacity to 
change them.  
 Under the rubric of “new” governance,8 the state has been split into “a collection of inter-
organizational networks made up of governmental and societal actors with no sovereign actor 
able to steer or regulate” (Rhodes 1996, 57). These models reflect the shift away from a singular 
notion of bureaucracy, hierarchically organized with a centralized system of rule, toward multi-
actor, decentralized modes of governing. NG goes a step beyond recognizing multiple actors in 
the provision of global governance to recommend a shift away from central rule in “favor of 
local actors” (Kooiman 2003, 105). In the domestic policy literature, as is in global governance, 
multi-actor governance tends to operate in tandem with decentralization.  
The roots of the NG framework are also found in public organization theory. One of the 
earlier concepts is the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) set out by Paul Sabatier (1988). 
Under this framework, civil society and the state come together in coalitions to pursue 
governance goals (McGuire 2006). Coalitions have been important in forest management in the 
United States and Canada. The ACF highlights the importance of strategically engaging the state. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




Activist groups cannot achieve their policy aims without being careful about the messaging they 
use or the demands they make of public officials. For example, the Quincy Library Group in 
California was initially successful in framing its goals on fire control (S. Pralle 2006), but 
ultimately failed because it codified too strictly what was supposed to be a localized 
collaborative process (Davis and King 2000). In British Columbia, by contrast, activist groups 
were more successful in slowing timber overharvest because they built a coalition from a broad 
base of sectors spanning local, regional, and international governance levels (S. Pralle 2006). 
ACF brings attention to how civil groups can significantly affect management decisions.   
An NG framework builds from here, going further in its attention to patterns of authority. 
Beyond seeing the state as a target for activists’ strategies, NG pays attention to the configuration 
of authority, particularly with regard to the changing nature of the relationship between state and 
society. Instead of coalitions acting upon agencies or elected officials, in a NG scheme, they are 
equal players in visioning and goal setting. There is a wide range of configurations in the ways 
authority is shared between public and private actors (Moore and Koontz 2003).  
Just as collaborative governance at the state and local level can link up jurisdictions that 
would not be otherwise required to work together, international multi-level governance can link 
up sub-state actors in the absence of a binding treaty or agreement (e.g. forest certification 
schemes). Joachim Blatter (2003, 519) calls this a “more collaborative relationship between the 
state and civil society.” Likewise, Migdal, though he does not explicitly refer to networks, 
implies that the state is inseparable from society. To parse out some of these similarities and 
differences, Table 2.2 on the next page offers a list of related literatures, their primary 





Table 2.2 Literatures that Overlap with Networked Governance. 
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(Börzel and Risse 
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In the 1990s, discussions of the interconnectedness between the state, society, and 
interest groups shifted to more specifically refer to network organization. For “new governance” 
and organizational theory, NG meant: a select, persistent, and structured set of autonomous firms 
(as well as non-profit agencies) engaged in creating products or services based on implicit and 
open-ended contracts to adapt to environmental contingencies and to coordinate and safe-guard  
exchanges. These contracts are socially, but not legally, binding (Jones et al. 1997, 914). In this 





The precursor approaches carefully consider the overlap of the public and private sector 
in meeting social needs. Social-ecological systems approaches also have a focus on both the 
public and private interest, but also bring in ecological concerns. The various strands share a 
desire to embrace the messiness, or complexity, inherent in the challenges behind steering. This 
is especially true when it comes to making decisions about ecological systems. 
 
2.4 Ontological Assumptions  
A networked governance approach fits with constructivist approaches to international 
relations. Constructivists tend to consider the role of individual choice; bound up in this are the 
perceptions that people hold about the choices they make. This basic assumption about the world 
and how choices are made is a fundamental component of NG. We can separate approaches 
based upon those that take structures as driving features of politics from those that more closely 
consider agency and individual choice. An NG approach is structural to the extent that it pays 
attention to patterns or configurations of authority. However, it pays closer attention to the 
agency that individuals and groups exercise in making choices about their interactions and 
relationships. Instead of seeing actors as similar units, reducible to a set of pre-determined 
interests, NG sees individuals as uniquely part of and enmeshed within their social context.  
The constructivist ontology, or its assumptions about the world and the units it comprises, 
is fundamentally social. That is, individuals and states cannot be separated from the context 
within which they are situated. Individuals understand their surroundings in terms of how they 
relate to the people and processes around them. There are a couple of important components for 
consideration here: (1) a recognition that individuals are the fundamental units of world affairs 
and (2) individuals’ behavior is shaped by the identities, norms, and ideas they hold and finally 




constituted”) and do not exist independently of them (Onuf 2013; Onuf and Klink 1989; Wendt 
1995). 
Individuals shape transnational spaces just as much, and perhaps more so, than states 
(Fierke 2010). Furthermore, if we disaggregate states, we see that they are comprised of many 
sub-units: legislatures, agencies, and courts. These sub-state units have an effect on governance. 
Unpacking these units further we see that individuals’ behaviors and perceptions shape 
organizational outcomes, whether public or private (or on the border somewhere in between). 
One of the most significant turns in international relations theory was the recognition that 
individuals matter, even at the international level. States are not the solid, impermeable units of 
international affairs. The oversimplification and reductionism inherent in realist-rationalist 
storylines cuts a story short, implying states will not agree to environmental cooperation because 
it would limit the pursuit of their own interests (Fearon and Wendt 2002). However, this has not 
been the case in forest governance (Humphreys 2009). Sub-state and non-state entities form 
networks to share information and resources, ultimately binding together in a way that results in 
meaningful change.  
A relational ontology eschews the notion that material interests drive international 
interactions. If states were only concerned about their material interests, many developments in 
the 20th century may not have come about (Hopf 1998). We would likely not have seen the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, or the creation of the International Criminal 
Court, to name a few examples. Ideational forces impart a lasting impact on international  
politics: ideas about what constitutes what is acceptable, moral, or desirable for a group’s well-





Ideational forces that shape norms and identity are not created in a vacuum; they are 
often contingent on others’ perceptions of what is right and wrong. Ontologically, constructivism 
challenges the rationalist focus on individuals (humans and/or states) as self-interested, survival-
seeking, and imbued with a set of preferences from the start. In that sense, politics is “a world of 
our making” (Onuf and Klink 1989). Furthermore, “It is not that actors are totally free to choose 
their circumstances, but rather that they make choices in the process of interacting with others 
and, as a result, bring historically, culturally, and politically distinct ‘realities’ into being” 
(Fierke 2010, 180).  
For these reasons, we can say that an NG approach, first and foremost, sees interactions 
between individuals as fundamental units. Individuals, rather than states, are the important actors 
in world affairs. Beyond this, the approach acknowledges that individuals’ behaviors are shaped 
by the identities, norms, and ideas they hold. Last, the framework is consistent with the view that 
these ideational elements come out of interactions that actors have with each other and do not 
exist independently of them. All of this hinges on a fundamental worldview that individuals and 
ideas matter.  
 
2.5 The Promise of Networked Forest Governance: Flexibility and Adaptiveness to Address 
Complexity  
	  
Flexible and adaptive arrangements are part of developing a more effective response to 
global forest degradation.9 This is where the promise of networked governance lies. Governance 
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would also cross borders. As shown in chapter one, the interplay amongst institutions designed to address other 
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have changed dramatically in the past twenty years and continue to co-evolve (O’Neill et al. 2013). Ideally, these 





networks for Huppe, Creech, and Knoblauch (2012) are a part of a trend toward a new type of 
governance altogether. “Transition governance” represents a fundamental shift toward multi-
actor, multi-sector arrangements that are designed to address complex problems (Loorbach, 
Franttzeskaki, and Thissen 2011). This shift means that multiple actors are included, with 
multiples types of knowledge, across many scales (Berkes et al. 2003; Lebel et al. 2006) 
Before even considering competing social demands and changing ecological conditions, 
forest management is complex on its own. Consistent with a social-ecological systems approach, 
an NG analysis differs from one that would study a social or ecological system alone (Folke, 
Hahn, and Olsson 2005). It considers many broader land use concerns beyond timber extraction, 
such as the protection of wildlife, water quality, aquatic species, spiritual values, non-timber 
products, and even energy development, among others. The social demands and pressures placed 
on forest managers and users are often tied to a wide variety of other issue areas. 
In addition to the complexity inherent in forest management, there are other factors to 
consider. Rather than developing detailed knowledge of the smaller parts, a social-ecological 
systems approach seeks to improve our understanding of the dynamics of the larger system 
(Folke, Hahn, and Olsson 2005). First, as with other social-ecological systems, forests are tied to 
and affected by multiple social systems (Anderies, Janssen, and Ostrom 2004). The social 
demands placed on a system from these various sources may complement each other, they may 
compete, or they may conflict. Governance, then, needs to address the complexity that stems 
from social systems. This is the first impact identified in the upper left portion of Figure 2.1. 
Second, complexity also implicates ongoing change and uncertainty (Armitage et al. 
2009). Ecosystems change continually and the conditions under which certain elements can 




ecological conditions is subject to a degree of uncertainty. With regard to our knowledge of 
ecosystems, new information can lead to change, action, and learning (Nelson, Adger, and 
Brown 2007). Coupling these components of complexity, change (in the ecological systems) and 
uncertainty (in our knowledge about them) has been referred to as “interlocking complexity” 
(Olsson, Folke, and Berkes 2004). This is the second impact identified in the lower left portion 





Figure 2.1. Flexibility in Networked Governance is an Adaptive 
 Response to the Complexity Inherent in Forest Management. 
 
The complexity inherent in forest management, coupled with competing social demands 
and the new knowledge emerging about ecosystems calls for adaptive systems of governance. 
Networked arrangements are well-suited to address complexity in transnational forest 
management. Scholars have called for multi-level governance solutions that work across 
organizational and ecological levels (Andonova and Mitchell 2010), multiple and diverse actor 




2012). In similar language, Gupta et al. (2010) state that the “unstructured” nature of problems 
embedded in social-ecological systems requires a variety of actors, discourses, and solutions.  
In global forest management, I argue that systems are adaptive to the extent that they are 
flexible. Networked forest governance is promising in being able to adjust and respond to 
changes.10 Its sources of flexibility are found in being able to adjust to changing needs, through 
decentralized authority, and also in being able to respond to multiple demands by empowering 
civil society actors to fill gaps left by states. Civil society plays a key role in providing 
information and generating the knowledge required for policy learning. In order to reach the full 
potential of civic engagement, governance networks need to move away from stricter rules and 
negotiated power relationships toward open patterns of communication (Castells 2008). In its 
flexibility, networked governance provides the space for creativity (Folke, Hahn, and Olsson 
2005). The ability to adjust to changing conditions and needs is a key component in adaptive 
governance (Armitage, Marschke, and Plummer 2008; Gupta et al. 2010).  
To the degree that NG is flexible, then, it is adaptive. Flexibility entails adjusting to 
social needs and changing ecological conditions (or our new knowledge about them). The 
capacity to adjust involves responding to a need as it is recognized. In other words, knowledge is 
shifted into an actionable response (Lebel et al. 2006). Responsiveness is enhanced with civic 
engagement in governing social-ecological systems (Connolly et al. 2014). In the forest context, 
civil society fills governance gaps left by states, suggesting that more direct public involvement 
is required (Cashore and Bernstein 2004; Klenk et al. 2013). The connection between flexibility 
and adaptiveness is rooted in an arrangement’s ability to respond to changing social demands and 
ecological needs and adjust accordingly. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 In fact, some suggest NG may be the only way to deal with the tensions related to the dynamics of globalization 




The NG, social-ecological systems, and adaptive governance literatures share much in 
common, including a focus on learning, or being “reflexive” (Armitage, Marschke, and Plummer 
2008; Dryzek 2014). Though there are slight variations, learning is generally defined in the 
adaptive governance literature as sharing experiences, reflecting upon them, and changing 
management practices to be more effective (Armitage, Marschke, and Plummer 2008). Being 
able to learn in the context of uncertainty is what allows systems to adapt (Gunderson and 
Holling 2001). In considerations of networked governance, the notion of reflexivity closely 
mirrors learning. Reflexivity implies that there is a process of self-examination looking at the 
consequences of various courses of action (Dryzek 2012). Linking the NG and social-ecological 
systems literatures allows us to see the governance network as a complex social-ecological 
system capable of making adjustments.  
This suggests that the informal nature of networks provides a good backdrop for the type 
of adjustments that are required to facilitate learning processes (Pahl-Wostl 2009). Bringing in 
civil society is integral, because it introduces contesting and competing discourses that prompt 
reflection (Dryzek 2012). Flexible networked processes accommodate the inherent value in new 
ideas, and in trying new practices. A certain degree of experimentation and failure allows a 
process to adjust management practices toward success. Learning-by-doing has been recognized 
as a valuable component of governance for sustainability (Loorbach 2007). Reflexivity, or 
learning, then, is an important benefit of the flexibility built into NG as it allows for adjusting 
and learning from mistakes, ideally repeating successes and avoiding failures.  
Opening up the arena of actors not only introduces new ideas, but also allows for faster 
response to problems. Devolving authority to the local level has been shown to result in the 




needs (Dupuits 2014). Decentralization and the devolution of authority go hand-in-hand, linking 
forest users more directly in with decision-making processes (Berkes 2010; Monditoka 2011). 
New actors from civil society often step in to fill in for the formal oversight role of the state. 
Being a part of a governing network can be attractive to individuals and organizations for 
many reasons. By pooling resources, governance networks are appealing because they allow 
actors to achieve more together than they can alone. They also allow actors to pursue their goals 
without binding them to specific set of actions. Their flexibility offers a voluntary basis for 
participation. Even when they are not required to participate, smaller, local-level community 
groups often recognize they can accomplish more when they are linked together (Agrawal et al. 
2008; Dupuits 2014; Monditoka 2011). A major advantage of working together is the ability to 
respond to changing conditions. Responsiveness has received recent attention as an integral 
component of flexibility (Connolly et al. 2014). The promise of networked governance lies in its 
ability to pull from various sectors, drawing on the strengths of the public and private sectors. To 
a large extent, the involvement of civil society has bolstered the ability of governance 
arrangements to fill the gaps left by a lack of international binding agreement surrounding the 
management of forest resources.  
Placing forest governance in the transnational context is a complex undertaking that 
involves bringing in many actors across multiple sectors. When groups link up across borders in 
transboundary forest conservation arrangements, they create multiple centers of authority. As 
part of the collaborative process, decisionmaking authority is shared between state, federal 
agencies, other landowners, and private groups. These arrangements are generally seen as 
flexible and adaptive. Spreading authority between sectors and across scales is a promising 





2.6 The Pitfalls of Networked Forest Governance  
	  
While networked forest governance is generally viewed as a promising development, 
there are some areas of concern. For some, the inclusion of civil society is seen in instrumental 
terms, insofar as it is a vehicle to achieve multi-lateral agreements or to put pressure on states to 
cooperate in formal treaty arrangements where they may not have done so before (Bernauer, 
Bohmelt, and Koubi 2013). If we view it this way, NG is not a permanent solution. Others worry 
that a more insidious plot is playing out, that drawing upon private actors leads to closed-door, 
clubbish behavior that shuts out traditional forms of political oversight, threatening the potential 
for democratic governance (Falk 2005; Slaughter 2004).   
Going in either direction, scaling governance up or down changes the location of 
decision-making, and also who makes the decisions and whom they affect. First, considering the 
global-to-local implications, when institutions designed to address global problems are scaled 
back to the local level, it can become unclear how local resource users can or will respond to a 
consideration of broader needs. In forest governance, there have been many calls for more direct 
participation, particularly of local communities (Bixler and Taylor 2012; Pagdee et al. 2006). 
However, it is not always clear that local communities are equipped to consider needs beyond 
their own jurisdictions. For example, they may be susceptible to the whims of market influences 
when it comes to selling forest products (McCarthy 2005) or converting lands toward shifting 
production needs (Lambin, Geist, and Lepers 2003), rather than taking into account dynamic 
landscape-level concerns that happen on a larger scale (Dramstad and Fjellstad 2011). 
Going in the other direction, it is also important to ask whom the affected public is when 
scaling governance up. There has been a call for considering the local-to-global implications of 




one another (Mason 2005). Others consider whether arrangements that cross borders can be 
considered democratic. John Dryzek (1999, 30) poses the question, “...globalization means that 
important issues increasingly elude the control of nation-states. Can democracy follow this 
migration of issues, problems, strategies, and solutions into transnational society?” In other 
words, if problems cross borders is it also possible that transboundary governance can adequately 
respond? Is there a unified population, to begin with, that recognizes itself as tied together? 
Additionally, this line of inquiry also asks whether it is possible to achieve broad participation 
across borders. 
In addressing complicated challenges related to forest management, governance 
arrangements can become quite complex. While the primary challenge might pertain to dealing 
with the natural resource issues involved in forest management, secondary challenges related to 
governance emerge. The arrangements we design to address complexity in the natural world 
become quite cumbersome themselves. Questions surrounding the rule-making authority of non-
state actors in NG, have arisen in the past decade as a ‘second-generation’ of theoretical 
investigation (Sørensen and Torfing 2005). Now that it is widely recognized that partnerships 
between public and private actors are an important part of governance, we are moving toward a 
more critical evaluation of their potential to be part of a fully functioning democracy. 
	  
2.6.1 Critiquing Legitimacy in Networked Governance  
Legitimacy is defined as “the acceptance and justification of shared rule by a 
community” (Bernstein 2004, 142). A system of governance becomes legitimate when authority 
is perceived as appropriate. That is to say, an arrangement is accepted by those affected because 




2010). The two components, acceptance and validity, bring together elements of what is and 
what should be. The notion builds from a baseline examination of whether a system of rule is 
accepted toward looking at whether it should be accepted and the basis for its acceptance. 
To date, legitimacy in global environmental governance has been challenged when it 
does not include non-state actors. Habermas (2008) explains that technical problems can be 
addressed in systems of coordinating, information exchange, consultation and control across 
borders. However, when it comes to fully engaging in transnational governance of complex 
environmental problems, the nation-state lags behind. International processes can fail to achieve 
legitimacy because they are made up of states, rather than individuals, as members. In other 
words, they do not engage citizens at the global level, and governments have failed to respond to 
the challenges of globalization (Bernstein 2004; Zürn 2004).  
However, in decentralized networked forest governance, a new set of critiques comes into 
play. Legitimacy in networked forest governance can be complicated by a mismatch of social 
and ecological scales. This can place limits on its problem-solving effectiveness (Börzel and 
Risse 2002). The validity of a set of rules is dependent on a correct fit between the ecological 
problems and social solutions designed to address them. Networked forest governance retains 
individual jurisdictions. When local institutions evade the enforcement of formal rights 
guaranteed at higher levels of government, their legitimacy can be called into question on the 
basis of broader-level larger landscape scale concerns (Anderies, Janssen, and Ostrom 2004).  
While social actors in civil society do link up across borders, at the end of the day, the 
arrangements are not legally binding across the entire landscape. When scales do not match up, a 
governance network faces challenges when it lacks the problem-solving capacity to address the 




Beyond limitations in problem-solving capacity, past work in decentralized systems has 
demonstrated challenges related to opt-out. Between actions taken at the local and federal levels, 
there is the broader problem of venue-shopping and other strategic behaviors (Baumgartner and 
Jones 1991; Pralle 2003). Any party can leave the network. As a result, legitimacy is also called 
into question when a process is not representative and inclusive of multiple stakeholders 
(Bäckstrand 2006a). Private actors at the sub-state level are not held to the same standards as 
state actors and their participation is voluntary. Voluntary compliance is an important component 
of a process’ legitimacy (Paavola 2007). Therefore, legitimacy can be problematic when affected 
communities opt out of an arrangement because they do not accept it as an appropriate form of 
governance. Finally, because networked forest governance relies on informal forms of 
accountability, participants may call an arrangement’s authority into question when rules are not 
monitored or enforced (Anderies, Janssen, and Ostrom 2004). However, as shown in the analysis 
in chapter six, the legitimacy challenge is a false problem. Opt-out is not an obstacle because 
participants genuinely want to be involved in the Roundtable. Furthermore, its rule-making 
authority is not called into question because the governed are drawn into the Roundtable as 
governors and participants, co-creating the rules along the way. This is discussed more in chapter 
four. 
 
2.6.2 Critiquing Accountability in Networked Governance  
Accountability relates to an arrangement’s ability to connect those making decisions to 
those who are affected by the decisions. The sanctions for aberrant behavior can vary from 
formal to informal. On the more legalistic end of the spectrum, accountability is defined as a 




other end of the spectrum, in informal arrangements it is viewed as the ability to opt-out or exit 
an on a voluntary basis (Hirschman 1970). In a formal setting, it is about redress and 
compensation when a wrong is incurred; at the informal end, it is more about social rewards. In 
any case, accountability is a two-way construct that relates the responsiveness of governors to 
the expression of demands from the governed.  
In networked governance, political jurisdictions remain intact. The logic implies 
individual organizations, agencies, and private landowners retain ultimate decision-making 
control. When authority is decentralized, how can the affected populations hold others 
responsible for harm? If environmental degradation in one location is caused by entities in 
another political jurisdiction, how can these negative effects be remediated without higher 
oversight? 
In the context of forest governance, control is located at smaller scales with individuals as 
members of governance networks. In these instances, civil society often makes decisions about 
how forests are managed. By filling gaps left by states, non-state actors, including civil society 
and market-based actors alike, have carved themselves a niche as an authoritative source of 
governance (Bernstein 2004; Betsill and Bulkeley 2006; Cashore, Auld, and Newsom 2003). 
These non-state actors often operate at the more local level, drawing authority downward 
(Agrawal et al. 2008; Monditoka 2011). In forest governance, non-state actors tend to be 
associated with informal behaviors, often forming protest coalitions to express their disapproval 
of existing institutions (Reinecke et al. 2014). Shifting the focus of global forest governance 
away from treaties and legal agreements toward local community based control tends to go hand 





independence” apart from regulation and formal planning processes and their members are not 
overseen by their agencies or constituencies (Folke, Hahn, and Olsson 2005). 
There are some potential drawbacks from separating a governance process from formal 
mechanisms for oversight. When considering accountability, two related and interlinked 
dimensions of NG are important: decentralization and the involvement of non-state actors. In 
NG, accountability is complicated because the scale of the problem can be detached from its 
solution. The problem, originating from the ecological system, may bound a larger area while the 
solution, stemming from the linked social system, may be confined to a smaller area. In NG, 
political jurisdictions remain intact. Borders are not removed. In fact, the process of working 
around formal political channels can reify these borders, as they continue to operate in a separate 
arena. If the mechanisms for oversight are informal, civil society continues to operate outside 
and around the state.  
Drawing localized actors into governance is not a value-free process. In a decentralized 
global forest regime complex, linkages between civil society and other actors are central to the 
governing process. In forest management, in particular, it is possible for local actors to become 
focused on their own concerns to the extent they may not take outside interests into full 
consideration (Monditoka 2011). When authority is drawn downward, it is uncertain whether 
local actors are able to link up their decisions with concerns outside their communities. In other 
words, NG leaves communities and sub-jurisdictions open to make their own decisions apart 







2.7 Concluding Thoughts 
	  
Sustainable development is “not a destination, but a dynamic process of adaptation, 
learning, and action” (United Nations Secretary General’s High-Level Panel on Global 
Sustainability 2012). As such, governance practices have shifted accordingly. Networked forest 
governance is an emergent pattern to address the challenges of sustainability.11 Faced with 
problems of forest degradation, resulting from destructive patterns of human organization, the 
challenge is to develop a collective vision rather than reifying our differences. Patterns of human 
organization can alter and destroy the planet, but can also reorganize and rectify the damage. Is 
NG the “middle way” out when neither market based actions or government regulations will 
suffice? 
As a process, NG is flexible. It does not impose particular endpoints or outcomes. Rather, 
it considers a variety of interests and is based on an inclusive process. As a form of organization 
that brings together a variety of actors, it fundamentally restructures the relationship between the 
“governed” and the “governors” (Avant, Finnemore, and Sell 2010). This is a complicated 
undertaking. For some, the inclusion of civil society is only seen in instrumental terms, insofar as 
it is a vehicle to achieve multi-lateral agreements or to put pressure on states to cooperate in 
formal treaty arrangements where they may not have done so before (Bernauer, Bohmelt, and 
Koubi 2013). Some worry that a more insidious plot is playing out, that NG leads to closed-door, 
club behavior that shuts out the potential for democratic governance (Falk 2005; Slaughter 
2004).  
For others, these challenges are not insurmountable; NG is an ideal governing solution 
because it combines the “voluntary energy and legitimacy of the civil society sector with the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  





financial muscle and interest of businesses and the enforcement and rule-making power and 
coordination and capacity-building skills of states and international organizations” (Huppé, 
Creech, and Knoblauch 2012, 2). Others echo this optimism that bringing non-governmental 
actors and informal rule-making together can be an appropriate and effective mode of governing 
(Bäckstrand 2006b; Cashore and Bernstein 2004; Streck 2002). 
In sum, the components of NG that make it flexible and adaptive may complicate the 
democratic quality of the governance arrangements, particularly when it comes to the rule-
making authority of non-state actors. These challenges are real and should be considered 
carefully, but do not negate the possibility that NG can be democratic. The following chapter 
presents the case of the Crown Roundtable and its development. This history provides context 
and an introduction into an instance of NG. Chapter four expands upon the puzzles related to 
legitimacy and accountability in governance, exploring the theoretical background of each 


















3.1 Introduction  
	  
A major challenge in environmental governance stems from the mismatch between the 
interconnectedness of ecological problems and the fragmentation of institutions to address them. 
Siloed institutional arrangements are not well suited to address complex challenges related to 
sustainability. Some of the problems in sustainable forest management today include combating 
deforestation, contamination of waterways as a result of mining operations, lack of wilderness 
designation for wildlife habitat connectivity and growing pressures related to energy 
development. These concerns cross national borders, and require comprehensive approaches that 
stitch many jurisdictions together.  
The chapter introduces the case of Crown of the Continent and its governance network, 
the Crown Roundtable. It details the social-ecological system, the background on the Roundtable 
on the Crown of the Continent, including prior conservation efforts, and the basic layout of the 
landscape on which it is located. Having a case background helps us move from theories of 
networked governance to examining the specific challenges of accountability and legitimacy in 
networked governance. The chapter sets up the backdrop for the analyses presented in chapters 
five and six.  
First, the following section presents the research questions, covers the study design, the 
merits of a case study approach for addressing the research questions, and the reasons for 
selecting the Crown Roundtable case. Next, the methods section provides a general overview for 
how the data were collected and analyzed for the project. More specific information regarding 




In the fourth section, the Crown of the Continent landscape is introduced as a social-
ecological system, with foci on the Waterton-Glacier International Peace Park and Biosphere 
Reserve and the political and organizational context for building the Crown Roundtable 
initiative. In the next sections, I examine the Crown Roundtable in more detail, looking at why it 
was created, its membership and activities. I conclude with a discussion of how the case 
illustrates the advantages of networked governance for sustainable forest management. 
 
3.2 Case Study Research Design  
The study contributes to our current knowledge about global forest governance by 
focusing on an emerging suite of mechanisms designed to address the lack of an overarching 
treaty. As shown in chapter one, networked arrangements are under-studied. This research 
focuses on networked forest governance for multiple reasons. To begin, it advances our 
understanding of how networked forest governance arrangements fill gaps left by an absence of a 
hierarchical, legally binding treaty regarding forest management. Furthermore, it enhances our 
knowledge of whether and how networked forest governance can maintain democratic qualities 
of accountability and legitimacy, two components that are sometimes lacking in the market-
based arrangements that have cropped up in the absence of a treaty.  
The project investigates several sets of questions. Specifically, what are the ways in 
which actors hold each other accountable in the Roundtable on the Crown of the Continent (the 
Crown Roundtable) social network? Subsequently, how has the process come to be accepted as a 
legitimate mode of governing? The analysis helps us better understand how networked forest 







3.2.1 A Case Study Approach to Studying Networked Forest Governance  
  
The case study approach fits the questions and also the type of evidence available; it is a 
realistic approach with particular advantages. To begin, the case study method is well suited to 
explore the research questions, as it allows for induction and theory building. Accountability is 
somewhat tenuous in the transboundary context, so network analysis can help highlight some of 
the social linkages that stand in place of legal agreements. On the other hand, it is important to 
consider more nuanced features of these interactions that network data cannot accommodate. The 
investigation of legitimacy, in particular, lends itself to qualitative methods that are more 
attentive to context, space, time, and can be situated with a unique sense of place.   
Additionally, since not much is known about networked architectures, in terms of how 
they operate or their implications,12 the case study approach is realistic. It is not possible to 
conduct a large-n statistical analysis, as it would require a large population of existing cases and 
a body of theory. Given the lack of attention to the dimensions of networked forest governance 
and the small number of instances, an inductive, qualitative case-study approach is fitting. The 








	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




Table 3.1 The Dimensions of the Case Study Approach. 
Dimensions of the Case Study Reasoning 
Advantages  - Suits the types of research question 
-Allows for induction and theory building 
-Provides a high degree of conceptual validity 
Limitations: A Realistic Approach -Networked forest governance is under-studied 
-Large-n study is not possible 
-Fills a gap where there is little consideration of the 
governance implications in existing work 
Type of Case Study: Building Block -Inductive: moves from facts to theory 
-Makes contingent (rather than overarching) 
generalizations 
-Lends to institutional design recommendations  
 
Case study research is advantageous when a high level of conceptual validity is required 
(George and Bennett 2005). Accurate description sometimes requires very particular language, to 
the point where it describes only one instance of a phenomenon. In these cases, there is a high 
degree of validity, but a lower degree of generalizability. This approach is useful when it is 
difficult to find universal definitions of the concepts under examination. A focus on 
accountability, for example, can vary quite a bit. Sometimes accountability refers to monitoring, 
justification of actions/decisions, and punishment for non-compliance (Schedler 1999); other 
times it refers to moral and legal responsibilities (Mason 2005). Some have called it the 
“continual correction of mistakes” (Scholte 2004) or “answerability” (Mason 2005). Determining 
what accountability means in terms of transnational NG requires a more nuanced consideration 
than can be built into a single variable. Legitimacy is also a contested concept. In some 
instances, it refers to the acceptance of authority (an empirical component) and in other instances 
it is used in reference to the justification of such authority (the normative component) (Bernstein 
2004). The case study allows for an investigation of these competing or overlapping definitions.  
Furthermore, it is a realistic approach. A suitable global-level dataset does not exist on 
networked forest governance, nor would it be desirable, as much of the contextual richness 




these lines, Blatter and Haverland (2012, 6) point out, “Case studies are superior to large-n 
studies in helping the researcher to understand the perceptions and motivations of important 
actors and to trace the processes by which these cognitive factors form and change.” This is 
particularly true for examining context-dependent, theoretically rich, and sometimes contested 
concepts like accountability and legitimacy.  
Case studies have the ability to lend to theory development, both in terms of hypothesis 
testing, and also in discovering new trends. The case study is more exploratory in nature for a 
couple of reasons: more knowledge is needed about how networked governance structures 
actually play out in practice, and it is also important to consider the potential pitfalls. Existing 
research on networked forest governance tends to focus on its benefits (flexibility and 
adaptiveness), without critically examining potential flaws or challenges. For example, past 
studies have shown that decentralized forest governance benefits from increased linkages 
between different governance actors (Andersson 2004), or that multi-spatial interactions have a 
positive impact on forest outcomes (Ros-Tonen, Hombergh, and Zoomers 2007), but more work 
is needed to examine the potential for these arrangements to meet certain standards of democratic 
governance. The investigation presents novel insights into the inner workings of networked 
forest processes. 
The case study approach goes beyond “hypothesis testing,” or confirming or discrediting 
existing theory, and moves toward induction. Induction allows for generating insights on a newer 
phenomenon not covered by existing theory. The single case study carefully considers the 
dynamics within a single setting (Eisenhardt 1989). Starting from observations, the qualitative 
case study approach moves toward making “contingent” generalizations rather than running 




tentative statements about how an overarching phenomenon might take place, based on 
observation of a particular instance (George and Bennett 2005). The project does not add to a 
dataset or sample that is already in existence. In this sense, the approach is in line with the view 
that cases are more important “for their value in clarifying previously obscure theoretical 
relationships than for providing an additional observation” (McKeown 2004). From case studies, 
it is possible to draw conclusions about a particular class or subtype of instances (Berg 2004). 
The “building block” case study design is part of a newer generation of qualitative research that 
differs from earlier case study models sometimes referred to as disciplined configurative cases, 
theory testing cases, or plausibility probes (Eckstein 2000; George and Bennett 2005; Lijphart 
1971). These earlier case methods share a focus on uncovering underlying patterns of causality, 
but it would be problematic in the instance of networked forest governance to use this narrow 
focus.  
There is general agreement that, especially over the past twenty years, the multi-layered 
blend of public and private governance is a staying trend. It is not particularly relevant at this 
point to look at why networked governance architectures have emerged. Instead, it is more 
pressing to consider what the trending shift toward networked arrangements means for the 
provision of forest governance. The “building block” case study method allows for a better 
understanding of the implications of the move toward networked governance. George and 
Bennett (2005, 76) explain, “‘Building Block’ studies of particular types or subtypes of a 
phenomenon identify common patterns or serve a particular kind of heuristic purpose. These 
studies can be component parts of larger contingent generalizations and typological theories.” 
Because the case study at hand is a building block for a new way of understanding forest 




strong suit of case studies furthering theoretical development by starting from observations 
(George and Bennett 2005). In this sense, the Roundtable on the Crown of the Continent case is a 
building block to better understand the dimensions of networked forest governance.  
 
 
3.2.2 A Case Study on the Roundtable on the Crown of the Continent  
 
The case selection criteria in qualitative research differ from those in statistical research. 
When looking at phenomena with large numbers of examples it is possible to run statistical 
models, with the aim of determining overarching trends. As an alternative method, case studies 
allow researchers to look at new and emerging trends with fewer instances (Bennett and Elman 
2006). Choosing a case from a smaller pool presents certain challenges. The population of 
existing cases is a limiting factor from the outset (Eisenhardt 1989).  
The selection process for this project began with a consideration of sites where 
transboundary forest conservation is taking place. Coupled with increasing cross-border 
interactions, the rise in protected area designation provides an avenue to represent conservation 
discourses in a tangible way. The United Nations Education, Scientific, and Cultural 
Organization (UNESCO) World Heritage Sites program recognizes world-class locations with 
cultural and ecological significance. Many of them cross state borders, and some of them cover 
forested landscapes. Table 3.2 highlights where the transboundary forested World Heritage Sites 
are located, their size, and whether there is a conservation network in place. From the list of 
World Heritage Sites, those that crossed international boundaries, protected natural (rather than 
cultural) resources, and forested ecosystems were selected.13 This initial survey of sites reveals 
that while some conservation networks are in place, the Crown Roundtable is the only instance 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 There are currently 1007 World Heritage Sites. 197 are classified as “Natural Properties,” 13 of them are transboundary, and 9 




of networked governance arrangement. Recalling from the previous chapter, networked 
governance goes beyond merely having a network in place.  
Table 3.2 Forested UNESCO Transboundary Natural Heritage Sites. 
Site Countries Forest type(s) Size Independent Conservation Network 
or Networked Governance 
Arrangement in Place? 








Not current. Temporary Bialowieza 
Forest - Ecological Network Pilot 
Project was formerly in place for 18 
months ending in 2006. 







750,000 ha Not current. Sangha River 
Conservation Network (by Yale 
University Council on African Studies) 
was in place in 2003. 
Kluane / Wrangell-












No. International Union for 
Conservation of Nature maintains 










457,614 ha Yes. The Roundtable on the Crown of 











570,045 ha Not at this time. The Darwin Initiative 
network was formed in 2006 and 
concluded in 2011; the archives are 
held at a local museum.14 The Nature 
Conservancy hosts a network for 
tourism development, species 
protection, and payments for 
ecosystem services. 









18,000 ha Not at this time. Fauna and Flora 
International and U.S. Agency for 
International Development co-
sponsored a study to examine 
collaborative relationships between 
agencies, NGOs, and others involved 
in conservation.15 
Primeval Beech 
Forests of the 
Carpathians and 
the Ancient Beech 







62,403 ha Not currently, but there is a need. The 
Centre for Biological Diversity hosted 
a trinational working group to 
determine the state of the beech forests 
in 2011.16  




3,207 ha Somewhat. An association of museums 
(which lobbied for the WHS 
designation) has been in place since 
2001. 17 
   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 More information on the Darwin Initiative is available at: http://www.inbio.ac.cr/pila-darwin/ 
15 “Cross-sectoral parnerships for conservation, sustainable management and improved livelihoods at the Nimba Biosphere 
Reserve, Republic of Guinea.” Report available at: www.fauna-flora.org. 
16 More information is available in a presentation at: http://www.cbd.int/doc/meetings/ecr/cbwecr-2014-06/other/cbwecr-2014-
06-presentation-01-en.pdf.  




 In thinking about its potential contribution, it was also important to anticipate the 
reliability of the case in the context of the theoretical framework. In other words, thinking about 
the implications of the study’s findings, required considering how the case speaks back to the 
theory on networked governance. The Crown Roundtable provides a reliable background to 
investigate how networked governance arrangements may be adaptive in the face of the 
complexity inherent in forest management. Situated on a landscape that is home to the first 
international peace park, the Crown Roundtable is a unique case of networked forest governance. 
Out of 1,007 World Heritage Sites,18 96 are classified as forested (Patry, Bassett, and Leclerq 
2005). Eight of these sites cross national borders. Worldwide, the Crown Roundtable it is one of 
only a few instances of transboundary forest conservation. Furthermore, in the context of 
transboundary forest conservation sites with networked arrangements in place, it stands apart in 
scope and scale.  
 
 
3.3 Methods  
 
In order to more closely connect with and examine the Roundtable case, the first phase of 
fieldwork involved travelling to Fernie, British Columbia for the 3rd annual Crown Roundtable 
Conference in September 2012. I also spent two weeks conducting interviews with various 
agency representatives, foundation members, tribal leaders, and civil society organizations. 
Preliminarily, an interview list was based on purposive sampling (Jackson, Lee, and Sommers 
2004; Tashakkori and Teddlie 1998) from the Crown Roundtable’s leadership team. These 
individuals represented tribes, state-level natural resource agencies, U.S. Forest Service, a 
manager’s partnership, an education consortium, a geo-tourism council, and various private 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




conservation organizations. Connecting with people in leadership roles led to a snowball 
sampling of those in less-visible roles or those who may have weaker ties with the network 
(Granovetter 1973). This sampling strategy has also been called chain sampling because each 
individual has the potential to connect the researcher with new interviewees (Tashakkori and 
Teddlie 1998). Research on other instances of forest governance has shown that connecting with 
those in less visible roles can help uncover new information that might not show up in a 
sampling of those who are in regular contact with each other (Jackson, Lee, and Sommers 2004). 
Mixed methods, or “eclectic” qualitative approaches are well suited for investigating 
networked governance because they allow researchers to go beyond looking at networks as 
structures toward seeing them more akin to actors (Kahler 2009). Figure 3.1 below depicts the 
modes of analysis and the broader conceptual aims for each of the data collection strategies. 
Investigating accountability was done with surveys. The concept hinges on the relationships 
between individuals in the network; therefore, the social network survey is best situated to gather 
the data to examine these questions. On the other hand, because legitimacy has more to do with 
the perceived “fit” of governance and the moral right to make rules, it is difficult to access 
without additional qualitative data. Here, the information gleaned from semi-structured, longer 
interviews was integral. Participant observation was also important. Being involved in the 





Figure 3.1 Data Collection Strategy and Corresponding Modes of Analysis. 
 
 
3.3.1 Interviews and Participant Observation 
	  
For examining questions surrounding legitimacy, I used interviews and participant 
observation to gather information on perceptions related to acceptance, participation and identity. 
In the aim of understanding the social constitution of the network, the interviews were centered 
on how actors understand their involvement with the process and their relationships with other 
conservation practitioners. The questions were also meant to give interviewees the chance to 
speak to how they understand their role vis-à-vis the larger landscape and other organizations. In 
particular, because legitimacy depends on the perceived appropriateness of a particular set of 
rules, it was important to speak candidly with conservation practitioners. The open-ended nature 
of questions in semi-structured interviews gives the opportunity to identify new ways of seeing 
and understanding (Cohen and Crabtree 2006). The informal nature of the interviews made it 
possible to uncover perceptions and attitudes that are not gauged in the network survey.  




— How do individuals and organizations navigate the complexities of transboundary and 
multi-level governance? What are the roles of the various sectors: government, market, 
and civil society? How do these roles link actors up across the landscape? Ultimately, do 
these linkages seem to result in a move toward achieving accountability?19  
— Has a common landscape-level identity coalesced around the Crown ecosystem and if so, 
how? What factors play a part in the selection of appropriate conservation scale, and is 
there a relationship between scale and identity? If an actor only identifies with a small 
watershed or forest ecosystem, is there still potential for “scaling up” in order to 
collaborate with other units? 
 
The questions above provide a sample of some of the elements addressed in both my semi-
structured interviews and through participation in the Roundtable processes. The fact that the 
Roundtable brings together many divergent interests was both a challenge and an opportunity. It 
made it more complicated to craft a single interview schedule. Participant observation provided a 
way to triangulate the parts of the themes that did not lend themselves easily to interviews.  
 Participant observation was conducted at the third annual conference held in Fernie, 
British Columbia in September 2012. As a research method, it requires immersion as a 
participant in the “social world” of study (Marshall and Rossman 2010). I registered as an 
attendee and signed up for all of the events including panel presentations, breakout discussion 
sessions, field visits, and social gatherings. Additionally, I provided a benefactor sponsorship 
through my Center for Collaborative Conservation fieldwork grant. The Roundtable sessions 
were opportunities to take part in discussions about ongoing issues, ask questions, and observe 
presentations and dialogue. The conference organizers were interested in sharing the project with 
participants and put time on the agenda for me to introduce the network survey and to talk about 
the broader aims of the research. This paved the way for hallway conversations where 
participants shared their experiences, asked about the Center for Collaborative Conservation, the 
research, or the specifics of the social network survey.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 The survey questionnaire, written and online, was designed to create a visual representation of accountability 




The longer, in-depth interviews, field note voice memoranda, and portions of audio 
recordings from Roundtable panels and breakout sessions were transcribed. This produced 105 
pages of transcripts (about 52,000 words) from more than 25 hours of audio files. These 
materials were analyzed using Microsoft Office and QSR NVivo software. Coding involved 
setting up categories that point to participants’ understandings of their roles; the pervasive norms 
in the network; and how the identities of participants, their organizations, and the larger network 
have evolved across the landscape. More detailed description of the narrative analysis is 
presented in chapter six. 
 
3.3.2 Survey Questionnaire 
  
The survey portion of the research was conducted at the fourth annual Roundtable 
meeting in a paper form with a follow-up online survey. Surveys and questionnaires are widely 
accepted methods for gathering network data; they allow researchers to access information on 
relationships and connections without an imposing time commitment from individuals (Scott and 
Carrington 2011).  
At the 2012 Annual Conference for the Roundtable on the Crown of the Continent, a 
survey questionnaire was distributed in the registration packet. Twenty-one surveys were 










Table 3.3 A Selection of Prompts from the SNA Survey Questionnaire. 
 
Prompt Response Choices 
Please indicate how long your organization has been 




-More than three years 
What natural resources do you manage, use, or aim to 
conserve? Check all that apply.  
-Forests: wildlife habitat 
-Forests: timber production 
-Forests: fuels reduction/fire management 
-Forests: carbon sequestration 
-Forests: other 
-Agricultural land use: ranching 
-Agricultural land use: crop production 
-Agricultural land use: carbon sequestration 
-Agricultural land use: other 
-Wildlife: game management 
-Wildlife: biodiversity conservation 
-Wildlife: protection of trust species 
-Wildlife: other 
-Aquatic species and habitat: water quality 




-Recreation and tourism 




-Climate change or other landscape stressors 
-Multiple use management 
-Other 
Please list four individuals you are most likely to 
contact when you need help with a resource 
management problem and indicate how frequently you 
communicate by placing a number next to the 
individual’s name. 
(1) More than once per week 
(2) Weekly 
(3) Monthly 
(4) Less than once per month 
 
Examples: 
Bob Jones, 3 
Sharon Smith, 1 
 
The survey asked for information regarding relationships and frequency of contact 
between conservation practitioners from the public and private sectors on the Crown landscape. 
A sample of the survey questions is listed in Table 3.3. The survey was approved by the 
University’s Institutional Review Board in the fall of 2012 and subsequently renewed for another 








3.4 The Crown of the Continent as a Social-Ecological System 
 
The Crown of the Continent ecosystem extends over a 16,873 square mile area through 
Northwestern Montana, Southeastern British Columbia and Southwestern Alberta. It is home to 
the Waterton-Glacier International Peace Park, tribal lands, and designated wilderness areas 
(Prato and Fagre 2010). National, state/provincial, municipal, and private lands make up the 
varied ownership and management jurisdictions. Public lands comprise 83% of the Crown of the 
Continent Ecosystem. The landscape is managed for multiple uses, including recreation, 
biodiversity, water supply, timber extraction, and fish and wildlife habitat.  
Situated in the transition zone between continental and maritime climatic zones, forest 
cover types include Pacific interior rainforests and Boreal forests (Bay et al. 2010). Other 
ecotypes are alpine tundra and prairie savanna (Ibid). There are high levels of biodiversity, 
including 1200 species of vascular plants, more than 300 bird species, and 65 mammal species 
(Legault 2011). The landscape is home to a diverse host of wildlife, including a full complement 
of native carnivores. Carnivore species include grizzly bears, lynx, marten, wolverine, and 
wolves (Weaver 2001). Prey species include moose, elk, and white-tailed deer (Ibid). The 
transboundary Flathead River basin is especially key for providing high-quality, lower-elevation 
riparian habitat for these predator and prey species, as well as aquatic life (Hauer and Sexton 
2013). Figure 3.2 shows the boundaries of the landscape with park designation in green and an 






Figure 3.2 The Boundaries of the Crown of the Continent Landscape. 
 
The ecological context is favorable for conservation because the Crown of the Continent 
is home to one of the world’s most intact ecosystems. In addition to hosting diverse wildlife, 
measures of forest health indicate highly functioning ecosystems. While deforestation continues 
apace in the surrounding areas, forest cover within the Crown is plentiful. Figure 3.2 depicts 
forest cover, with the red patches indicating a net loss from the year 2000 to 2012. The patch of 








Figure 3.3 Forest extent change from 2000-2012 (Hansen et al. 2013).  
 
 
3.4.1 The Waterton-Glacier International Peace Park and Biosphere Reserve  
	  
Waterton-Glacier was the world’s first international peace park, established in 1932. 
Along a peaceful border, the space was set aside as a symbol of peace rather than an area 
designated to reduce conflict (Tanner et al. 2007). Borders are intended to maintain order, but 
they can also cause social conflict when they separate communities and natural systems. 
Transboundary protected areas can decrease these tensions. International peace parks are 
protected areas with a legal framework for protecting transboundary ecosystems. They promote 
adaptive management and better ecological outcomes. Especially when they involve local 
communities, transboundary protected areas have been shown to promote better conservation 
outcomes (Agrawal 2000). Their benefits go beyond protecting ecosystems. They have been 
shown to reduce conflict (Ali 2014). By fostering and sustaining interactions across borders, they 
increase cooperation (Brock 1991).  
The Waterton-Glacier Biosphere Reserve, which is part of the United Nations’ 
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization’s (UNESCO) Man and Biosphere Program, is 




economic development, and maintaining cultural values (Waterton Biosphere Reserve 2012). 
UNESCO recognizes that while the term ‘reserve’ indicates that it is “a special area recognized 
for balancing conservation with sustainable use,” the land is not completely exempt from human 
impacts (Ibid). In other words, communities are not prohibited from using biosphere reserve 
spaces for resource development or other non-extractive purposes. There are three designation 
zones: core, buffer, and transition which delineate core legally protected areas (whether they are 
publicly or privately owned), from contiguous buffer zone areas that are appropriate for forest 
and vegetation management, experimental research, and even agriculture and ranching. 
Transition zones are also called “areas of cooperation” in that they comprise the larger area 




3.4.2 The Political Context  
 
The political context is a bit more varied. Constitutionally, the two federal systems have 
some important differences. According to a political scientist who has lived and worked in both 
the US and Canada,21 in Canada “good government is a constitutional value,” hinting that the 
Canadian constitution predisposes it to a larger degree than the U.S., toward communitarian 
governance. Seymour Martin Lipset (1986) noted that Canadians tend to be more collectively 
oriented than Americans; additional value differences include Canadians being more law-
abiding, more elitist, and more particularistic (more group oriented). For Lipset, these differences 
spring from the founding of the United States, which was largely shaped by the American 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 In its own interpretation of the Biosphere zoning, the Waterton Biosphere Reserve Association offers that transition zones are 
where “the local communities, conservation agencies, scientists, civil associations, cultural groups, businesses, and other 
stakeholders agree to work together to manage and use the area…in a way that will benefit the people who live there” (Waterton 
Biosphere Reserve 2012). 
21 Michael Hawes, director of the Canadian Fulbright Program also points to there being no private universities, and that health 




Revolution and the accompanying attitudes expressed in the Declaration of Independence. 
Classically liberal Lockean notions of the self as a worthy individual are woven throughout 
American founding documents.  
 Alternately, in the Canadian context, Lipset claimed there is more of an emphasis on 
conservatism, in the European sense, that emphasizes the principles of noblessse oblige, or the 
notion that those in positions of power are obligated to serve their country. For Americans, this 
seemed too similar to British colonial rule by royalty. The differences, then, suggest a higher 
degree of public critique for authority in the U.S., which in turn means that comparatively, 
Canada may have developed into a stronger state in terms of providing for domestic welfare. The 
language in the Canadian Constitution seems to support this notion that public policy is less 
about public choice and is more in line with European models, which focus less on individual 
rights and roles (Lipset 1986). This fits with the communitarian philosophies of Taylor, Hegel, 
and others, in its recognition that individuals are embedded in and defined by their communities. 
Interview data reveal a few insights on the differences between the United States and 
Canada. Elaborating on frustrations surrounding what she saw as the BC government’s economic 
capture by American interests, a small-scale community organization member told me, “The 
Canadian political environment is not as progressive as you might think.” She was particularly 
referring to frustration with the provincial government’s lack of support for setting aside park 
designation in the Glacier-Waterton complex that would protect wildlife corridors. This is in line 
with another interviewee, an Albertan provincial who remarked, “the government of Alberta has 
not set down and said yes we will help you with the transboundary regional plan and we will 
formally cooperate with Montana and BC in developing that plan.” From the local level to the 




interviewee said that, “the political process is so much different in Canada than it is in the United 
States and Canadian politicians respond so much differently to pressure than American 
politicians do.” These sentiments seem to indicate that overly general claims about Canada 
having a more communitarian environment, or one that fosters cooperation within larger political 
units, might simply not be true today.22  
 
3.4.3 The Organizational Context and Prior Conservation Initiatives  
 
The Roundtable is not the first transboundary conservation initiative on the Crown 
landscape. To understand how the Roundtable came about, it is useful to look at the conservation 
efforts that came before. Some of them have come and gone, but the membership overlaps. A 
few of the same people I met who were involved with transboundary efforts in the 1980s are still 
involved today. As organizations have come and gone, many of the people involved in 
conservation have remained. While the Roundtable may be made up of some of the same 
individuals who were members of previous initiatives, the organizational itself is quite unique. 
The Crown Roundtable is special in that it is a network of organizations that already function as 
smaller networks themselves. Figure 3.4 below highlights some of the sub-regional initiatives 
that are involved in the Roundtable.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 In fact, decades after Lipset’s general claims about Canadian political culture, empirical research based on 
environmental outcomes rather than attitudes showed that the U.S. regulatory model allowed the Toxics Release 






Figure 3.4 Sub-Regional Initiatives in the Crown Roundtable  
(Courtesy of the Crown Managers Partnership).  
 
 
The membership on the Roundtable leadership team is also reflective of the tendency to draw 
from a variety of high-functioning networks. Because the Roundtable brings together smaller 
groups and sub-regional networks, it is worth looking at the longer and varied history of some of 
these initiatives.  
To situate the Roundtable on the Crown of the Continent, it is helpful to understand the 
progression in governance initiatives across the landscape. The Crown region, much like others, 
reflected trends in the 1990s related to ecosystem management, which recast environmental 
issues in social, economic and political terms (Clark 1993; Grumbine 1997; Pedynowski 2003). 
The rise of the ecosystem management model corresponds with the emergence of initiatives in 
the Crown region. Ecosystem management approaches tied in with the international peace park 
movement in that it built in a consideration of bridging management approaches for a wide set of 
issue areas across mixed political jurisdictions (Stefanik 2009). As technocratic resource 




began to crop up across the landscape. There are a number of them worth mentioning. In some 
ways they share similarities with the Roundtable, and in other ways they are different.  
The first major Crown-wide initiative is a forum led by educators to inform a general 
audience about the bioregion. Since 1994, the Crown of the Continent Ecosystem Education 
Consortium (COCEEC) has worked on landscape-wide concerns in the public education system 
to increase awareness about issues. According to one interviewee,  
COCEEC is mostly about education. I used to go to their board meetings pretty regularly 
for a while, for about a year or two and it’s great. They’ve really been able to get the 
concept, the Crown of the Continent, into the curriculum, and it really elevated 
conservation education within public education, which is great. 
 
It is largely an informational forum, linking outdoor educators with NGO leaders, agency 
representatives and the general public. It took on projects from lesson plan development to 
offering a mini-grant program for funding citizen science and restoration projects. One of its 
more well-known products is a borderless bioregion map, designed to highlight the 
connectedness of the landscape. The map, pictured below in Figure 3.5, is a mosaic woven 
together from satellite images; these images depict mountain ranges, lakes, and other natural 






Figure 3.5 Bioregional Borderless Map, Courtesy of COCEEC.23 
 
 
While the map above indicates that the eco-region is fairly contiguous, and many regard it as 
“ecologically cohesive” (Darrow et al 1990; Stanford and Ellis 2002), there are indeed many 
jurisdictional boundaries super-imposed upon the landscape. In fact, the Crown of the Continent 
Ecosystem includes at least seventeen public lands jurisdictions amongst two federal 
governments, two provinces (Canada), one state (U.S.), and the tribal entities on both sides 
(Pedynowski 2003). Table 3.4 below lists some of the other major Crown-wide initiatives, with 
brief comments on their founding, purpose, and current membership. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




Table 3.4 Crown of the Continent Ecosystem (COCE) 












Educators, NGOs, and 
agency representatives 
Raise local, regional, and global 
awareness about the Crown ecosystem; 
“foster concern and voluntary action;” 
create and provide curriculum materials 
Educators, 









Faculty and students from 
the Environmental Studies 
Program at the University 
of Montana; 
Environmental Design at 
the University of Calgary; 
Miistakis Instiute at the 
University of Calgary 
Provides support through the Henry P. 
Kendall program for research, also 
fosters “the knowledge and skills 
necessary to manage environmental 
issues across domestic and international 
boundaries” (through an intensive course 




Canada and the 
United States  
Crown Managers 
Partnership, 2001 
Roughly 20 land 
management agencies in 
Montana, British 
Columbia, and Alberta 
Created as an inter-agency forum and 
voluntary partnership to “build common 
awareness of Crown interests and issues, 
shape relationships, and identify 
collaborative and complementary tasks 
that various participating jurisdictions 
can pursue.” 




Crown of the Continent 
Geotourism Council, 2007 
 
National Geographic 




information-sharing network. Provides 
information about the Crown of the 
Continent region for visitors and 
residents “to understand, appreciate, and 
help preserve its geographic character, 
including historical, cultural and 
environmental heritage.” 









Roundtable on Crown of 
the Continent, 2008 
The Center for Natural 
Resources and 
Environment Policy 
(CNREP) at The 
University of Montana 
and the Lincoln Institute 
of Land Policy 
“Provide a multi-stakeholder forum to 
exchange ideas, build relationships, 
identify shared values and interests, and 
facilitate working relationships. In 
addition to organizing periodic forums 
and workshops, CNREP and LILP will 
convene an annual conference beginning 
in 2010, and has taken the first steps to 
convene policy leaders representing the 
major jurisdictions within the Crown of 
the Continent to create a national pilot 






Crown of the Continent 
Conservation Initiative, 
2009 
ConserveMontana.org -“articulate and advance a long-term 
conservation vision for the 
Crown...while supporting sustainable 
and vibrant regional communities.” 
-Achieve “comprehensive and 
collaborative conservation strategies in 
four key areas: climate science, policy 
framework, communication/outreach, 
and capacity building. Climate change is 
the overarching them of the CCCI.” 
steering 
committee of 15 
organizations in 







3.4 The Crown Roundtable  
 
Cross border flows of natural resources necessitate an integrated management response. 
There are no obvious ecological markers of the border between the US and Canada and very few 
indicators that there is a political separation, even though it is the world’s longest between two 
countries (Stefanik 2009). The interconnectedness of the Crown landscape lends itself well to a 
phrase invoked at the beginning of the Roundtable meeting: “Where no border can be seen, no 
border should exist.” The Roundtable was created explicitly with the goal of more closely 
connecting people and organizations across the already very connected landscape. Various 
pressures and intensifying concerns include barriers for migratory wildlife, increasing 
recreational use, and international conflicts over resource industry activities in the Crown of the 
Continent landscape (Pedynowski 2003) contributed to the need for ecosystem-wide, large-
landscape scale cooperation.	  	   
The Crown Roundtable was formed to facilitate working relationships between 
individuals, groups, and organizations to match the interconnectedness of the landscape. The 
goal of the Roundtable is to build a community around pressing conservation issues in the 
region. It is a “network of networks” that links individuals and organizations across borders. Two 
major contributing factors led to its creation: a recognition that there were already groups and 
individuals working on cross-border conservation issues and a desire of public land managers to 
engage in outreach with tribes and non-governmental groups.  
Agency representatives had formed their own group, the Crown Manager’s Partnership,  
in 2001. The Manager’s Partnership is a self-proclaimed “coalition of the willing”24 that brought 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 This is how a National Parks Service representative referred to the Roundtable during an interview. A coalition of 





together individuals from various agencies including U.S. National Parks Service; Alberta 
Tourism, Parks, and Recreation; the University of Montana; the University of Calgary; Flathead 
Lake Biological Station; U.S. Fish and Wildlife; and the U.S. Forest Service. However, several 
years later, some of the members of the leadership team recognized the need to bring in civil 
society.  
Crown Roundtable activities first began in 2006 as a survey project at the University of 
Montana’s Center for Natural Resources and Environmental Policy where graduate students 
created an inventory of formal and informal conservation initiatives in the Crown region 
(Roundtable on the Crown of the Continent 2014). In 2007, the Crown Manager’s Partnership 
(CMP), recognizing a need to reach out to conservation groups, recreation organizations, and 
citizens at large, commissioned a communications plan for building and improving these 
working relationships. The report outlines pressing issues in the region, existing collaborative 
work, and opportunities for improving collaboration (Communication Strategy for the Crown 
Managers Partnership 2007). 
Later in 2007, in a separate event, the Center for Natural Resources and Environmental 
Policy at the University of Montana and the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy brought together 
more than one hundred participants in Whitefish, Montana, to identify common conservation 
issues. After this initial gathering, smaller groups of recognized regional leaders met to explore 
the idea of connecting existing efforts in a roundtable format. During this exploratory phase, 
these leaders met in Kalispell, Montana and in field visits with Tribes and First Nations in 
Pincher Creek, Alberta. The Center for Natural Resources and Environmental Policy (CNREP) 
led the process of bringing individuals and organizations together. The CNREP provided the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
coalition of the willing can include any and all entities who want to make progress from the municipal to the federal 




institutional home base for the effort, with staff and a committed group of graduate students. In 
the initial phases, the group created a website, along with a regional map and GIS data layers. 
In 2010, the Center for Large Landscape Conservation was invited to co-direct the 
Roundtable. The first annual conference was held in Waterton, Alberta. From the inception, the 
Roundtable’s creators identified the idea of serving as a “laboratory” for transboundary 
cooperation and using social networks to work toward conservation goals. Today, the 
Roundtable brings together over 100 actors from government agencies, NGOs, tribal groups, and 
place-based partnerships and spans eight regional initiatives aimed at various aspects of 
transboundary conservation, education, and geotourism.  
In many ways, it is a “network of networks,” designed to “test new forms of governance.” 
Individuals, representing their particular agency or organization, are encouraged to attend 
conferences (there have been five so far, in 2010 through 2014) and workshops in order to “think 
regionally, but to act at whatever scale makes sense” (“Roundtable on the Crown of the 
Continent” 2011). This flexibility allows members of public agencies to participate without 
overstepping boundaries related to their own agencies’ missions and mandates.  
Because the Roundtable grew out of academia, it had the potential from the start to be 
innovative. Universities are increasingly acting as catalysts for landscape scale conservation 
initiatives. They are well-suited to do the work because it requires a high level of coordination 
and integration across many scientific disciplines (Levitt and Woodley 2014). Built by people 
who study collaborative governance, in some ways it was pre-disposed to be successful, as it 
could benefit from the lessons learned from landscape scale collaboration in other areas. 
However, in other ways, the Roundtable was created with very specific interests in mind. While 




particular course of action (Barnett and Duvall 2005), setting up the Roundtable required 
bringing in outside funders including philanthropic donors who may have their own agendas 
(Himmelstein 1997). The initial grants came from the Kresge Foundation, the Center for Large 
Landscape Conservation, and the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy. These private foundations 
invest in philanthropic and conservation efforts across the U.S. and are based in other locations 
and states. For example, the Kresge Foundation is located in Detroit and generally focuses on 
urban development projects and the Lincoln Institute is based in Cambridge, Massachusetts. 
While they may have self-stated non-profit missions, these organizations must still answer to 
their donors at the end of the day. It is important to be cognizant of who the initial members and 
donors were and why they become involved.   
 
 
3.4.1 The Membership of the Crown Roundtable  
 
The Roundtable’s membership is varied and diverse. It includes representatives from 
tribal and first nation communities, local businesses, tourist organizations, universities, industry, 
and others. Members became involved in the Roundtable for a variety of reasons. An individual 
who worked for the National Parks Conservation Association (NPCA) played a big part in the 
creation of the Roundtable. He told me that he felt it was important to participate in 
transboundary initiatives because they foster the relationships and sense of trust that are 
necessary to achieve conservation objectives across borders. For him, it was important to work 
beyond the Waterton-Glacier International Peace Park into the broader Crown landscape. For 
others, being a part of the Roundtable offered the change to link up their grass-roots conservation 
efforts with other towns, offering the chance to learn about best management practices for 




found it helpful to join the Roundtable to tap into reporting and citizen science initiatives around 
aquatic invasive species like the zebra mussel. Just as the reasons to become involved are diverse, 
so are the members.  
Whether looking at the general membership list in the spring of 2012 or the list of 
participants in the fall 2012 annual conference, it is clear that the Roundtable draws heavily on 
civil society membership. As tables 3.5 and 3.6 show below, civil society organizations form the 
largest portion of the membership at about 40%.  
Table 3.5 Crown Roundtable Conference Participants by Organization Type,  
Separated out by U.S. and Canada. 
US National NGO 15 
US Regional NGO 9 
US Local NGO 6 
US General Public 7 
US Educational Institution 17 
US Tribal 3 
US Economic Development, Private Business 7 
US Federal Public Agency 2 
US State Public Agency 2 
US Local Public Agency 0 
Canada National NGO 4 
Canada Regional NGO 10 
Canada Local NGO 0 
Canada General Public 5 
Canada Educational Institution 5 
Canada Tribal 4 
Canada Economic Development, Private Business 6 
Canada Federal Public Agency 0 
Canada Provincial Public Agency 7 
Canada Local Public Agency 4 
 
 
Table 3.6 Crown Roundtable 2012 Conference Participants by Organizational Type. 
	  
NGO 44 













Similarly, the membership on the Roundtable leadership team is reflective of the 
tendency to draw from a variety of organizations. The leadership board includes individuals from 
the Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes, the Montana Department of Natural Resources and 
Conservation, the Crown of the Continent Conservation Initiative, the Blood Tribe, the U.S. 
Forest Service Region 1, the Crown of the Continent Ecosystem Education Consortium, the 
Crown Managers Partnership, Alberta Environment, the Crown of the Continent Geotourism 
Council, East Kootenay Conservation Program, Blackfoot Challenge, Northwest Connections, 
Water Matters, and the two co-directors.25 Notably absent is a representative from the B.C. 
provincial government. Table 3.7 outlines some of the member organizations of the leadership 
board and lists the resources they conserve. 
 
Table 3.7 Names of Selected Roundtable Leadership Board Member Organizations 
and Natural Resources Conserved. 
 
Organization Name & 
Type 
Natural Resources 
USFS - Flathead NF 
Federal agency 
Forests for wildlife habitat, timber production, fuels reduction/fire 
management, carbon sequestration and other forest uses 
Sun River Watershed Group 
Regional non-profit 
Forests for fuels reduction/fire management and other; Agriculture 
for ranching and other; Wildlife; aquatic species and habitat, water 
quality and water quantity; Watershed conservation; Ecosystem 
restoration; Ecosystem services; Climate change and other landscape 
stressors 
Crown Managers Partnership 
International non-profit 
Forests for wildlife habitat; forests for timber production; forests for 
fuels reduction/fire management; forests for carbon sequestration; 
forests for other uses; agricultural land use/ranching; agricultural 
land use/ crop production; land use/carbon sequestration; other 
agricultural land use; wildlife game management; wildlife 
biodiversity conservation; wildlife protection of trust species; other 
wildlife conservation; aquatic species and habitat water quantity and 
quality; protection of aquatic trust species; watershed conservation; 
mining; oil extraction; recreation and tourism; protection of Native 
American cultural resources; ecosystem restoration; ecosystem 
services; wilderness preservation; climate change or other landscape 
stressors; multiple use management 
MT Department of Natural Forests for wildlife habitat; forests for timber production; forests for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




Resources and Conservation 
State agency 
fuels reduction/fire management; forests for carbon sequestration; 
agricultural land use/ranching; agricultural land use/ crop 
production; other agricultural land use; wildlife protection of trust 
species; other wildlife conservation; aquatic species and habitat 
water quantity; protection of aquatic trust species; watershed 
conservation; oil extraction; recreation and tourism; protection of 
Native American cultural resources; ecosystem restoration; 
ecosystem services; climate change or other landscape stressors; 
multiple use management 




Forests (general); wildlife (general); watershed conservation; 
recreation and tourism; protection of Native American cultural 
resources; multiple use management 
The Wilderness Society 
National nongovernmental 
organization 
Forests for wildlife habitat; forests for timber production; forests for 
fuels reduction/fire management; wildlife biodiversity conservation; 
aquatic species and habitat water quality; protection of aquatic trust 
species; watershed conservation; recreation and tourism; ecosystem 
restoration; ecosystem services; wilderness preservation; climate 
change or other landscape stressors; multiple use management 
Water Matters Society of 
Alberta 
Citizen conservation group 
Aquatic species and habitat water quantity and quality; watershed 
conservation; ecosystem services 
Alberta Southwest 
Economic development and 
tourism organization 
Forests for wildlife habitat; agricultural land use/ranching; 
agricultural land use/ crop production; wildlife biodiversity 
conservation; aquatic species and habitat water quantity; watershed 
conservation; recreation and tourism; other 
Alberta Tourism, Parks and 
Recreation 
Provincial parks management 
agency 
Forests for wildlife habitat; forests for fuels reduction/fire 
management; wildlife game management; wildlife biodiversity 
conservation; wildlife protection of trust species; aquatic species and 
habitat water quality; protection of aquatic trust species; recreation 
and tourism; protection of Native American cultural resources; 
ecosystem services; wilderness preservation 
Swan Ecosystem Center 
Community based non-profit 
organization 
Forests for wildlife habitat; forests for timber production; forests for 
fuels reduction/fire management; forests for carbon sequestration; 
forests for other uses; wildlife biodiversity conservation; wildlife 
protection of trust species; other wildlife conservation; aquatic 
species and habitat water quantity and quality; protection of aquatic 
trust species; watershed conservation; recreation and tourism; 
ecosystem restoration; ecosystem services; wilderness preservation; 





Forests for wildlife habitat; forests for timber production; forests for 
fuels reduction/fire management; forests for carbon sequestration; 
wildlife game management; wildlife biodiversity conservation; 
wildlife protection of trust species; aquatic species and habitat water 
quantity and quality; protection of aquatic trust species; watershed 
conservation; mining; oil extraction; recreation and tourism; 
protection of Native American cultural resources; ecosystem 
restoration; ecosystem services; wilderness preservation; climate 
change or other landscape stressors; multiple use management 
East Kootenay Citizens 
Concerned about Coalbed 
Methane (CCCBM) 
Private citizen research group 
 
Forests for wildlife habitat; forests for timber production; other 
agricultural land use; wildlife biodiversity conservation; aquatic 
species and habitat water quality; watershed conservation; mining; 
oil extraction; recreation and tourism; wilderness preservation; 





The absence of a representative from the B.C. provincial government is worth noting. 
During the 2012 Roundtable, the province held a conference for municipal leaders, which 
seemed to pull would-be participants from attending the conference that year. However, in 
looking back at past attendee lists, the B.C. Ministry of Environment did not attend. While 
attendance lists confirmed the absence of representatives from B.C. provincial agencies, they do 
not explain why the provincial government was hesitant to participate in the Roundtable. 
Referring to interview data, a more complete explanation emerged. Piecing together details from 
what a retired mining geologist volunteering for a B.C. town museum, a U.S. Parks Service 
official, and the directors of two Montana-based and one British Columbia-based conservation 
organizations told me, an explanation surfaced. Transboundary processes in the 1980s had left 
the province bitter about the potential to develop mines.26 The provincial government seemed to 
view binational cooperation as a threat to coal development. Its absence, then, was not a 
coincidence, but a strategic demonstration of power; and perhaps an effort to avoid placing 
restrictions on current and future mining operations in the portion of the Crown landscape that 
falls within its borders. In the absence of B.C., then, the members of the leadership board 
represent public and private groups from Montana and Alberta. 
 
 
3.4.2 The Activities of the Crown Roundtable  
 
The Roundtable’s activities are wide and diverse. It ranges from being a forum for policy 
dialogue, hosting workshops, forums and annual conferences, to providing funding for project 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 As one interviewee mentioned regarding B.C.’s involvement in the transboundary International Joint Commission 
process, the promise of coal development was a strong pull. In his words, “Yet here was British Columbia saying, 
screw those goddamn Americans—excuse my French—screw those Americans, we got two billion dollars worth of 




implementation. The annual conference is the major undertaking, but in recent years the 
Roundtable has taken part in on-the-ground work by financing projects through the Adaptive 
Management Initiative and sponsoring internships and fellowships. These activities lend to the 
aim of “connecting people to sustain and enhance culture, community, and conservation in the 
Crown of the Continent” (Crown Roundtable 2012).  
Initially created as an open space for building and maintaining connections between 
individuals and organizations, the Roundtable fosters policy dialogue, knowledge transfer, and 
innovation. The main venue is the annual conference, but the relationships formed continue 
beyond. The conference provides some structured time, as well as times that allow participants to 
interact in a more open format. At the conference, panel presentations offer updates on current 
issues. For example, at the 2012 Roundtable, topics varied from payments for ecosystem 
services, economic development, tourism, forest ecology, water management, and energy 
resources (Crown Roundtable 2012). In less structured time, “hot topics” breakout sessions give 
brief slots for participants to share their concerns, and collaboratively identify solutions.  
Field visits are also an important part of the annual conference, creating shared 
experiences for learning and sharing management practices. Site visits to local old-growth 
forests, nature preserves, aquatic restoration sites, and tribal lands are opportunities to learn new 
management approaches. Traveling to and from the field sites, hiking the trails together, and 
standing in the same streams brings participants together in shared experiences. These strengthen 
bonds, creating stronger relationships that continue beyond the conference.  
The Roundtable facilitates the transfer of knowledge and ultimately lends to learning 
between participants. This learning carries over and back into home organizations and agencies, 




species has led to changes in the ways personal watercraft are washed after and before entering 
lakes and waterways. Shifts and changes in preferences and behavior happen in sometimes more 
subtle ways. For example, one participant mentioned that the issues might be different from one 
community to another, but said that “in all projects there are similar contexts that we will 
absolutely be learning from and going to each other to solve, around issues that come up as we 
go.” The Roundtable events offer the chance for people to meet with one another and follow up 
from one year to the next. 
In addition to hosting conferences, the Roundtable also sponsors project implementation. 
In 2012, the Roundtable launched the Adaptive Management Initiative (AMI). The AMI 
provides funding for projects ranging from raising public awareness for building wildlife 
corridors across highways, to looking at the impacts of climate change on native trout species 
and Whitebark Pine, to building collaborative capacity for climate adaptation between 
indigenous communities and non-governmental organizations. Sponsorship of these working 
projects is possible in part through external grants, including from the Kresge Foundation.  
 
 
3.4.3 The Advantages of Networked Governance for Sustainable Forest Management: The 
Crown Roundtable as an Example  
 
There are multiple barriers to transboundary forest conservation in the Crown of the 
Continent landscape: a lack of information about ecological trends on the landscape, a lack of 
capacity for individuals and organizations, lack of a coordinated conservation strategy, 
inappropriate policy tools, and a lack of financial investments for conservation (McKinney, 
Scarlett, and Kemmis 2010). A new approach to governance was needed to facilitate 




As discussed in chapter two, networked governance is adaptive because it draws upon 
multiple actors, multiple sectors, operates at multiple scales, and draws upon multiple types of 
knowledge. The Crown Roundtable case demonstrates these advantageous features of networked 
forest governance, particularly in being flexible. The Crown Roundtable has an unstructured, and 
open format allowing the process to adjust to changing social needs and ecological conditions. 
These adjustments allow for learning. Social learning is essential for setting goals, negotiating 
how to achieve them, and putting plans into action (Newig, Günther, and Pahl-Wostl 2010). 
Membership in the Roundtable is voluntary, commitments are non-binding, civil society groups 
are brought into the decision-making process but agencies do not formally give up authority. 
Adaptive governance points to some of the same features identified in the networked 
governance literature. Networked governance facilitates multiple types of learning (Pahl-Wostl 
2009). Being able to respond to multiple, overlapping, and sometimes competing demands are 
the first steps toward reflexivity (Dryzek 2014). The Roundtable creates a forum where diverse 
needs and concerns are voiced (Kemmis and McKinney 2011). The Roundtable also organizes 
responses to the needs of various users on the landscape. The Crown Roundtable demonstrates 
adaptiveness in networked governance because it deals with overlapping forest-related ecological 
systems or issue-areas simultaneously, operating under what has been called the “nexus 
perspective” (Hoff 2011; Nilsson and Persson 2012). Bringing together multiple issue areas, the 
Crown Roundtable works at the nexus of forest management on public lands and private lands, 
management of agricultural production, water resources management, and national and 
international parks management, among others. 
Networked processes, with their decentralized nature, challenge conventional notions of 




the case of the Crown of the Continent ecosystem, this has historically been a beneficial process, 
allowing larger groups to draw upon the experience of smaller, more local groups (Pedynowski 
2003). Returning to the definition of networked governance in chapter two, it involves lateral 
linkages across a multiplicity of actors (state agencies, NGOs, citizen advocacy groups, and 
national governments, among others) that hinge on norms of trust and a shared purpose and 
identity, for the purpose of making decisions or informing decision-making procedures. The 
learning that happens at the Roundtable is an important part of the second component, informing 
decision-making procedures. To learn and inform, some creativity and innovation is necessary. 
Experimentation in new modes of governance is one of the design features of the Roundtable. In 
larger studies of networked governance, innovation has been listed as a positive benefit (Benner, 
Reinicke, and Witte 2004).  
In the Crown Roundtable, new ideas are incorporated in presentations and breakout 
sessions. These allow participants to learn from each other and draw upon diverse expertise 
(Bäckstrand 2008), they expand beyond a single organization’s vision (Benner, Reinicke, and 
Witte 2004). Drawing upon a diverse pool of expertise is advantageous (Bäckstrand 2008). 
Networked collective action boosts capacity, allowing organizations to do more together than 
they can do alone (Kahler 2009). They improve problem-solving abilities by pooling public and 
private resources (Benner, Reinicke, and Witte 2004). Collaborative arrangements allow for an 
overall more effective response (O’Leary, Bingham, and Gerard 2006; Wyborn and Bixler 
2013), and also a quicker response (Bäckstrand 2008).  
Finally, the Crown Roundtable could be considered adaptive because it operates at 
multiple scales. Networked governance at the landscape level represents both scaling up and 




level UN Forum on Forests’ “Forest Principles” and far-reaching international agreements on 
sustainability reporting, but it also represents a shift for smaller conservation efforts toward 
thinking at the larger landscape level. In the case of the Crown ecosystem, for example, smaller 
private groups such as the Blackfoot Challenge and the Water Matters Society of Alberta, which 
have already worked hard to unite divergent interests in their locales, and are already functioning 
networks, must now think about how their interests fit within the even larger geographical, 
ecological and political scales. If the Crown Roundtable is functioning as it was designed—to 
“test new forms of governance”—then we should see that landscape-level conservation provides 
a viable channel to “think regionally, but to act at whatever scale makes sense” (Crown 2011). 
This innovative solution could provide a way out of a global cycle of deforestation and resource 
depletion by uniting diverse actors and interests around a common identity—a shared landscape. 
	  
	  
3.5 Concluding Thoughts 
	  
 The mixed methods case study provides an in-depth look at an instance of networked 
forest governance. This approach offers the chance to explore the inner workings of the process, 
comparing observation to theory along the way. Its decentralized structure, informal nature, and 
mix of actors across multiple scales are unparalleled. In its first years, it has brought together an 
impressive array of actors including more than one hundred organizations, agencies, businesses, 
and concerned citizen groups.  
The conscientious institutional design is consistent with the principles of networked 
forest governance outlined in chapter two. It is informal, voluntary, reflexive, and relies on a 
deliberative model of participation. Its informal nature and flexibility are adaptive in the face of 




However, it is important to ask whether it has lived up to its potential. The informal 
nature of networked arrangements can mean that they are lacking in particular dimensions 
associated with democratic governance. The chapters in Part II examine these questions. Chapter 
four presents a theoretical background on two major principles of democratic theory: legitimacy 
and accountability. From there, I pose questions about the possible drawbacks to networked 
forest governance. Chapters five and six present the empirical investigation of legitimacy and 
accountability in the Crown Roundtable case. Chapter seven concludes with design 




















CHAPTER FOUR: Legitimacy and Accountability in Networked Governance 
 
 
4.1 Introduction  
Global problems and the governance solutions designed to address them, particularly in 
forest management, are complex. The threats of deforestation and ecological degradation, 
coupled with increasing pressures related to resource demands, implicate a need for more 
effective governance. Formal and legally binding treaty arrangements could possibly ease 
disparities in forest management approaches between the U.S. and Canada (Howlett and Rayner 
2006). However, it is not clear when it comes to governing the commons, that centralized or top-
down approaches are the most appropriate (Agrawal and Ostrom 2001; Ostrom 1990; Ostrom 
2010). Environmental problems are complex and do not often fit neatly within jurisdictional 
boundaries, making governmental entities ill-suited to address them on their own (Carlsson and 
Sandström 2008).  
Networked governance was heralded as “the blueprint for the international architecture of 
the 21st century” (Slaughter, 1997). Indeed, as chapter two demonstrates, there is a lot of promise 
in networked governance; it is adaptive, flexible, and inclusive. However, it is important to ask 
whether it has lived up to its potential. The informal nature of networked arrangements can mean 
that they are lacking in particular dimensions associated with democratic governance.  
This chapter explores and examines these possible shortcomings. It begins by defining 
the concept of legitimacy and then moves into a discussion of why it matters in networked 
governance. The chapter then traverses toward some general critiques of legitimacy in NG, and 
presents ways of overcoming these shortcomings. The research questions for chapter five 
pertaining to legitimacy follow. The second half follows the same path exploring accountability: 




deficit.” The chapter then presents some ways to overcome the accountability deficit, and lays 
out the questions explored in the Crown Roundtable case. The end of the chapter covers research 
questions for accountability in the Crown case. Examples from the Crown Roundtable are woven 
throughout, paving the way for the empirical investigations of each concept in chapters five and 
six.  
 
4.2 Legitimacy in Networked Governance  
Authority is fundamentally different from power. In fact, many political scientists 
distinguish authority from power on the basis of legitimacy, which sets authority apart from 
power because it usually involves voluntary changes in behavior brought about through 
acceptance by the governed (Avant, Finnemore, and Sell 2010; Bernstein 2004). The state’s 
authority is traditionally accepted because it holds a monopoly on the use of physical force over 
a population in a given territory (Weber 1946). Authority is centralized in hierarchical 
arrangements and participation is drawn from within political units (Easton 1957). Participation 
occurs in an ordered setting with pre-determined rules about who can take part, and in what role. 
These are usually established in a set of legal codes or formal guidelines (Ku 2014).   
Because it is wrapped up in the control of material resources, ultimately, the legitimacy 
of hierarchical arrangements is tied to the state. As Dryzek (2010, 199) puts it, “The imagery 
here is of a state with no rivals when it comes to exercising legitimate authority over the people 
within its jurisdiction, with the authorization of that people—and nobody else.” That is to say, 
the state is usually the entity best positioned to maintain the level of control that engenders this 




be conferred through the control of material resources, through a rule-making process, or through 
the provision of public goods (Krasner 1999; Sandler 2004; Weber 1946). 
Legitimacy is the basis for establishing a governing entity’s authority; it is a process of 
turning absolute power into a morally based ‘right’ to govern. This means that authority must be 
earned, and as Ku (2014, 37) puts it, “Authority today, whether international or domestic, public 
or private, is no longer a given, but must be earned with an increased emphasis on performance 
as a basis for legitimacy.” It is a major benchmark in maintaining the democratic quality in any 
system of governance and it is an inherently social process. As Christian Reus-Smit (2007) puts 
it, “…when we say that an institution is rightful, and hence legitimate, we are saying that its 
norms, rules, and principles are socially endorsed.” To understand the alternative bases for 
establishing legitimacy outside formal representation and legal frameworks, it may be helpful to 
consider how authority is legitimated in hierarchies and markets, and ultimately, networked 
governance. Table 4.1 below presents the authority pattern for each of the three modes of 
governance as well as the bases for participation and acceptance. Here participation and 
acceptance are the common elements: they are the building blocks without which legitimacy 
cannot be conferred. However, there is some variation between the three types of governance.  
 
Table 4.1 Bases of authority, participation and acceptance  
in hierarchies, markets, and networked governance. 
 Authority pattern Participation Acceptance 
Hierarchies -Command and control 
-Centralized authority 
-Non-voluntary 
-Rule-making and elections housed 
within political jurisdictions 
-Control of material resources 
-Formal rules 
-Substantive 
Markets -At-will exchange -Voluntary  
-Buying, selling, and trading units 
of currency, goods, or services 









exchange of resources 
-Social capital: deliberative 
qualities of trust, shared identity, 






These differences in the way authority is granted necessitate a shift in the way legitimacy 
is defined in NG. In forest management, the case of the snowy owl in California exemplifies the 
importance of working toward process based sociological legitimacy, rather than outcomes or 
standards. The problem of deforestation and habitat loss is fairly straightforward. Decreasing 
forest cover impedes wildlife corridor connectivity patterns, and might indicate a need for a 
logging ban in some instances. This was the case of the snowy owl in California during the 
1990s. The endangered species was experiencing habitat decline due to decreasing forest 
coverage, as some argued. Logging bans were met with heavy industry backlash, however, 
insofar as logging operations and mills perceived the substance of the claim (that logging was 
decreasing owl habitat) to be in direct contradiction with their economic well-being. Whether the 
science created an ecological basis for a reduction in logging was irrelevant. Policies banning 
logging would always be deemed illegitimate. Substance and reason, as shown, do not always 
form a clear basis for legitimacy. As Smith and Brassett (2008, 72) articulate, “Legitimate 
political decisions should not be made exclusively on the basis of an aggregation of preferences, 
or strategic compromises between competing interests, but on the basis of public reasons.” 
Public reasoning and the deliberative process, rather than scientific facts alone, form the 
substance of legitimacy in NG.  The definition of legitimacy, then, depends to a large extent 
upon perceptions of authority.  
For some, by its very nature, legitimacy is inherently set apart from coercion or self-
interested behavior; instead it is the belief that an institution should exist because it is believed to 
have the right to rule (Buchanan and Keohane 2006). Hurrell (2005, 16) claims that a sense of 
legitimacy is  “distinguishable from purely self-interested or instrumental behaviour on the one 




some other basis—a third way outside of hierarchies and markets— that the governed accept 
rules because they perceive governors as authoritative in crafting an institutional arrangement, 
rather than any allegiance to the institutional framework itself. This is a helpful way to begin to 
think about legitimacy in the context of NG, which does not rely upon coercion or inducement.  
 
4.2.1 Defining Legitimacy  
Political authority is granted in networked governance by sharing information, 
knowledge, and values (Betsill and Bulkeley 2004). Consistent with a constructivist 
understanding of transnational politics, environmental governance should garner support to the 
extent that it prioritizes inclusion, shared identity, common norms, and trust—rather than the 
extent to which it is directly linked with changes in behavior or ecological outcomes. 
Legitimacy, according to this perspective, is a construct associated with governance-by-doing. 
NG works toward process-based social goals rather than the narrow pursuit of particular 
outcomes (Paavola 2007). In this sense, NG relies upon a sociological, rather than a standards-
based view, of legitimacy. 
In managing global forests, it becomes clear that governance mechanisms must rely upon 
an alternate source of authority, as states have been historically reticent to sign onto binding 
international treaties. Through alternate channels, processes outside the state can become 
legitimate avenues for governance. Bodansky (1999) claims that legitimacy is simply the 
justification of authority. The justification for authority varies, though, across governance 
arrangements and today, especially in market and networked arrangements, builds upon elements 




process of legitimation (Bernstein 2011). This is often closely linked with accepting the rule-
making authority of non-state actors. 
This process is inherently social. That is, power becomes authority when it is perceived to 
be legitimate. It is, according to Bernstein (2011, 20), the “glue that links authority and power.” 
Legitimacy, when conferred upon the governors by those whom they govern, creates a basis for 
authority. Authority is sometimes fleeting, as coercion and inducements are often not within the 
scope of global governance arrangements (Hurd 2007). Once a population accepts power, it 
confers legitimacy. Legitimacy, then, is about the acceptance of a system of governance. Other 
principles commonly associated are responsiveness, fairness, transparency, and accountability 
(Bernstein 2011; Gupta and Mason 2014).   
Legitimacy, broadly defined, is “stakeholder acceptance” (Sandström, Crona, and Bodin 
2014). It denotes the fairness, correctness, or rightfulness of power relations. It makes the 
difference between people accepting or rejecting “the rules of the game” (Sandström, Crona, and 
Bodin 2014). Stakeholder acceptance can apply to different areas: the decision-making power 
itself, the procedure of decision making, or what is decided (Scharpf 2009).  
Simply put, legitimation as a process moves away from a pure focus on the standards, 
participation, and consensus associated with a normative notion of legitimacy toward an 
emphasis on perceptions, acceptance, and deliberation (Bernstein 2004). Critiques of legitimacy 
have quite a bit to do with how authority is granted to non-state actors. It centers on questions 






4.2.2 Specific Critiques of Legitimacy in Networked Governance  
Legitimacy can be complicated because NG extends over jurisdictions and levels, and 
includes many types of actors (Bäckstrand 2006a). No clear singular governed population, or 
demos, exists. Stitching together multiple communities into a process brings together differing 
goals and expectations. These different communities’ interpretations and expectations can 
introduce controversy, making it difficult to reach consensus (van Buuren et al. 2014). This 
complicates the notion of a social contract where the state acts as arbiter between parties; instead 
groups and organizations work directly together (Giovannucci and Ponte 2005). This open-
endedness can leave things somewhat uncertain. However, to accommodate multiple 
perspectives, it is adaptive for networked arrangements to be flexible.  
Flexibility in NG can take on multiple forms; it can be a part of decision making, policy 
interpretation, or resource deployment (Lau 2014). Flexibility in decision-making implies a 
quicker and more efficient response to new opportunities (Ibid).  Flexibility in policy 
interpretation refers to the ability to adjust to external pressures depending on the viability of a 
chosen response. Finally, flexibility in resource deployment implies that a blend of public and 
private resources can be used to achieve policy goals (Ibid).  
While more work has been done looking at the relationship between these forms of 
flexibility and accountability, there are significant gaps pertaining to our understanding of what 
flexibility means for legitimacy. Recent investigations of NG have made explicit calls to look at 
the relationship between flexibility and legitimacy (Connelly 2011; Lau 2014; Sandström, Crona, 
and Bodin 2014).  
Realists tend to eschew the question altogether whether transboundary networked 




perspective of high politics, or under the aegis of state-based security concerns that tend to 
dominate their investigation of world politics. Liberal institutionalists, on the other hand, 
sometimes dismiss the possibility for democratizing global governance, resigning that legitimacy 
is elusive without the backdrop of formal legal mechanisms. Keohane (2003, 133), for example, 
claims, 
Since there is no global government, global governance involves strategic interactions 
among entities that are not arranged in formal hierarchies. Since there is no global 
constitution, the entities that wield power and make rules are often not authorized to do 
so by general agreement. Therefore their actions are often not regarded as legitimate by 
those who are affected by them. 
 
This perspective offers little to work with for those interested in landscape-scale environmental 
governance. Transboundary arrangements are not legally equipped or authorized to make 
decisions, under this perspective, and therefore cannot be considered appropriate avenues for 
decision-making.  
 Traditional electoral models focus on the free and fair elections of representatives at the 
state and federal level are warranted in pointing to the importance of open elections and the 
added legitimacy that representative democracy brings. In terms of a full deliberative democratic 
system of governance, these formal processes have some shortcomings. First, the electoral cycle 
imposes a certain shortsightedness focused on immediate policy items. Held and Hervey (2009, 
5) refer to this problem as “short-termism,” noting that  
The short duration of electoral cycles ensures that politicians are concerned with their 
own re-election, which may compromise hard policy decisions that require a great deal of 
political capital. It is extremely difficult for governments to impose large-scale changes 
on an electorate whose votes they depend on, in order to tackle a problem whose impact 
will only be felt by future generations.  
 
For the limitations imposed by the electoral cycle and population numbers at the transboundary 




decisionmakers at the landscape scale. In terms of accepting a political order at the international 
level, this means that we are moving away from a notion that elections make a policy process 
legitimate. In fact, Habermas might respond that representation is the wrong focus at the multi- 
or international level; he (2010, 285) notes, 
The legitimizing power of democratically elected governments who send their officials as 
delegates to international organizations is held to be quite sufficient for international 
agreements, even if there is no public discussion of the relevant issue in the countries in 
question. On this reading, the unequal distribution of voting power and influence within 
the GEMs [global economic multilaterals] is not a serious problem, because democratic 
representation is simply the wrong model. 
 
Under this perspective, since it is not possible to balance votes by economic might, population 
size, or otherwise, it seems fruitless to pin legitimacy onto representation. But what does this 
mean for legitimacy? What are the alternative channels for legitimizing transboundary 
governance?  
	  
4.2.3 Ways to Overcome the Legitimacy Challenge in Networked Governance 
 How can a process of legitimation take place that will make it possible for NG 
arrangements to come to be seen as authoritative? Here the deliberative quality of the process 
becomes important in addition to developing social ties. As presented in section 4.2.2, legitimacy 
in NG is conferred on a sociological basis. Sociological legitimacy examines how the governed 
perceive a set of rules, an institution, or a governance arrangement (Avant, Finnemore, and Sell 
2010; Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen and McGee 2013).  In this sense, it is akin to an inductive approach 
to research. Investigating a question without making explicit claims about what effects may be 
observed or setting hypotheses to prove or disprove, a sociological notion of legitimacy 
explicitly acknowledges the importance of the relationship between decision-makers and those 




process between the governed and the governors. Understanding how this process takes place is 
key to understanding how NG is legitimated. 
In networked governance, it is particularly significant that the governed population 
overlaps with the governors (Avant, Finnemore, and Sell 2010). In this sense, NG often puts the 
‘decision-takers’ into the role of ‘decision-makers.’ Here, perceptions matter all the more, 
because the governed must feel empowered to participate in the process, actively setting policy 
directions and co-creating rules with others.  
Hierarchical systems of governance are accepted out of a sense of obligation that is based 
upon avoiding negative repercussions. The consequences of not following the rules are strong 
enough to deter inaction. The basis of acceptance in traditional forms of governing are based on 
punishment or redress (March and Olsen 1998). Individuals and organizations accept and abide 
by rules in hierarchies almost by default, out of a sense of obligation toward institutions and not 
other individuals. There is a built-in notion that the repercussions for not following the rules will 
be strong. The control of resources or use of physical force has been used historically to 
legitimate domestic rule (Baldwin 2002). However, it is increasingly untenable at the 
international level to rely upon force or imposition for coercion.  
Rather than coercion, we now see states cooperate with one another and participate in 
intergovernmental institutions on a voluntary and mutual basis (Ku 2014). Unilateral claims to 
legitimacy are particularly troublesome. Lynch (2006, 184) claims, “Since legitimacy can only 
be achieved through an open dialogue among all affected actors, no single actor can alone define 
its terms.” In the case of the Crown Roundtable this has been true. One participant put it this 
way, “This is what it takes a long time to work together to be able to collaboratively or 




size.” Interviewees emphasized the open-ended nature of the process, mentioning that 
participants voluntarily came together to identify goals, without pre-conceived ideas of how to 
achieve them. This can require a considerable amount of time. 
A population deems a system of rule appropriate when it meets particular standards. In 
this sense, the right to rule must be justified. At the international level this could be done by 
having a certain number of actors be involved, or requiring that they be drawn from particular 
sectors. Beyond this, others suggest meetings should take place in rotating host states (Bernstein 
2011). This has been true for the Crown Roundtable. It has been hosted in alternating locations 
between the U.S. and Canada. An interviewee described this process of connecting communities 
in the following way,  
“…we needed people there who were in touch with government who were in touch with 
government and had a relationship with government: bureaucrats as well as ministers in 
order to be persuasive and also to build constituencies down there because that’s the 
population/demographic center of the province and then we needed a local group in the 
Southeast Kootenays, you know, Fernie, Sparwood, Cranbrook, in order to legitimize and 
build support for all those goals down there.” 
 
Having a mix of private and public actors as stakeholders is a strength of NG. As non-state actors 
come to be seen as authoritative governors, the process may be seen as increasingly more 
legitimate. Chapter five explores how the governed are drawn into the governing process, 
suggesting they are more likely to accept decisions because they are directly involved in making 
them. That is to say, as those affected by decisions are increasingly brought into the decision-
making process, it is likely to become more legitimate. Including public officials from the start 
and keeping them committed is also important (Sandström, Crona, and Bodin 2014). At the base 
level, an array of actors should be brought in, to the extent that it is possible. Though a wide 




Legitimation occurs when acceptance is based on trust and social capital. Both of these 
take time, and they are built through repeated interactions. It is not enough to simply “add civil 
society,” like water, to the mix. Bringing more actors into a process neither ensures that they 
represent diverse interests nor that they will engage each other in a trusting way that builds a 
common identity or shared norms. In other words, for authority to be perceived as legitimate in 
NG, broad participation is not enough—though it is certainly important. Rather, the governed 
accepts a system of rules because they are an active part of the rule-making process: the 
governed are simultaneously governing (Avant, Finnemore, and Sell 2010). Participation is not 
based on adherence to pre-determined standards, elections and political jurisdictions or even 
economic resources, but on the creation and approval of the rules themselves. The basis of 
participation is a key component—it should be deliberative (van Buuren et al. 2014). Active 
deliberation and open debate are important. Deliberation is a process of engaging one another in 
a way that is considerate of divergent perspectives (Stevenson and Dryzek 2012).  
Thus, I contend that legitimacy in NG is brought about over time through a deliberative 
process that builds trust and social capital in the form of a common identity and shared norms. 
The graphic below, Figure 4.1, illustrates the intermediary role that deliberative qualities play in 





Figure 4.1 Depicting Legitimacy Based on the Deliberative Qualities of 
Participation. 
 
Conferring legitimacy in NG is not a one-time endeavor, but an ongoing process of 
creative discovery. Seeing this continual process of self-reflection in the Crown Roundtable, I 
was reminded of a Naessian “deep ecological philosophy,” or a commitment to repeatedly 
revisiting needs and how to adjust a process to meet them (Naess 1987). This ongoing reflection 
brings an awareness of one’s needs and where it is possible to make adjustments.27 In the case of 
the Crown Roundtable, recognizing various needs and being able to voice them lends a strong 
sense of empowerment. The Roundtable’s designers recognized the need to move away from an 
“expert-driven” model of governance toward the inclusion of citizens, professionals, and 
communities (McKinney 2011a). The Crown Roundtable is designed with the collaborative 
mindset, keeping that in an uncertain world, all decisions are inherently contingent and that 
governance is not about finding the best solution but the best way of proceeding (McKinney 
2011a). 
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one’s highest potential but acknowledging needs and weaknesses. I was curious in the investigation of the Crown 




The ability to engage in self-examination is an inherent strength of NG. In the 
Anthropocene, it is the “first virtue” of political institutions (Dryzek 2014). Ongoing deliberative 
efforts to examine and reframe the process are critical (Sandström, Crona, and Bodin 2014). 
Bringing people into the process humanizes rules by making them contingent and flexible. When 
rules are open to interpretation, stakeholders feel empowered. In the Crown Roundtable, this is 
particularly true. One interviewee put it this way, 
We have issues. We are a very large landscape and we are carved up into many 
jurisdictions and this represents the heart of the problem. This is what it takes a long time 
to work together to be able to collaboratively or collectively achieve goals or objectives 
for small tasks or large tasks across an ecosystem of this size with this many boundaries 
drawn into it. 
 
Legitimacy is conditional, it needs to be challenged and continually re-evaluated. It requires 
commitment and reflection. As the process comes to be viewed as legitimate, it can also become 
more accountable. The governance network is a sphere of engagement, or an arena for political 
interactions to take place, but not a commitment to any substantive or procedural policy goals.  
 
4.2.4 Key Research Questions for the Crown Roundtable Case Pertaining to Legitimacy 
	  
How, without the types of backing conferred through general elections, the outright 
control of security resources, centralized administrative bodies, or even the inducements found in 
economic arrangements, are networked arrangements legitimated? That is to say, how is 
authority conferred upon these alternate arrangements? This is really to ask how NG processes 
come to be accepted and why the governed agree to participate in and abide by their guidelines. 
More specifically, it is an examination of the process through which actors in civil society 





Embracing contingencies and perceptions, we see that the moral validity of procedures 
becomes more important than the rules (Risse 2004). In other words, shared perceptions about 
rules lend to their acceptance more than the content of the rules themselves. Buchanan and 
Keohane (2006, 405) claim “an institution is legitimate in the sociological sense when it is 
widely believed to have the right to rule.” When an actor sees a rule as legitimate, she complies 
out of an internal sense of obligation, derived from a set of morals (Hurd 1999). The point of 
inquiry is how these norms, morals, or ideas about what constitutes appropriate rule, come about. 
Sociological legitimacy not only recognizes that actors abide by a logic of appropriateness, but 
asks how actors come to accept new logics—in this sense it more than the study of modes of 
steering, but investigating the mechanisms behind them (Risse 2004). It becomes particularly 
important to understand how it is that new forms of governance come to be seen as authoritative. 
This process is investigated by looking at the perceptions of participants.  
The literature suggests that the presence of previous collaborative processes can lend to 
legitimacy of NG. Previous institutional structures and collaborative initiatives contribute by 
building trust in new co-management initiatives (Sandström, Crona, and Bodin 2014). As shown 
in chapter three, there is a range of initiatives from which the Crown Roundtable builds. A key 
question is what sort of institutional background has been built by prior conservation initiatives? 
Related to this, how can trust be created in the process? How might NG tie together competing 
perspectives from disparate communities with shared norms? Finally, is it possible to create a 
single common identity in a transboundary landscape? These questions are investigated in 
chapter five. The next section turns to an examination of accountability and the questions that 





4.3 Accountability in Networked Governance  
Given the patchwork of governance arrangements in the transnational context, it is 
sometimes difficult to establish the body of individuals and/or organizations that should 
participate in international processes. Grant and Keohane (2005) point out that there are 
numerous “global publics” and that is difficult, if not impossible, to have a democratic system of 
governance at the global level. How do we determine the appropriate political audience for 
certain international or global processes? For example, are consumers of Apple’s electronic 
products eligible to have a voice when it comes to China’s involvement in mining operations in 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo? Or do populations vulnerable to sea level rise have a 
right to be involved in land use decisions in Amazonian forests that sequester rising greenhouse 
gasses? As these hypothetical questions suggest, establishing accountability at the global level is 
complicated by the intricacies of determining which populations are affected, let alone justified 
in or capable of holding other actors responsible for their actions. Here it becomes easy to see 
how translating accountability up from the domestic level to the global level becomes 
problematic. 
At the international level, accountability is often achieved through private mechanisms 
(Newell 2008). Market transactions allow consumers to make choices about whether to support 
certain companies based on their business practices. Corporate social responsibility is another 
avenue for establishing accountability. When transnational companies self-regulate, it is usually 
based on what they perceive as their audience’s sense of what constitutes acceptable behavior. 
Carbon trading schemes constitute yet another market avenue for holding entities accountable at 
the global level. Emitters, under carbon finance schemes, are able to purchase credits (or the 




responsible through required payments, or ultimately, by an overall set limit on total allowable 
emissions.  
Networked governance, however, depends on non-monetized relationships between 
individuals. While agencies and organizations may not be able to make formal ties and 
connections, individuals can (Rudeen 2013). As one public administration scholar put it, “we 
need a richer vocabulary for the kinds of conscious, normatively-grounded (and fragile) forms of 
obligation” found in networked governance (Moore 2013). The project fills this gap by putting 
forward a framework for studying these connections, increasing our understanding of the 
democratic quality of networked governance. 
 
4.3.1 Defining Accountability  
	  
In a democratic system of governance, holding entities accountable implies that there is 
(a) some identifiable group, a governed population (‘decision takers’), that is justified in holding 
their governors (‘decision makers’) responsible for their actions and (b) that there are clear 
mechanisms for doing so. Succinctly put, accountability is equal to answerability and redress 
(Mason 2005). It is the notion that the governed can make demands of governors and that there 
are channels for rectifying wrongs when they do occur.  
In order to establish accountability, the relationship between governors and their 
constituencies must have a quality Mason (2005) calls answerability, which relates to the ability 
of the governed to articulate their claims to governors. Answerability is about keeping actors 
committed to the process and to one another. For Grant and Keohane (2005), this means that 
“some actors have the right to hold other actors to a set of standards, to judge whether they have 




determine that these responsibilities have not been met.” It implicates a basic level of 
responsiveness (Bovens 2007) between governors and the governed (Avant, Finnemore, and Sell 
2010). In looking further at the dimensions of answerability, Mashaw (2006, 117) is concerned 
with who is held answerable “to whom, about what, through what processes, by what standards 
and with what effect.” Going even further, Philp (2009) suggests normative dimensions that 
include holding behavior to an ethical standard, rather than another entity.   
There are a number of reasons why a particular group would claim it is justified to hold 
others to a particular set of standards, even if they are not legally codified. Keohane (2003) 
names three such instances. Explicit authorization can take place where one group openly states 
it will abide by another’s demands. Demands can also be made in line with the basis of financial 
support such as a tax base. Finally, actors can claim justification for holding one another to 
account is in having shared exposure and impacts from harm. This reasoning fits best in the case 
of a transboundary ecosystem. In the instance of shared exposure, cosmopolitans like David Held 
rely upon Rawlsian logic. Under this line of thinking, those whose actions result in a particular 
shared impact should be held responsible. Ecosystems cross borders, so shared impacts, by 
default, implicate a variety of actors across the landscape.  
 
4.3.2 The Accountability Deficit: Critiques of Accountability in Networked Governance  
In the domestic setting, citizens hold government accountable through elections and 
ballot measures. Accountability, then, under this aegis is about public oversight and the ability to 




ix) puts it, “citizens become clients and public officials become managers.”28 International 
relations scholars have recognized, perhaps more so than those who study domestic politics, that 
at the heart of the “‘the politics of accountability’ is a struggle over who should be accepted as a 
principal” (Behn 2001; Keohane 2003, 142). At the international level, not only do we have a 
moving target, but one that changes size and shape. In other words, the affected population is 
defined depending on the issue at hand. 
Traditional, hierarchical patterns of governing associated with top-down flows of 
authority and clear assignment of blame offer more direct avenues for sanctioning violations. For 
example, it is possible to “vote out” those in elected positions, or pursue legal violations through 
judicial avenues. Accountability, at the domestic level, often entails using the courts to enforce 
legal institutions. This process allows affected individuals and groups to register their complaints 
and be compensated for their damages. Judicial bodies, though, at the international level are 
plagued with problems related to opt-out and the barrier of state sovereignty.  
In contrast, NG blurs the lines between governors and the governed. It not only brings in 
a mix of different actors, but also fundamentally changes the way they work together. An 
informal, flexible, and open-ended setting replaces rules and prescribed procedures. Some have 
pointed to a tradeoff between flexibility and accountability – suggesting that as processes are 
more flexible (subject to fewer obligations), they struggle with accountability in the eyes of the 
public (Lau 2014). Depending on the degree of flexibility, it is possible that NG may be more or 
less accountable. For example, when private resources are put toward projects, implementation 
may depend less upon the direct efforts of public officials, placing more impetus on civil society 
to monitor outcomes (Lau 2014; Newman 2004). Under this line of thinking, some type of 
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authority is needed in order to monitor and account for deviation from standards. Newell (2006) 
asserts that achieving redress hinges on the ability of the affected group to wield power over the 
wrongdoer. However, in the NG setting these components are complicated because there is no 
clear set of rules, mode of arbitration, an established mode of punishment, or even a clear 
distinction between those who make the rules (the rule-makers) and those who abide by them 
(the rule-takers).  
For Robert Dahl, democratic accountability depends on elections and a homogenous 
population base. Though Dahl acknowledges the need to address problems at the international 
level, the benefits of engaging a smaller political unit are more attractive. He articulates a 
frustration with the ability of citizens to appropriately hold their governments accountable for 
foreign policy decisions, and uses this despair as the basis to refute the claim that citizens of 
disparate countries can ever control the decisions made in an international process. Under this 
outmoded and unrealistic notion of electoral accountability, there is good reason to fear that 
transnational NG is not democratic.  
If we were to embrace the naysayer’s argument that international processes can be 
accountable, it seems unlikely that we can adequately address transboundary environmental 
problems because there is no way to hold decisionmakers accountable (there are no elections at 
the global level) and the population is too large and too heterogeneous. Competing identities and 
divergent interests would prevent the possibility of ever reaching consensus. Furthermore, with a 
pessimistic outlook on human nature, Robert Dahl (2010, 428) claims,  
Beyond the boundaries of one’s own intimate attachments, altruism is uncommon, and as 
a steady state among many people it is too feeble to be counted on. In sum, among a large 
group of persons with varied and conflicting ends, goals, interests, and purposes, 
unanimity is unattainable, disagreement on the best policy is to be expected, and civic 





It is difficult to achieve consensus within a large population, and different communities’ 
interpretations of problems can make it difficult to reach agreement about solutions (van Buuren 
et al. 2014).	  Indeed there are echoes of realist pessimism at the possibility and potential for 
cross-border collaboration in forest management (Humphreys 2006). With what we know about 
the global forest governance regime complex, this realist argument holds at the surface level 
insofar as treaty-level binding arrangements pertaining to sustainable forest management have 
not materialized. 	  
While formal arrangements between states may have formed the bulk of international 
relations in the past, today’s fluid borders and enhanced economic and social flows implicate a 
much broader base of participation, one that includes civil society. Fifty years ago, international 
interactions widely took place in the realm of interstate negotiations and formal international 
organization; this meant that responsibility for oversight rested with states (Scholte 2011). States, 
then, as members of international organizations (IOs), were responsible for ensuring their 
citizens’ needs were met and that IOs served the general interest of the international community 
(Ibid).  
At the end of the Cold War, open borders and rising flows of people and capital 
facilitated the formation of new political ties. States were no longer the sole arbiters of these 
flows as people and organizations began to directly engage one another. Coupled with 
decentralization of authority at the international level, and the decreasing prominence of state-
based regulatory authority in international interaction, a growing concern emerged that these 
cross-border social and economic flows were taking place in a cloaked fashion, without the 
watchful eye of states. In essence, removing states as central and sole actors of international 




the only actors capable of administering the subcomponents of accountability (Scholte 2011). 
Networked processes are built upon social connections that rely on informal ties. 
Participation is open to land managers, conservationists, and citizens alike. Once public officials 
step outside their formal roles, they are not bound by the same electoral and legal procedures that 
govern their actions when they are working within their agencies. The informal nature allows for 
creativity but also means that rules for participation are often vague or unstated. This means that 
it can be unclear how or when participants can address problems when they arise.  
 
4.3.3 Ways to Overcome the Accountability Deficit  
However, the diffusion of authority beyond states does not necessarily lead to a lack of 
accountability. Social ties between non-state actors can fill the gaps left by official oversight of 
states. The horizontal and decentralized configuration of authority can make for better outcomes 
and richer community engagement. Coinciding with the rise in popularity of constructivist 
approaches to studying international relations in the early 1990s, the notion of a ‘global civil 
society’ emerged (Keane 2003).  A civil society capable of spanning borders provided the 
answer to concerns about decreased accountability. “Global citizens” are more capable in 
forming direct relationships with global regulatory arrangements than are national citizens, 
whose actions are mediated by states (Scholte 2011).  
There is a fundamentally different basis for accountability in NG. The ways that actors 
relate to one another, based on rewards rather than punishments, form the basis of holding one 
another to account. In other words, accountability comes from social characteristics rather than 
legal rules or codes (Bovens 2007). By pulling the governed centrally within the governing 




oversight. In a realm previously dominated by states, individuals and sub-state actors are able to 
sit as equals in transnational NG. Therefore, if people, as empowered global citizens, form the 
backbone of NG processes, it follows that accountability is drawn from the patterns and traits 
inherent in social relationships and processes.  
In networked forest governance, there is a shared sense of responsibility for 
environmental degradation. This fits with a cosmopolitan approach, which sees humans as 
members of a broader population than the home country they may happen to reside in (Held 
2003). To conceive of transnational NG processes as accountable, it is important to make the 
analytical move toward seeing a transnational public. The concept of a transnational public 
encompasses the notion that despite drawing from disparate populations and varying interests, 
there is a glue that holds a group of individuals and organizations (both public and private) 
together across sovereign state borders. This notion has been called a global civil society, 
transnational civil society, and even a transnational demos (Bruhl 2001). 
As the line is blurred between governors and the governed, we see the formation of ties 
between actors become the avenues for answerability and redress. These partnerships are “self-
organizing and coordinating alliances” (Glasbergen, Biermann, and Mol 2007, 2). More 
precisely, they are “collaborative arrangements in which actors from two or more spheres of 
society (state, market, and civil society) are involved in a non-hierarchical process through which 
these actors strive for a sustainability goal” (Ibid). Public private partnerships improve 
communication between the ‘rulers’ and the ‘ruled’ (Börzel and Risse 2002), which is especially 
important when the lines are blurred between governors and the governed from the start. 
Partnerships, or relational ties, formed within the transnational public become the 




interests as well. Dryzek (2010) and Eckersley (2004) illustrate this in terms of making 
international organizations and states more deliberatively democratic, and Clapp (2005) does this 
in looking at the political economy of transnational corporations. Reconfiguring our views of the 
affected public up to the international level (Mason 2005), it becomes possible to identify the 
mechanisms for accountability.  
Two-way responsiveness between governors and the governed is a central component of 
answerability in the NG setting. It is particularly central because the lines between the decision-
makers and ‘decision-takers’ are blurred. DeLeon and Varda (2009, 60) state, “collaborative 
policy networks are characterized by discursive properties, specifically reciprocity, 
representation, equality, participatory decision making, and collaborative leadership.” This focus 
on a responsive process is consistent with going beyond defining accountability in terms of a 
one-way relationship between principals and agents. In a principal-agent relationship, agents 
generally answer to principals through formal mechanisms such as elections or economic 
payments.  
The Crown Roundtable, as a networked governance arrangement, is touted as a viable 
alternative for a formal treaty between the United States and Canada. While the global 
governance literature points to problems with informal arrangements, it is not always clear that 
this is as much of a problem as it is made out to be.29 While these types of informal networks can 
fill a gap in governance, they are also susceptible to the critique of operating outside of 
traditional channels of accountability, including electoral representation or political appointments 
(Bäckstrand 2006; Behn 2001; Biermann and Gupta 2011; Slaughter 2001). Participation rules 
are often left open, meaning that anyone can join. This open set of rules can also mean that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Chapter three introduces the notion of an ‘accountability deficit,’ which finds flaw in NG related to the lack of 




participation is limited to those who either choose to take part or have the time and resources to 
do so. For some, this suggests that networked governance operates behind the public arena in a 
gray area where rules are set in an ad hoc fashion and participants come and go as they choose, 
without binding obligations to one another. The net result of this flexibility, under this line of 
thinking, is that actors can simply choose to leave the arrangement if it is not working to their 
liking.  
As we move into the transnational space, it may not be feasible to pin answerability and 
responsiveness on elections, nor is it desirable to link social processes or ecological outcomes 
solely to financial transactions. Rather, a sense of democratic accountability is fostered through 
the personal connections and bonds within the space of a transnational public (Eberly 2008). A 
civic culture is what creates the “democratic ethos” at the transnational level. 
 
4.3.4 Key Research Questions for the Crown Roundtable Case Pertaining to Accountability   
In Chapter 5, I address three key areas of inquiry in the case of the Crown Roundtable, 
based on what the literature suggests about alternative accountabilities in transnational civil 
society. For one, the project asks, are individuals bound and committed to each other because of 
their social relationships? If networked governance is to reach its full potential we would expect 
a vibrant set of ties between individuals. However, little is known about the configuration of 
these ties. The project fills a gap in asking, what do these linkages look like across borders? 
Applying social network analysis is a novel approach to the problem (Jedd and Bixler 2015; Prell 
2011). I look at the features that may have a higher propensity to keep participants engaged. 
Additionally, I investigate the shared sense of responsibility and obligation, which is 




Specifically, I ask whether participation is based on rewards rather than redress. Evidence in 
chapters five and six supports the proposition that participants stay engaged more out of a sense 
of seeking positive consequences rather than avoiding negative repercussions. Finally, because 
some participants are state and provincial officials, I ask, do networked arrangements tap into 
more traditional forms of governance? In other words, do networks create a layered set of 
accountabilities where public officials are held responsive to citizen demands? These questions 
form the basis for the empirical analysis presented in chapter six.  
 
4.4 Concluding Thoughts  
Human activities are so fundamentally altering the planet that geologists now routinely 
call this new stage the Anthropocene (Crutzen 2002).30 Some argue the Anthropocene began in 
the late 18th century, the point at which polar ice cores reveal that trapped air began to show a 
growing global concentration of greenhouse gasses carbon dioxide and methane (Ibid). Going 
even further back, others suggest that the beginning of agricultural cultivation and settlements 
are more apropos for marking the era of human influence.  
Whether we use ice caps or agricultural markers as indicators, it is clear that we have 
fundamentally altered both the atmosphere and the Earth’s layers. Plastic deposits, gravels and 
sands left behind from mining, drilling and other extractive activities are clearly linked with 
processes that exist within the bounds of human control, reinforcing the notion that we are in a 
stage of history where human activity is fundamentally changing the planet.  
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Even in a place as pristine as the Crown of the Continent, home to some of the planet’s 
most intact forested ecosystems, there is evidence of intervention in the form of human 
settlements and resource extraction. The historical record shows that the first inhabitants of the 
Crown landscape, the ancestors of the Blackfeet, Kainaiwa, Ktunaxa, Salish and Kootenai 
peoples, used fire to restore lands, built trails and roads, and constructed camps and villages. 
Fossil records tell a story of bison hunts that involved running herds over cliffs; these records 
intersect with evidence of trapping and exploring by early European settlers. Today animal 
trapping and hunting continues, along with forestry, recreation, ranching, mining, as well as oil 
and gas exploration. 
If human activities have been the cause of environmental degradation, it makes sense that 
people would form the basis for solutions. Governance networks provide a way to do this. 
Directly involving civil society creates pathways for new ways to hold each other and the state 
accountable. However, the components of governance are contingent; that is to say, they are not 
conferred all at once. It is important that they be continually revisited and renewed. In networked 
environmental governance, this is particularly true. As Adger et al. (2003, 1099) put it, 
“Legitimacy can be gained and compromised through the process of making environmental 
decisions.” Conscientiously evaluating how this process takes place will ultimately help with 
institution design. Here I conscientiously choose the term legitimation because it implicates an 
ongoing process. 
Spanning from the family table to global governance regimes, across all levels of 
organization, there are mechanisms in place to ensure that rules are followed and standards are 
adhered to. These mechanisms ensure that outcomes are achieved, both in the sense of on-the-




applies to both outcomes in the natural world as well as following through on commitments we 
have to each other. Environmental problems often stem from resource misuse or overuse, which 
results more from underlying social conditions rather than any inherent qualities of the natural 
world. The social pressures placed on the environment suggest that it is important we understand 
clearly how actors respond not only to changing ecological conditions, but also to one another. In 
this sense, accountability in environmental governance, by necessity, is wrapped up in social 
relations.  
As Paul Harris (2013) suggests, putting people at the center of governance is a solution 
for the lack of accountability from state institutions and arrangements. This lesson has been true 
in other issue areas as well. Keck and Sikkink (1999) and Sikkink (2005) note that in human 
rights, other forms of accountability are needed. For human rights violations, the propagation of 
international norms—stemming from both advocacy coalitions and UN Universal Declaration of 
Human rights, though to a lesser degree—is what was needed to push domestic institutions 
toward embracing and codifying human rights law. Keck and Sikkink found states reticent to 
rectify violations on their own until transnational advocacy networks placed pressure on them. 
These networks achieved their goals by sharing information across borders (Keck and Sikkink 
1999). This “boomerang effect” from transnational advocacy efforts can be, though it has not 
been extensively, applied to other issue areas. In this sense, solutions originating in civil society 
may have an incredibly empowering effect. The following chapters investigate these notions in 








CHAPTER FIVE: Legitimacy in the Crown Roundtable 
	  
	  
“If you don’t meet the needs of the interests at the table, they will leave the table.” 




The Crown Roundtable, to the extent that it has become a site of governing authority, 
represents a new generation of sustainable forest management that is equipped with flexibility 
and adaptiveness that are not intrinsic to hierarchical arrangements. Furthermore, it has the 
potential to be more inclusive than market mechanisms in drawing a broader base of 
participation. In a British Columbia case study Rossiter (2007) explains the “old” basis for 
legitimacy in (top-down) forest management was based largely upon sustained yield. Land and 
forest managers, however, are shifting to a “new” legitimacy, or one that is based upon shared 
authority in (bottom-up) collaborative arrangements. This significant shift in forest governance 
explains why the Roundtable has emerged as a viable governance alternative but also suggests 
that those managers and stakeholders who still see legitimacy as conferred through top-down 
management will likely pose objections to participating (Rossiter 2007). If managers still adhere 
to this old discourse, that managing forests for sustained yield is the sole jurisdiction of the state, 
it is difficult to see the incentives for participation in the landscape-wide transboundary 
Roundtable. In this chapter I argue there is an alternative basis: the perceptions of the governed 
form the basis of the justification for authority in the NG process. 
At the outset of the project, I wanted to make sure that I was not making the assumption 
that simply adding civil society to the mix would lead to acceptance of an NG process. Others 
have shown that it is not necessarily the case that bringing in a wide variety of actors and 




(Steel and Weber 2003). So I wanted to avoid assuming that simply bringing in civil society 
would automatically lead to an increase in legitimacy. Likewise, I avoid assuming that 
deliberation is a threshold. The investigation presented in this chapter, then, builds from the 
assumption that legitimation is a deliberative processes. That is to say, the basis of participation 
matters more than the numbers at the table. From there, it investigates the mechanisms behind 
legitimation. 
Achieving a level of participation that is entirely inclusive and comprehensive is 
admittedly problematic. In the Crown landscape, for example, there are 4.4 million people living 
in the province of British Columbia, just over four million in the province of Alberta, and 
slightly more than one million in the state of Montana. Pooling input from all individuals within 
the political jurisdictions covered by the landscape, let alone the natural resource organizations, 
is a monumental task at this scale. Rather than focusing on the numbers of participation, it is how 
actors interact that determines whether the process is seen as legitimate. As discussed in chapter 
4, qualities pertaining to social capital and the quality of participation, rather than the quantity, 
matter more for governance. 
The chapter first introduces how legitimacy is conferred in various governance 
arrangements, highlighting the bases for participation and acceptance. I then explore types of 
legitimacy with the aim of situating acceptance and participation in NG as a sociological process 
set apart from normative standards. Without the basis of acceptance found in hierarchical settings 
(the formal backing of the state) or the basis of acceptance found in market arrangements (stable 
exchange rates and a state-backed currency), it is important to ask how networked processes 
come to be accepted as appropriate sites for governance. I argue that legitimacy is conferred 




claims that the governed accept authority when it is seen to result from a deliberative process. 
That is to say, participants accept the rules because they are actively creating them.  
The chapter presents empirical material supporting the altered basis of legitimacy in NG, 
using narratives that illustrate each of the three major components of social capital that have built 
acceptance of the Roundtable as a legitimate mode of governing a transboundary landscape. 
Because it is constructed as a deliberative space, participants accept the Crown Roundtable 
across jurisdictions. Participants ultimately confer legitimacy on the Roundtable through a 
deliberative process as they come to trust each other, share a common identity, and accept a set 
of norms. In essence, these three components are the mechanisms for legitimating the process. In 
the next section, I present the methods for investigating how they were brought about.  
 
5.2 Qualitative Methods 
 
I use the case of the Crown Roundtable to illustrate the sociological basis of legitimation 
in networked governance. The narratives that emerged from my time in the field provide a rich 
contextual backdrop. I conceive of narratives as the storylines behind, or building blocks for, 
larger discourses, relying on Hajer's (1997, 44) notion that discourse is “a specific ensemble of 
ideas, concepts, and categorizations that are produced, reproduced, and transformed in a 
particular set of practices through which meaning is given physical and social realities.” In order 
to investigate the mechanisms behind the process of legitimation, I looked for narratives or 
storylines that would indicate how participants began to accept the Rountable as a site of 
authority.  
The point of inquiry here is to understand the process of legitimation in networked 




how a process comes to be rather than examining variance between events (Maxwell 2005). That 
is to say, the analysis does not correlate events to one another, nor does it use input or output 
variables to predict outcomes. While variance questions are often best answered with 
quantitative analyses that correlate variables in the aim of finding a causal relationship, process 
questions are well-suited for qualitative analyses (Ibid). The investigation does not focus on 
differences and their explanation, vis-à-vis asking questions related to whether or to what degree 
the Roundtable is accepted. Instead, the analysis reveals meaning and context, asking how 
networked arrangements are accepted by participants. The data for this chapter are interview 
transcripts, field notes, written material from participant observation, as well as Roundtable and 
conference publications such as pamphlets, maps, and reports. Here I briefly describe the data 
collection phase, the subsequent analysis, and finally touch upon how I selected the narratives 




As a socially-conferred quality of governance, legitimacy depends largely upon the 
perceptions of the governed. In both political science and sociology, there is some disagreement 
on the best ways to measure this “inherently abstract concept” (Raines 2003, 57). Raines (2003) 
uses a normative definition of legitimacy and focuses on standards of justice and fairness. For a 
standards-based approach, it is appropriate to use surveys and short interviews prompting 
participants to respond to statements about fairness, particularly as it relates to participation. In 
this study, however, my focus on the sociological aspects of legitimacy required longer, more in-
depth, partially open-ended interviews (some as long as two hours). In the semi-structured 




but found the most revealing responses in following up when interviewees discussed particular 
problems or issues they had dealt with in the past.31  
In the fall of 2012, I spent several weeks travelling around the region, beginning in 
Kalispell, Montana and traversing in a roughly counter-clockwise pattern between communities 
in Montana, the Glacier-Waterton International Peace Park, the province of Alberta, and into 
British Columbia, returning to Kalispell to complete the circle. I conducted seventeen semi-
structured interviews with individuals from public land and natural resource agencies (federal 
and provincial), community organizations, municipal government, private business, economic 
development groups, higher education, and an ecological research station. Sample questions are 
listed in Table 5.1 below.  Ultimately I envisioned the interview data would allow me to examine 
discourses about governance, but I was not entirely sure which narratives would emerge, so the 
questions were left somewhat broad and open-ended. 
Table 5.1 Interview Questions Arranged by Theme. 




Federal, State, or Municipal 
Government 
Trust – How do participants 
view others? 
Do you collaborate or share resources 
with the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service? 
Do you share confidential information or  
strategic approaches with other NGOs?  
Without the Memorandum of 
Understanding document, would you 
collaborate with other agencies in 
[province/state]? 
Norms – what are the shared 
standards and protocols? 
With regard to climate change science, do 
you think most Roundtable members use 
IPCC data? 
Does the Roundtable set 
management protocols?  
Identity – do participants see 
themselves and their 
organizations as part of the 
larger landscape? 
How do you encourage groups to 
participate or foster a sense of buy-in? 
What is the role of academics in creating 
a landscape-wide identity? 
How do agencies situate their 
jursidictions in the larger landscape? 
How do agencies understand view 
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5.2.2 Coding and Analysis 
	  
From the beginning, the semi-structured nature of the interviews allowed participants to 
have an active role, as I encouraged them to elaborate upon the experiences they had and the 
issues and challenges that seemed most pertinent to them.32 Toward that end, as I reached 
saturation for particular topics in earlier interviews, later interviews allowed for exploring new 
areas with participants (Huntington 2000). This open-ended and reflexive process carried over 
into the analytical phase. The coding and interpretation of interview data was an iterative process 
designed to reflexively analyze, rather than simply repeat or report upon, the understandings and 
perspectives of interviewees (Crang 1997). 
 I transcribed the longer, in-depth interviews and portions of audio recordings from 
Roundtable sessions using NVivo software and Microsoft Office. Transcription of selected 
interviews and meetings resulted in more than 52,000 words. The analysis of these materials was 
done with the aim of understanding the social constitution of the network, or how actors 
understand their involvement with the process and their relationships with other conservation 
practitioners. Instead of merely describing the Roundtable process, in terms of mapping out 
geographic distribution of participants or listing the agencies involved, or—at the other end of 
the spectrum—explaining the causal mechanism behind its formation, I sought to further 
knowledge of how participants in networked governance understand their role vis-à-vis the 
larger landscape and other organizations. That is, the aim was to explain how participants came 
to see the Roundtable as a legitimate governance space.  
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 The coding portion of the analysis took place in two stages, progressing from open 
coding to systematic coding. Open coding was based upon a grounded theory approach, which 
consists of “flexible methodological strategies” aimed at mid-level theorization (Charmaz 2003, 
440) and requiring the researcher to rely more heavily upon empirical material rather than upon 
pre-determined assumptions or hypotheses. After reading through transcripts several times, and 
making notes for noteworthy sections, I devised a host of themes. These emergent themes were 
unrestricted; that is, I made as many codes as seemed pertinent at the time. This is known as 
“provisional coding” (Glaser and Strauss 2009). The next step was to see which themes appeared 
the most. The theoretical density that emerged in later stages of open coding allows me to state 
with some confidence that three final categories are the most significant.  
Theoretical density, or the repetition of themes from one interview to the next (Glaser 
and Strauss 2009), allowed me to move toward systematic coding. I revisited themes that 
repeated; rising to the top were trust, identity, and shared norms. From there, I set up three major 
categories that point to participants’ understandings of their roles and responsibilities and the 
trust, or social capital, they have in working together; the pervasive norms in the network; and 
how the identities of participants, their organizations, and the larger network have evolved across 
the landscape. Parsing the data this way revealed that there was a story to tell for each.  
Queries in NVivo allowed me to identify areas where participants spoke about each of 
these thematic areas, ultimately identifying storylines that serve as discourses to illustrate how 
each component of social capital was built in the Roundtable. These narratives are illustrative of 
the discourses that lend to participants’ acceptance of the Roundtable. The narratives, then, are 
the mechanisms participants use to make “practical judgments” (Hajer and Wagenaar 2003) as 




accepting the Roundtable. In the following section, I explore narratives pertaining to each of the 
three components of social capital showing how the Crown Roundtable has come to be accepted 
as a mode of governance. Direct quotations are used as evidence for the narratives (Corden and 
Sainsbury 2006); they are particularly helpful for illustrating the ways in which individuals 
construct or understand their relationship to others in the Roundtable and to the landscape. In the 
presenting the narratives, I have distinguished between trust, identity and norms for analytical 
purposes, but it should be noted that in practice they are inter-connected and do not always 
proceed in step-wise fashion. 
 
5.3 Constructing Legitimacy in the Crown Roundtable  
 
The deliberative basis for legitimacy is a strength of networked governance. In 
hierarchical settings, the basis of authority is derived from the state, whether it arises from its 
control of resources or its adherence to the rule of law, free and fair elections, and participation 
in international processes. In market arrangements, authority is derived from the fulfillment of 
contractual obligation, which is legitimated through the stability of currencies and the 
performance of financial mechanisms. However, in networked governance, the governed actively 
participate in the governing process.33 This requires stripping away the standards-based 
requirements in favor of looking at contextual, process-based qualities. As the Crown case 
illustrates, these qualities are based upon a rootedness in deliberation; beyond this, the qualities 
of trust, a shared identity, and common norms are important. A collaborative approach to 
ecosystem management can improve the outcomes of government actions by bringing together a 
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wider host of resources; when these resources are used to work toward achieving public goals, it 
becomes possible to build a wider base of support than may otherwise be present (Steel and 
Weber 2003). 
A common identity fosters a sense of shared fate and shared potential. Identity at the 
landscape level facilitates collaboration between individuals and organizations across borders 
because there is an understanding that those across borders are similar and face common 
challenges. It fosters a sense of community and credibility (Cheng and Daniels 2003). The 
presence of a perceived community is important to stitch together the ways of understanding 
landscape change (Davenport and Anderson 2005). Its absence can pose considerable challenges. 
In Zürn's terms, “The absence so far of a fully developed transnational political community is 
incongruous with the existence of transnational social spaces, and poses a congruency problem 
that cannot easily be overcome” (2004, 260). This move toward a transnational sense of 
community is a critical component for building trust. However, the process is mutually 
reinforcing. To build the perception that a community exists without borders it helps to include a 
host of actors who trust each other. 
 When working at the large landscape level, it is important that individuals trust each 
other. This is what has allowed project implementation to move forward in various locales across 
the Crown landscape as the Roundtable has moved into its project implementation phase. 
Opinions on management decisions are heeded when actors trust each other enough to view them 
as appropriate ways of solving common problems. This trust is built upon the deliberative 
qualities of the governance process: namely a shared identity and common norms. The 
investigation of each of these qualities—trust, identity, and norms—proceeds with qualitative 







When a process is described as legitimate, it implies that decisions are made with the 
democratic majority of “a political community based on trust and solidarity” (Zürn 2004). As 
trust is built into relationships between individuals, particular views are legitimated (Ball and 
Junemann 2012). If mechanisms for engaging users across jurisdictional borders are absent, the 
goodwill required for collaboration decreases. Mere compliance does not reach the cooperative 
standard required in networked governance. As Barbara Misztal (1996, 245) points out, “While 
obedience can be sufficiently procured by incentives and sanctions, social cooperation, however, 
is unachievable without trust…” Cooperative governance arrangements require trust because 
they are about shared visioning rather than simply enforcing rules.  
Trust involves taking some risks in that actors are vulnerable but proceed with the best 
intentions, believing that others will do the same. In governance trust is a stable expectation that 
actors make decisions with the broader interest of others in mind (Klijn, Edelenbos, and Steijn 
2010). Trust is a critical component of social capital. As the complexity of a problem increases, 
so too must social capital (Huppé et al. 2012). When uncertainty about challenges is high, or 
there is conflicting scientific information, trust is especially important (Klijn, Edelenbos, and 
Steijn 2010). As a problem crosses borders, the institutional design process becomes more in-
depth and requires more good social will in order to work within the bounds of both 
collaborative visioning and environmental effectiveness (Huppe 2012, 19).  
Opinions on management decisions are heeded when actors trust each other enough to 
view them as appropriate ways of solving common problems. Working at the large landscape 
level, trust can become an obstacle. In some of the rural portions of the landscape, in particular, 




the notion of a Crown-wide identity, because as she put it, “It’s all about who controls the land” 
(Yung, Freimund, and Belsky 2003). In other words, this private individual saw linking up at the 
transboundary ecosystem level as a threat to her ability to make decisions or to even remain on 
her ranch, “which she believed was coveted by conservationists and agencies” (Ibid). Participant 
observation at the Roundtable revealed similar challenges. These sentiments emphasize just how 
important it is for individuals and organizations to come together in collaborative relationships of 
trust.  
Indeed, in the case of the Crown Roundtable, the board of directors explicitly recognizes 
the value of a regional forum for exchanging ideas and building relationships with the ultimate 
aim of creating “opportunities to work together” (‘Remarkable Beyond Borders’ 2012), none of 
which would be possible if participants did not trust one another. One interviewee confirmed,  
[W]e all work well together; we all are completely open and trust each other we know 
how to delegate different aspects of the work to the appropriate organization and no one’s 
really concerned about the ego gratification. We’re all concerned about the outcomes, so 
it’s not about taking credit, it is about getting results.  
The interviewee’s statement reinforces the notion that working relationships must be formed on 
the basis of trust. Without trust in other participants, it would be difficult to accept the governing 
authority of the Roundtable. This basis of acceptance was reiterated by other interviewees and 
also in a case study report on the Crown. Under a collaborative rationality, decisions are 
inherently contingent, and can be revised McKinney (2011). Especially given what we know 
about environmental problems: that new scientific information may reveal changing conditions, 
and that the people who depend on natural resources for their livelihoods may change their 
demands or desired level of involvement. In the context of uncertainty, decisions can be revised 
in light of new information or changing preferences. The glue that holds the process together is 




accept the governing authority, knowing that they can actively shape the process as it proceeds. 
This acceptance is based upon the deliberative qualities of governance, including that actors 
believe others have their best interest in mind.  
A shared identity is closely related to the notion of trust. Indeed, one of the major players 
in creating the landscape-wide Crown of the Continent identity stated,  
I realized that building those relationships and trust across these borders was going to be 
absolutely essential to any long-term solution. It was in the spirit of the world’s first 
international peace park but we needed to take the concept of international cooperation 
beyond just the Waterton-Glacier International Park to encompass the entire Crown of the 
Continent. 
 
One of the major preceding efforts to the Roundtable, the National Geographic map project, 
required trust across borders. This fits with observations from the Roundtable and in 
conversations and interviews with other actors on the landscape. In order for individuals and 
organizations to want to be associated with others across jurisdictional borders, let alone commit 
the time and resources toward the collaborative process, they had to trust that these relationships 
were formed on the basis of shared goals. A conservation NGO in Montana, for example, might 
want to engage the governance process with a public land management agency if there is a basis 
of trust that creates a backbone of mutual goals.  
 Trust is bound up in the notion of identity, because without it, it is easy for individuals 
and organizations to imagine that there is a vast chasm between their own goals and others’. 
Prior to the National Geographic map project, a degree of isolationism between rural residents 
and communities prevented them from seeing shared interests. As an NGO founder put it, the 
hurdles in community engagement for conservation included a shared mistrust for public 




is not the best messenger. Government is not very great at communications; they’re not 
comfortable with it. They shouldn’t be the ones to invite people to the party.”  
Once a level of trust is established, it becomes possible for individuals and organizations 
to relate as similar entities, making it seem as if there is a singular identity blanketed across the 
landscape. However, the creation of trust does not always precede the formation of an identity. 
Sometimes the identity, when cast in place, can create a space for trust in advance, where it may 
not exist yet.  In the words of the same co-creator of the National Geographic project,  
…[T]he idea of it was to start to stitch together a regional identity for the Crown of the 
Continent to help people in Choteau, Montana and Pincher Creek, Alberta or Cranbrook, 
British Columbia; Big Fork or Polson Montana to realize and be proud of the fact that 
they are part of this internationally significant region that is surrounds the world’s first 
international peace park. Everyone wanted to be on that map. 
 
The formation of the trust was, in part, co-created in a bottom-up fashion by the desire to share 
an identity.  
Can trust also be engendered in a top-down fashion? Bailer and Heinrich (2012) present 
quantitative evidence that trust is not robust in the bottom-up context of political culture. Top-
down claims that trust is created through institutions, however, are well supported. That vibrant 
political institutions are crucial is indeed supported in the case of the Crown. Several 
interviewees offered support for this claim by pointing to a Memorandum of Understanding 
between the governors of British Columbia and Montana placing a moratorium on mining 
activities in the Elk River Valley of BC.  
The activist NGOs and concerned land managers alike were elated by the formal 
recognition that these practices were harming delicate ecosystems. A land manager said of the 
process of creating the 2008 BC – Montana MOU: 
There are the MOUs, they speak to working together, because they’re—it’s not really 




you know, we’ve all got to do things to make that happen, because the bears are going to 
move around… And that MOU talks about things both governments will do to work 
together, and after that British Columbia passed further legislation and we're waiting for 
the US to do the same. 
 
However valuable the MOU is for fostering cooperation, it would not exist without the bottom-
up quality of social capital, trust, and neighborly good will.34 Similarly in Alberta, an MOU was 
created through community and cooperation. In response to invasive aquatic species,  
So we simply chose something simple. We don’t have these three things. We don’t want 
them. Our outcome is to keep them out. Does Montana agree with that? Yes. Does BC 
agree with that? Yes. Does Alberta agree with that? Yes. Ok, what’s Alberta doing, 
what’s Montana doing, what’s BC doing? What are we doing together, within the 
Crown? So that’s how we’re dealing with it in the Crown. The mechanism—my long 
spiel is about to come to an end—the mechanism would probably by an MOU, Theresa. 
We’d write this down, formally. Is the outcome, is what the individual jurisdictions are 
doing—and then we’d have that signed off. 
 
These instances and the managers’ perceptions of them support the claim that top-down 
institutional arrangements and bottom-up trust and social capital confer legitimacy on the 
transboundary civil society (or political community, or deliberative transboundary space) in the 
landscape whose effects would not be felt without communicative practices. That is to say, the 
MOUs were necessary, but not sufficient, components of legitimation in the Roundtable. 
A clear order is not always apparent in the creation of legitimacy and that the elements 
identified (trust, identity, and norms) may not proceed in stepwise fashion in every instance; 
rather, they may crop up in phases, tugging at each other in a general push toward the end 
product. In this sense, the analysis shows that legitimacy cannot be examined in terms of strict a 
priori protocol, reinforcing Bernstein’s (2011) notion that legitimacy in global governance is 
contextually conferred. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  





5.3.2 Identity: Being Part of a Place 
	  
The case revealed the importance of another component beyond establishing trust. 
Legitimacy, as a process, depends a great deal upon the shared identity across the landscape. As 
a “social fact,” collective identity follows the Durkheimian notion that people construct the 
meaning of the world around them not through individual choice but through the ways that 
others view them (Misztal 1996).  The presence of a shared social identity can have the effect of 
changing behavior in a pro-environmental direction (Goldstein, Cialdini, and Griskevicius 2008). 
Having already gone through the process of creating a shared identity in the Crown of the 
Continent allows decision-making to move more swiftly through initial stages of communication, 
because it is understood where the bounds of the landscape lie. In the words of an NGO director, 
the shared identity allows the Roundtable to “communicate really quickly to the public” what the 
ecosystem is, almost as if it is a “commercial brand” with instant recognition.  
Maps matter a great deal for creating a landscape identity. Different assumptions are 
projected depending on the focal components, how the lines are drawn, and which juristictions or 
features are portrayed. Many of the interviewees either referenced a particular map in 
conversation or pointed directly to one displayed on office walls. Two interviewees even drew 
out their own maps, sketching out landscape boundaries, both in terms of political jurisdictions 
and natural features, while we spoke. In the Roundtable panel discussions, maps were displayed 
to illustrate In the Crown landscape. The map, then, became a boundary object that allowed 
participants to explore their shared identity. It forms a virtual “meeting place” that allows 
participants to link up with each other. 
The study of place is “an integrative approach to understanding people’s relationships 




increasingly popular in forest governance scholarship both at the domestic level and the 
international (Manuel-Navarete, Slocombe, and Mitchell 2006; Nie and Fiebig 2010; Yung, 
Freimund, and Belsky 2003). It is particularly important to consider place and context, because 
so much of forest management is bound up in land use patterns and decisions. Furthermore, land 
use and tenure are heavily linked to people’s perceptions and the revelation of new scientific 
information is unlikely to change basic desires and goals, despite an improved understanding of 
natural systems. Sense of place is tied closely to discourse (Yung, Freimund, and Belsky 2003), 
which means that forest management will always be inherently political. A focus on place 
“moves forest policy and management beyond the narrow confines of economic research by 
acknowledging the multiple relationships people have with geographic locations” (Ibid, 860) and 
is concerned with the values, symbols and identities of a landscape. 
A shared identity has been particularly strengthened through a National Geographic map 
project. As a large, fold-out publication with images of the landscape as well as vignettes from 
those who live and work in the Crown of the Continent, it provides a cohesive picture of how the 
various jurisdictions fit together. One of the creators of the map stated,  
But the idea of it was to start to stitch together a regional identity for the Crown of the 
Continent to help people in Choteau, Montana and Pincher Creek, Alberta or Cranbrook, 
British Columbia; Big Fork or Polson Montana to realize and be proud of the fact that 
they are part of this internationally significant region that is surrounds the world’s first 
international peace park. Everyone wanted to be on that map. 
 
The map was made through a deliberative process that involved interviews and focus groups in 
communities across both Canadian provinces and the state of Montana. It was crafted in the spirit 
of geotourism, and commisioned by National Geographic. Geotourism is meant to “sustain or 
enhance the geographic character of a place—its environment, culture, aesthetics, heritage, and 




collaboratively by those who live on the landscape through a process that involved going out into 
towns and rural areas to talk to people and hear their stories. One community member in Fernie, 
B.C., a retired geologist, recalled with pride that he helped in the map-making process by telling 
the story of mining in the Elk River Valley. Another interviewee, one of the map’s key 
developers, insisted that he did not “write” the map, but instead drew together information from 
traveling around the region, holding focus groups, and getting to know people in other 
communities.  
The implications of mapping the Crown of the Continent landscape in such a visible and 
widely-recognized format have been significant. A Crown of the Continent geotourism web site 
heightened a sense of identity “among residents and vistors alike” with positive impacts on 
conservation goals as well (Chambers et al. 2010). The National Geographic map took this 
project a step further, in particular, by stitching together communities across the U.S.-Canada 
border. As the map project leader put it, “when you would talk about Crown of the Continent, 
maybe five or six years ago, it was just Montana. It was Glacier and Bob Marshall 
[Wilderness].” The Crown name and its counterpart identity was attributed to Montana, but not 
extended into Canada.  
[Montana], that’s only half of the Crown of the Continent—it goes up into Canada. Well 
he knew that, but he didn’t know that landscape. He taught a course at University of MT 
on the Crown of the Continent and he didn’t include anything in Canada. I said, that does 
not help the situation, because frankly some of our biggest conservation challenges are on 
the Canadian side. So if you’re just talking about Montana, you’re going to fail. 
 
To change this perception, the map broadened perspectives beyond particular subregions.  
This process would not have been possible without shared collaborative visioning. Here 
constructivist approaches to IR remind us that the dynamics of group decision making have the 




singular, identity to emerge. The map, for example, lists vignettes on a variety of topics from 
farming, mining, recreation, tourist destinations, climate science dynamics, local eating, seasonal 
shifts, first nations, and cultural festivals. The identity formation as a rich and varied landscape 
laid the foundation for trust, emphasizing the interconnectedness of these components. 
As civil society actors design solutions for transboundary problems, we see governance 
innovations that may eventually reach more formal levels of agreement. Borderlands are 
laboratories for this type of institutional change (Blatter 2003, 505). In terms of establishing 
accountable relationships, the way boundaries are drawn matters a great deal. The space in which 
a landscape is delineated can determine which communities are included and which particular 
problems are important. This is playing out in the Crown Roundtable. As one participant told me,  
…we are trying to go down this path and it’s still difficult; we’re still in our silos in terms 
of water, fisheries objectives, these are the groundwater or air quality objectives. But 
we’re trying to sort of integrate that around landscape intactness… How you set the 
landscape is ultimately going to determine what you’re seeing in terms of species or 
connectivity or intactness or whatever quality or criteria. 
 
In other words, the borders matter because the width of the net cast will return varying numbers 
of problems and implicate their according agencies, landowners, and interested parties. In that 
sense, the Crown of the Continent initiatives are incredibly ambitious in seeking to trace around 
a landscape of over 18 million acres.  
In setting up the Crown of the Continent boundaries, one environmental compliance 
officer for the National Parks Service told me that “[the Crown Manager’s Partnership] looked at 
landscape features. The ones that were harder were this prairie. You know, we could have easily 
gone further. But we felt like this prairie basin here was what made more sense from an 
ecological perspective it changes as you get out there.” Additionally, it was important that the 




those relationships and trust across these borders was going to be absolutely essential to any 
long-term solution. It was in the spirit of the world’s first international peace park but we needed 
to take the concept of international cooperation beyond just the Waterton-Glacier International 
Park to encompass the entire Crown of the Continent.” The decision to draw the landscape 
boundaries was also based on increasing geotourism and a National Geographic map drew quite 
a bit of attention to the landscape as well. Interestingly, many of the same individuals involved in 
making the geotourism map are involved in the Crown Roundtable process now.  
The National Geographic map creation was an involved process that took into account 
input from interviews and focus groups, as well as consulting with many local conservationists. 
As one of the leaders of the project informed me, this was not an uncontroversial process: 
Part of the attitude was, if we start talking about ecosystems, the Crown of the Continent 
ecosystem, all these—we’ve got them on both sides of the border—these black helicopter 
type people that think the United Nations is going to come and get them. Or as one 
person said in a focus group, “I don’t want to be part of your stinkin’ ecosystem!” I don’t 
understand what an ecosystem is but it’s scary and it smells of United Nations and one-
world government and all these conspiracies that these small-town people in Montana 
and British Columbia have. 
 
Returning to the notion of the borderland as a laboratory for change, it is apparent that the 
process of defining the Crown of the Continent landscape was not without political contestation. 
Perhaps twenty years ago, it may have been difficult to imagine that individuals, groups, and 
public organizations would link up across the space. This notion of interconnectedness, however, 
seems to be winning out and it certainly predates the Crown Roundtable, supporting the claim in 







 5.3.3 Norm of Autonomy: Finding Freedom and Obligation 
	  
In the Crown Roundtable case, I found that identity was tied to norms insofar as there 
was an understanding amongst participants that they would simultaneously maintain their 
collective and individual identities. Ariel Colonomos (2008, 204), in writing about this refers to 
identities as composites; for her, the “plurality of the self” implies that individuals will present 
themselves differently based on the context in which they find themselves. This freedom to focus 
on different identities is a type of autonomy that is imperative for legitimating networked 
processes. It hearkens back to the voluntary and decentralized nature of networked governing 
arrangements and also the functional differentiation between units. The Crown network itself is 
not a site of management or direct implementation: so in order for the network to be effective, 
each organization or component entity must still perform its functions. In this sense, multiple 
identities provide the freedom necessary for component parts to meet their obligations. Like a 
good marriage, the maintaining separate and collective identities allows for networked 
governance to take place in public and private spheres. These spaces, taken separately or 
together, would not be possible without plural identities.  
One participant told me she “wears many hats” in the Roundtable. Trained as a biologist, 
she worked at a field station doing ecological monitoring but also worked in the policy context. 
She found the Roundtable’s origins in academia especially important as this space allowed 
participants to nurture their separate perspectives. In her words, 
…it’s rare where you have sort of industry, government and conservation groups all at 
the table so academia is the place where you can wear a government hat… because the 
University of Montana is a state entity but at the same time I can very well be a part of 
the NGO and industry and all the other conversations that are taking place. I wear that hat 
and can be part of the conversation. I’m obviously not a manager, I’m a research scientist 
at the [X] Biological Station; I’m on the Crown Roundtable and the University [of 
Montana] is on it as well. I work with the Crown of the Continent Conservation Initiative 




of the British Columbia-Montana Memorandum of Understanding and implementing that 
negotiation over the Flathead River.  
 
If her role sounds exhausting, that’s because it probably is. I was impressed time and again both 
in talking with her and others about her work. In fact, part of the interview took place on a bus to 
the field site, a testament both to her ability to think on her feet (or bus seat, as it were) and the 
fact that she was so busy the only time she could carve out was during transit. Beyond being 
extraordinary in this case, and perhaps somewhat simpler in others, this ability to maintain 
multiple identities can also be seen as a norm of autonomy. The next part of the section 
elaborates on the norm of autonomy.  
Because networked governance follows a fundamentally different pattern of organization 
or configuration of authority, it is difficult to know what the role of the public official is. While it 
is true that NGOs are inserted more directly into the policy process, public officials still need to 
take on a role of responsibility. It shifts the role of government from one of oversight and final 
say to one of hitting the streets and sitting at roundtables without a strong agenda of its own. This 
is evidenced by one participant’s remarks, from a public land management agency perspective:   
In some ways I think we’ve been cautious because there’s this perception of, you know, 
the Flathead Valley, is pretty conservative. There is a population here that is afraid of 
‘big government’ and that’s why… it’s one of the reasons about being very clear … 
We’re just a co—we’re a group of willing land managers that see value in working 
together collaboratively on some things and we’re each engaged to achieve our own 
missions.  
 
The land manager here was careful to acknowledge that her agency had its own mission and 
mandate and that her participation in Crown-wide collaboration should not detract from it. Much 
of the sentiment from agency officials I spoke with echoed the same: they did not want to 
abrogate their responsibility, their official role within the agency, by their membership and 




Another state-employed scientist put it this way, noting that the Roundtable “does not 
govern as an entity,” saying “We leave it up to the jurisdictions to govern in their jurisdictions. 
We talk about the areas where we can collaborate effectively and where working together 
collectively we can make a difference.” Multiple individuals told me that at the end of the day, 
each of their organizations and agencies had their own missions and mandates. Therefore, 
participation in the Roundtable could not replace or usurp those identities. Autonomy was not a 
problem in the Roundtable process because it is understood that others are facing the same 
challenges and constraints.  
For some, governing authority is fleeting and still very much a work in progress; it is an 
endpoint that has not been achieved at the transboundary level because agencies must retain their 
own local autonomy, to avoid straying from local needs and to be sensitive to those who are 
wary of transboundary governance. In the words of one US National Park Service representative 
describing governance in the region, “[we] need to be cautious because there is a contingent in 
the Flathead Valley that is wary of big government. The Crown Managers’ Partnership is very 
clear about saying the Crown initiatives are not management agencies and that ultimately 
managers have the decision-making authority.” Directly including citizens in the Roundtable 
process may be one way to overcome the distrust of government felt in the Manager’s 
Partnership. Bringing in a wider base of participation while also recognizing that individual 
communities will continue to face their own challenges is a strength of the Roundtable. In sum, 
finding the balance between obligations to the larger landscape and one’s own community can 






5.4 Concluding Thoughts: The Transboundary Landscape as a Deliberative Space 
 
The narratives told by Roundtable participants support the notion that acceptance is 
conferred not through traditional, state backed mechanisms found in codified rules; neither does 
it hinge on economic inducement or the pursuit of self-interest. Rather, it arises from the 
incredible amout of social capital that has been built between and among individuals and 
organizations across the landscape. The relationships formed through the Roundtable process are 
more than work-related. These bonds of friendship link agency representatives with private 
landowners, and forge a network that traverses jurisdictional lines. Friendships across borders 
have historically been an important part of this landscape since 1911 when the first two park 
rangers in Glacier and Waterton spent a long winter together. The recent development of the 
Roundtable has transformed these informal social ties into a promising governing arrangement. 
As it continues to convene each year, hold workshops and field trips, build upon project 
implementation, and connect conservation practitioners, these relational ties will likely become 
more central to legitimation. 
Collectively, these stories support the claim that legitimacy in networked governance is 
sociologically conferred. The findings suggest that legitimacy in networked arrangements is 
linked with social capital that is brought about through deliberation. Further examination of 
legitimacy in transboundary NG should consider deliberative components of the process. The 
next chapter considers how the social processes of trust, identity, and norms can boost the 
accountability of networked arrangements. In the concluding chapter I explore this notion of 
deliberation across borders, building from these findings to make suggestions for institutional 









This chapter explores the features of accountability in a networked forest governance 
setting. It begins by briefly presenting the methods that are specific to the analysis of 
accountability in the Crown Roundtable case, to complement the more general methods 
discussion in chapter three. A combination of network visualization and qualitative interview 
analysis is used to uncover the patterns of accountability. Social network analysis (SNA) gives a 
visual depiction of the working relationships between individuals. SNA also measures the 
network’s structural features, providing information about the ties between nodes. Interview data 
add context and depth. Findings from the social network analysis are presented in tandem with 
insights from interviews to paint a richer picture of accountability in the context of the Crown 
Roundtable. 
Accountable relationships are built upon trust. In the previous chapter, the process of 
legitimation examines how this component of social capital has been developed in the 
Roundtable. It is critical for establishing relations of accountability. When ties within a network 
are strong relationships built on trust, shared norms, and a common identity, they are imbued 
with the potential for allowing actors to make demands of each other when things go wrong. In 
other words, the components of legitimacy allow the Roundtable to weather times of conflict or 
disagreement.  
Building on the previous chapter’s consideration of the components in the process of 
legitimation, the three major insights here are that that accountability in NG (1) is relational,35 
(2) that it depends more upon rewards than punishment (or redress), and (3) that it is layered with 
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traditional forms. The chapter examines these claims in turn. Results from the Crown Roundtable 
case indicate that networked forest governance can contribute to an overall net gain in 
accountability by broadening answerability, moving from redress to reward, and layering on 
additional relationships that help individuals and organizations tap into other forms of control, 
such as hierarchical rule sets or market-based standards. The chapter concludes with suggestions 
for how accountability might function in other cases of networked governance and points to 
areas where gaps still remain. The conclusion also lays out directions for future research. 
 
6.2 Methods 
 The section presents a background on the methods specific to exploring accountability. 
The data collection and analytical techniques combine a range of qualitative field research 
methods with social network analysis (SNA). It has been beneficial in other studies to combine 
SNA with interviews, observation, and historical research (Cross et al. 2009).   
SNA offers a way to objectively measure the features of a somewhat malleable concept, 
global civil society. The literature on global civil society proposes there is a space where 
individuals link up across borders. Keane (2003, 8) refers to global civil society as an 
“unfinished project,” that is made up of “sometimes thick, sometimes thinly stretched networks, 
pyramids and hub-and-spoke clusters of socio-economic institutions and actors who organize 
themselves across borders.” This description offers an intriguing proposition: relationships 
within civil society are arranged in configured patterns across borders. The question becomes, 
how do we visualize these patterns? Is it possible to take a snapshot in time of the structural 
features of networks? The more complex a process or problem becomes, the more difficult it is 




important. Accountability in NG rests on the linkages between individuals, crisscrossing various 
boundaries. SNA helps us visualize these edges. Further exploring how SNA reveals relational 
patterns makes it possible to link them to accountability. The structure of a network has been 
linked to its effectiveness, productivity, and to the sense of obligation between its members (Burt 
2000; Pentland 2014). 
SNA is a relatively new application in the study of global governance. It has been used to 
show how individuals are connected (in an ‘ego network’) and also to show how organizations 
are connected (in a ‘whole network’). It is not a theory, but rather a set of descriptive and 
analytical approaches and techniques for examining relationships among individuals and 
organizations (Anheier and Katz 2005). In some instances, it is a tool to show how patterns of 
governance are structured. Paterson et al. (2013), for example, use it to first understand the 
diffusion of authority, or polycentricity, in emissions trading schemes and as a mapping tool to 
identify significant nodes for follow-up interviews. In other instances, it can be used to show 
how social-relational patterns “enable and constrain” individuals and processes (Bodin and Prell 
2011). A major advantage of network analysis is its ability to consider the social units that 
traverse across and around the boundaries of the nation state (Anheier and Katz 2005). 
 Just as there are many reasons for examining social networks, there are many ways of 
gathering the data. Some studies use web presence and links to show how virtual policy networks 
(informational networks where social relationships are proxies for hyperlinks to other webpages) 
are structured (McNutt and Rayner 2012). In other instances, attendance at forums, conferences, 
and meetings is used as a way to link individuals (Paterson et al. 2013).  For this portion of the 




prompts used in the survey.36 With free-response surveys, SNA can be harnessed to more 
directly examine social linkages as the individuals involved construe them, rather than as a 
whole-network approach where respondents are asked to indicate their working relationships by 
choosing from a pre-set list of organizations.  
The investigation began in September 2012 with three weeks travelling in the landscape 
doing participant observation and interviews. The first round of social network surveys was 
conducted at the third annual Crown Roundtable meeting, which took place in Fernie, British 
Columbia from September 27-28, 2012. The data, collected with open, free-response prompts, 
reveal relationships that are numerous and far-flung, showing how individuals and organizations 
tap into efforts from other communities in ways not captured in meeting minutes, attendance 
lists, web presence or other proxies. The second round, a web-based survey, was sent for those 
participants who requested more time to respond.37 Table 6.1 lists three of the prompts used on 
the survey.  
Table 6.1 Survey prompts for modeling the three network types. 
Prompt 1 Please list the top four individuals you are most likely to discuss issues regarding the 
Crown with. 
Prompt 2 Please list the top four individuals you are more likely to contact when there is a resource 
management problem or question. 
Prompt 3 Please list the top four individuals you think are most influential in setting goals for the 
landscape. 
 
Network analyses were conducted using Gephi, an open-source network visualization 
platform for Windows, Linux and Mac operating systems. The software allowed for interactively 
displaying nodes in various spatial configurations, along with a quantitative set of measures to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 For a more detailed list of the survey prompts, see Table 3.3. 
37 Some individuals expressed that there was not enough time during the meeting and told me they would be able to 
fill out a survey once they had returned home, but that they felt time was a little too limited during the meeting to 




examine the relationships between them. Most useful, perhaps, was the ability to visualize the 
data, to literally see the connections between individuals. To a large extent, the ability to 
recognize new patterns of engagement in the networks depends on being able to perceive them 
visually (Bastian et al., 2009). The network graphs were analyzed with standard algorithms for 
degree, density and modularity. More importantly for this analysis, the graphs were examined 
with an eye out for patterns formed by strategically configuring the network. Sometimes nodes 
overlapped or obscured each other. Similarly, connections between nodes needed to be spread 
out in order to see them. Ultimately, I used a Force Atlas 2 configuration, which disperses groups 
and gives space around larger nodes. The function ran until the graph was stabilized, with zero 
percent overlap (the nodes were separated out as to show the edges, or the ties, between them) 
with a scaling factor of 10. This configuration puts enough space between nodes so that the 
edges can be seen without excessive overlap of the nodes on top of one another.  
Visualizing the patterns of connectivity between individuals alone, however, does not 
paint the complete picture of accountability. Supporting social network data with other forms of 
qualitative information adds needed context. While SNA produces an outside view of the 
network structure, the in-depth interview data add to an insider view, with closer attention to the 
content, quality, and meaning of social relations. Mixing methods also provides a focus on 
network dynamics, in this case highlighting the dimensions of accountability that are not always 
apparent in the structure alone, such as the types and quality of interaction. The main objective in 
combining network analysis and qualitative inquiry, then, is to depict the relationships between 
individuals and to determine whether accountability is present.  
The qualitative analysis was conducted on transcripts from interviews and Roundtable 




coding was conducted in NVivo and Microsoft Word. For this portion of the study, as a 
complementary piece to the SNA, the transcripts were examined more for context and historical 
details rather than discourses or themes, as they were for the following chapter. As a supplement 
to the SNA data, the qualitative data provide a richer background for the three claims about 
accountability.  
The inferences drawn from the Crown Roundtable are presented as plausible patterns, 
with the idea that they represent ways that accountability can work in this particular case of 
networked governance, rather than being general claims about how accountability works in all 
instances of networked governance. By presenting observations in tandem with theory, it is 
possible to generate possible interpretations rather than seeking to prove the ultimate nature (if 
one exists) of accountability in NG.38 It is consistent with a desire to make inferences and 
observations that go as far as the data allow and not beyond. 
 
6.3 The Relational Nature of Accountability 
	  
Networked forms of governance are characterized by unique patterns of accountability. 
Because actors relate to each other in a non-hierarchical fashion, it is not always clear where 
directives or redress are initiated. Going back to the definition of networked forest governance 
(presented in chapter two) helps highlight the focus of the research. Networked forest 
governance is built upon the lateral linkages across a multiplicity of actors—state agencies, 
NGOs, citizen advocacy groups, and national governments, among others—that hinge on norms 
of trust and a shared purpose and identity, for the purpose of making decisions or informing 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 Though the grounded research design here means that findings and conclusions are generally limited to the case 
of the Crown Roundtable, the methods in this study could be used to investigate another case. The findings are used 




decision-making procedures. An understanding of network structure aids in determining the 
presence of these features. The structural features of networks (e.g. the relational ties) have an 
effect on the social processes (e.g. learning, knowledge transfer, information sharing, power 
dynamics, and the ability to build consensus) between participants (Bodin and Crona 2009) 
When it comes to examining accountability, the focus is on whether and how actors impact one 
another’s decisions in a two-way responsive pattern.  
The network analysis suggests that there are many ties between participants but does not 
always offer a clear explanation of why the ties exist. Interview data are helpful here. For 
example, several practitioners from the province of Alberta at the September 2012 annual 
conference told me that they participated in the Roundtable because of their relationship with one 
particular individual who works for a provincial natural resource agency. Without their strong 
ties to this individual, it is possible they would not have been involved in the Roundtable. Social 
network theory points to the importance of connectors, with a social network as “a structure 
composed of a set of actors, some of whose members are connected by a set of one or more 
relations” (Knoke and Yang 2008, 8). Nodes are the members of the social system and ties 
represent the relationships between them. The relationships will vary in form. More specifically, 
relational form is defined as “(a) the intensity, frequency, or strength of interaction between pairs 
of actors; and (b) the direction of relations between both dyad members—null, asymmetric, or 
mutual choices” while relational content refers to the “substance or reason for occurring” 
(Knoke and Yang 2008, 11).  
Network structures can say quite a bit about the relationships between individuals. 
Granovetter's  (1973) approach to network theory suggests that even when individuals are not 




together. However, the evidence suggests that across the Crown landscape, there are stronger ties 
at play. Observation in the Crown Roundtable reveals that agency officials sometimes step 
outside the bounds of their official roles, working together as friends and collaborators rather 
than in their formal roles as land managers. For example, while spending time in a couple of the 
communities on the landscape, especially Kalispell, Montana and Fernie, B.C., it was not 
uncommon for me to bump into land managers, scientists and NGO leaders meeting around 
town. Not only was this interesting for me as a qualitative researcher as it allowed additional 
exposure to the study population, but also for another key insight that emerged. These 
individuals—drawn from disparate groups of private citizens, landowners, public employees, and 
activist organizations— were not just working together during the Roundtable sessions. They 
were friends who spent time together otherwise. They knew each other’s families, they shared 
hobbies and pastimes, they traveled together, and ultimately they genuinely liked each other and 
enjoyed each other’s company.  
Fitting then, that just as Glacier-Waterton International Peace Park emerged as an idea 
between two friends, the first park rangers in 1910 and 1911 (Stewart 2013), friendship continues 
to be the glue that holds collaboration together. As these friendships are formed and maintained, 
a sense of obligation links individuals to each other across borders. Under Granovetter’s 
framework, we might think about these friendships as strong ties. The more frequently 
individuals interact, the more likely they are to develop a friendship. In this space of civic 
engagement, the important aspects of accountability in a networked setting come from the 
relationships that individuals have with each other. Because NG is a pattern of organization and 
not a commitment to a strict set of procedures and protocols, it matters what each individual 




SNA reveals that not all members of the network are equally equipped to hold one 
another to account because the structures of their social relationships vary. This suggests that 
accountability in networks may be relational. That is to say, there is variation in the ability to 
hold one another to account. For this reason, it is especially important to look at the way a 
network is configured. Accountability in NG is created through connectivity: bringing about 
change by forming and maintaining partnerships. This is not a new argument. In the study of 
environmental politics, it is commonly accepted that collective action is a requisite for change.  
Moving beyond the notion that it only takes one individual to change the world, Maniates 
(2001) argues for the importance of community engagement. Connecting with others who are 
working on similar problems leads to more collaborative solutions that may ultimately more 
effective in achieving outcomes. That individuals cannot act as effectively alone is echoed in a 
report on the Crown Roundtable, in which Margaret Wheatley and Deborah Frieze (2009) offer,  
Despite current ads and slogans, the world doesn’t change one person at a time. It 
changes as networks of relationships form among people who discover they share a 
common cause and vision of what’s possible… We don’t need to convince large numbers 
of people to change; instead, we need to connect with kindred spirits. 
Rather than thinking that one can single-handedly solve complex problems, particularly ones as 
complex as those related to environmental degradation, it can be more effective to form 
partnerships with others who may be able to help work toward the same goals. To lend to a better 
understanding of how these processes play out it is important to know the basic configuration of 
networks. 
  
6.3.1 Modeling Network Subtypes 
	  
Three network subtypes were modeled graphically: informational, problem solving, and 




individuals hold one another to account can change depending on the perceived purpose of the 
network. Several key quantitative measures for each are included in Table 6.3 below. Degree 
refers to the number of ties an individual has; it is the number of edges emanating from a node. 
The average degree pertains not only to the overall number of edges and nodes in a network but 
how many of these edges emanate from singular nodes. Graph density provides an indication of 
the level of connectedness in a network. It is the number of actual edges in a graph divided by 
the number of edges possible (Newig, Günther, and Pahl-wostl 2010; Otte and Rousseau 2002). 
Larger networks tend to be less dense (Newig, Günther, and Pahl-Wostl 2010). Otte and 
Rousseau (2002) explain that a density score of 0.05 is “very loose.” Fitting with what is known 
about civil society in the context of network theory, though, it is common for social networks to 
contain a central network (the core) within a larger subset of nodes that may not be so tightly 
linked (the periphery) (Anheier and Katz 2005).  
Modularity refers to the way that sub-communities emerge. It captures the notion that not 
all entities in a network are connected; rather, there are sub-groups that nest within a larger 
network and may not necessarily link up with the larger universe of individuals and 
organizations. Modularity is calculated by subtracting the number of edges in the network if they 
were placed at random from the number of actual edges falling within groups (Newman 2006). A 
positive value indicates the possible presence of a community structure (Ibid). The clustering 
coefficient reflects the tendency for tightly knit groups to form neighborhoods—it has been 
called the “small world” effect (Watts and Strogatz 1998). Average path length refers to the 
number of shortest paths passing through a node; it is related to the average ‘betweenness’ (Otte 
and Rousseau 2002). Path length, or betweenness, on its own, shows “how important a node is to 











Average Degree 0.895 0.588 0.726 
Graph Density 0.010 0.007 0.010 
Modularity 0.743 0.796 0.765 
Clustering Coefficient 0.014 0.004 0.024 
Average Path Length 2.005 1.161 1.418 
 
The variation in measures between the network subtypes suggests that individuals relate 
to each other differently depending on what they view the purpose of the network to be. For 
example, when individuals see their goal as sharing information, the network becomes denser. 
Here individuals may respond more readily to one another than when solving problems or 
engaging in project implementation. This finding was echoed in interviews as well. As one 
conservation practitioner told me, “Well, the Ministry of Environment, said that ‘this is our 
mission, this is our responsibility to do energy development’ and the Parks Service [said], ‘This 
is our mission to protect resources. We need to work together.” This same interviewee 
emphasized that it was sometimes difficult to achieve cooperation or agreement for on-the-
ground management practices like placing a moratorium on mining, but that when it came to 
sharing access to information on best management practices for aquatic invasive species, it was 
much easier. Information sharing through reports, in other words, is more easily achieved. 
However, when it comes to implementing projects or changing management protocols, separate 
agency and organization goals can get in the way of the ability of individuals to feel they can 
freely respond to each other’s needs. The three models of the network subtypes demonstrate 
these shifts by showing differences in measures of degree, density, modularity, and path length 
(see Table 6.2). This suggests individuals relate to one another differently depending on the 




The informational network depicts the linkages individuals report when they are looking 
to share information or discuss general issues. Data from prompt 1 populate this network 
model.39 This network consists of 95 nodes and 85 edges. Figure 6.1 depicts the graph of the 
central portion of the informational network.  
 
Figure 6.1 The Central Portion of the Informational Network. 
The informational network was built as a directed graph, meaning the edges are graphed 
with arrowheads to depict which individuals report reaching out to others. The way the survey 
was crafted allows for displaying ties directionally, showing which individuals report having the 
connection. The nature of the prompt, in other words, meant that respondents could name any 
other collaborator without being constrained to choosing from a list. This means that some nodes 
represent individuals who did not participate directly in the survey process. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  





The network graph of the informational network reveals disparate sub groups, or clusters. 
These groups would not be connected without the brokers. When these connectors bridge 
communities, they act as ‘hinges’ in network structure bringing together otherwise disconnected 
groups and thus promoting innovation and learning and providing opportunities for emergent 
leadership and collaborative innovation (Crona and Parker 2012). Through these connections, the 
brokerage organizations establish norms of interaction and information sharing and thus play an 
important role in the broader network processes of accountability. 
Next, the problem-solving network shows how individuals report connections when they 
are facing management challenges. It was graphed using data from prompt 2, “Please list the top 
four individuals you are more likely to contact when there is a resource management problem or 
question.” The network has 80 nodes and 47 edges and was also built as a directed graph using 
arrowheads to visually depict the direction of ties. Figure 6.2 depicts the graph of the central 
portion of the problem-solving network. 
 
 




The third subtype is the influence network, which reflects how individuals are linked to 
those they perceive as having higher ability to set direction for the Roundtable. Prompt 3 asked, 
“Please list the top four individuals you think are most influential in setting goals for the 
landscape.” Here, a built-in component of the survey that asks about frequency of 
communication verifies that individuals actually do collaborate with those they name. In other 
words, this network model does not merely depict a “who’s who” but real working relationships. 
Figure 6.4 depicts the graph of the central portion of the influence network. 
In sum, interaction and communication can vary quite a bit in networks, largely due to 
the variation in ways that the connectors can be configured. Parsing out the network subtypes 
helps display these differences. The number of ties and path length can vary quite a bit 
depending on the particular function of the governance network, but the basic pattern emerges 
that a few select individuals are hubs. They essentially serve as central connectors, drawing 
together a variety of actors from many organization types.  
 




What do differences in the analytical measures tell us about the way these sub-networks 
vary? Measures reveal differences in structural tendencies that suggest relational tendencies 
change depending on the task at hand. As Table 6.3 shows, each of these measures varies a bit 
between the three networks. As individuals work together to address challenges related to 
resource management, for example, network analysis shows that there are fewer edges or 
linkages but that, on average, they are of a shorter path length. This suggests that the problem-
solving network may be less developed, or that the Roundtable is still developing ways of 
responding in times of difficulty or conflict.40  
 However, where connections do exist in the problem-solving network, they are of a 
shorter average path length, indicating that individuals tend to engage one another more directly, 
rather than working through brokers or intermediaries, when it comes to management problem-
solving. What does this variation in network structure mean, and why is it important for 
accountability? The evidence suggests the ‘connector’ has a greater capability to hold others to 
account than non-connectors. It seems intuitive that we should be interested in the patterns the 
network takes on around these individuals, but why does it matter for accountability? 
 In many ways natural resource governance is intricately bound up with the relationships 
between people and communities. The decisions we make about managing natural resources 
depend upon the patterns of these relationships and interactions (Bodin and Crona 2009; Bodin 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 This was supported in the network analysis and in interviews. One Parks Service representative acknowledged the 
peaceful context for the conservation in the Crown landscape, saying,  
Canada and the US never really have been at war, but other places like between Finland and Russia where 
there’s a park. They have been at war, and while they aren’t currently, the effects of that have created— So 
it’s, can we learn from others, for sure. But in a lot of ways we are pretty unique. We have some of the 
cleanest water in the world and we maintain almost the full complement of carnivores, our vegetative 
diversity is huge, between the prairies and the mountains, and the Western edge where we’ve got some of 
the Pacific Northwest influences and vegetation. 
The lack of difficulty related to underlying ecological conditions suggest that the governance network may be less 




and Prell 2011). Whether or not we refer to governance arrangements as being networked, there 
are key social processes at play. For example, studies in community based natural resource 
management show that not all individuals are positioned in equal ways; some social actors are 
more capable of commanding goods and services than others (Leach, Mearns, and Scoones 
1999).  
 
6.3.2 The Role of the Connector 
	  
The notion that connectors, or brokers, matter for accountability in networked 
governance is supported by participant observation. Highly connected individuals can “bridge” 
divergent groups that would not otherwise connect (Putnam 1995). At the Roundtable meeting, 
several individuals from Alberta mentioned that they attended the meeting at the suggestion of a 
key resource manager in the province. They mentioned things like having first heard about the 
Roundtable from this particular individual, or that this individual is the one who sent them the 
reminder about attending in a given year. It was sometimes as simple as the connector providing 
basic information about the dates or location of the Roundtable, but often went beyond into their 
working relationships. This individual, a ‘connector,’ embodies the hub in the sub-and-spoke 
pattern within civil society (Keane 2003). Even when a relationship may not exist between the 
nodes at the end of the spokes, the common link of a connector suggests they may become linked 
in the future. While Granovetter (1973) calls these weak ties, more recent work has referred to 
this notion as transitivity, which claims that individuals who know another person in common 
will eventually know each other (Holman 2008).  
Analysis reveals the Crown Roundtable matches larger trends in other studies of global 




and organizations and a larger cohort that is isolated on the periphery (Anheier and Katz 2005). 
Brokers fill structural holes (Burt 1992, 2004), increasing the density of networks. Denser 
networks with a higher number of ties have a greater potential for collective action (Bodin and 
Crona 2009). Furthermore, denser networks have higher potential for deliberation because more 
participants know each other more closely (Newig, Günther, and Pahl-Wostl 2010). 
 It became clear that the member organizations, while each has their own mission and 
leadership composition, benefit from a core group of dedicated individuals who serve across 
multiple leadership boards, and devote large portions of time to conservation, in various forms, 
across the landscape. These individuals are the connectors; they are what make the Roundtable a 
“network of networks.” Brokerage, beyond its function linking together disparate portions of a 
network, is an important phenomenon in maintaining pathways between distant organizations 
and social groups (Anheier and Katz 2005). This was confirmed in interviews. In fact, one 
community organizer told me that he was the core of his group, that the organization was based 
on the connections he has, a fund of social capital that draws upon. In his words, without him, 
the organization would not exist. This is true in agencies as well. A U.S. Fish and Wildlife 
representative said, 
If you have the right leaders—the things I've done, the power of a leader is unbelievable. 
When we started the big project, we rebuilt one and a half miles of stream. The best trout 
stream in the US probably. The first meetings I'll never forget, was extremely 
contentious. You know, and here's the agencies trying to drive something. [Some 
landowners and community members] are already anti-government anyway. So we 
proposed it and everybody's going, ‘well that's not going to work 'cause of this and that.’ 
And so, one landowner said—an elderly gal— ‘You know, they have money, they want 
to do something. I think we all should listen.’ 
 
This agency official was an important part of bringing together the public and private landowners 




The role as an “institution” or a connector can be explored with social network analysis, 
which offers ways to visualize the ways individuals are connected. ‘Betweenness’ is a measure 
based on the shortest number of paths passing through an actor; those with high scores play 
connecting roles integral to overall network function—they are the ‘middlemen’ linking different 
subgroups. Figure 6.4 below illustrates this effect in the Crown Roundtable. The first image 
shows all of the nodes and edges gathered in the survey while the second zooms in on the major 
subset, showing that there are a few key places where individuals with high betweenness scores 
are the only link some others have with the network.  
 
 
Figure 6.4 “Connectors:” Individuals with High Betweenness Scores. 
 
Many of the individuals who participate in the Roundtable also serve on the boards or are 
members of the other Crown conservation initiatives. For example, a professor emeritus in Earth 
Sciences at the community college in Kalispell, Montana was a critical individual in starting up 
the first of the Crown-wide initiatives, the Crown of the Continent Ecosystem Education 
Consortium (COCEEC). While this individual was instrumental in linking up outdoor educators 
across the landscape in his role with COCEEC, he also continued to participate in the various 




director of a Flathead Valley NGO stated this individual was so dedicated that he really could not 
disengage from conservation in the Crown: 
Well he’s like late 70s and he’s trying to disengage, although he’s a very engaged person. 
He helped start the Glacier Institute and he started COCEEC. He’s a great guy. If you 
have the time, you should talk to him because he’s an institution in and of himself.41  
NG initiatives play out differently by setting and context based on the personalities and levels of 
social capital, engagement, and trust.  
One participant described another’s success in building relationships in the following 
way:  
[X] has a personal relationship with all these academic scientists, all these government 
scientists, land managers in Alberta, British Columbia and Montana, he’s done this work 
for a long time. He didn’t do any of the original ground research. He’s done it in the past. 
But for these two reports I’m talking about—he basically went to all these scientists and 
said, Hey can I have your data? A lot of them hadn’t even published it yet. They were 
going to use their data to publish it next year. But he has a good enough relationship, he 
got, I don’t know 30 different data sets on all these different pieces of the Crown of the 
Continent and he started to put them together to really look at the big picture.  
 
Without the relationships that this land manager had with other conservation practitioners across 
the landscape, he would not have been able to generate the knowledge needed to plan and 
implement projects, or in this case, compile a wildlife management report and plan.  
Depending on the perceived purpose of the network, individuals report different patterns 
of engagement. This is consistent with existing work on accountability at the individual level. 
Psychological studies have shown that when there is an expectation that decisions will have to be 
justified later, individuals feel a stronger sense of accountability toward one another and their 
task at hand (Tetlock 1985). This speaks back to the form of obligation in the Crown Roundtable. 
When working relationships are overlaid with friendships, collective intelligence can contribute 
to performing better on tasks, especially when individuals in the group are socially sensitive 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




(Woolley et al. 2010). Other studies document the benefits of working in groups. Pentland 
(2014) shows that network ties can lead to cascading behavioral change as individuals learn new 
practices from each other.   
In the Roundtable, participants with a greater number of ties are integral for bridging 
disparate groups (Bodin and Crona 2009; Putnam 1995). These individuals are the levers for 
promoting trust and cohesion required for reciprocal and mutually beneficial relationships. As 
one interviewee, a founding member of the Roundtable told me, “My focus became the entire 
Crown of the Continent. I realized that building those relationships and trust across these borders 
was going to be absolutely essential to any long-term solution.”	  Ultimately, being able to build 
consensus and resolve conflict (engaging in the coordination and steering of governance) is 
essential for holding participants to account. 
An expanded number of social ties can increase the potential for learning and behavior 
change as people are exposed to new and routine ways of doing things. These ties become social 
space for interaction, allowing participants to negotiate, express discontent, and pose solutions 
(Steyaert and Jiggins 2007). Returning to the definition of accountability, and acknowledging 
that it involves a level of responsiveness between those making claims and those solving 
problems, some evidence for this can be found in the Crown case. One participant (a key node 
identified in the influence network) mentioned that in dealing with uncertainty on the landscape, 
learning from each other becomes critically important, 
We don’t know what the future is in a year, we don’t know what the future is in five 
years, but you know, there are models out there of how people change the way they do 
things to the circumstances that they’re dealt and I think this is in the landscape way, not 
one sector is going to be able—not one type of person puts together a Toyota car. There 
are people who focus on the windshields, the tires, the engines, whatever. The car has to 
be built by all and they all have to change because each of those components is changing 
over time and I think we can do this. I think we can do this in a landscape way; and we 




separately, the conservationists can’t do it separately, the tribes can’t do it separately. We 
all have our part to play and we need to start playing together better, and learning from 
each other better. The Roundtable is a way for us to connect better on how to do that. The 
projects we have in front of us is a first attempt at how we put together better the Toyota 
of landscape conservation as a community from all sectors. 
 
In this sense, the connectors of the Roundtable recognize the importance of learning from each 
other. Connectors play an important role in facilitating the learning process and in getting work 
done (Makoto-Su, Mark, and Sutton 2007).  
However, it is important to caveat the role of the connector by acknowledging his or her 
potential to exercise power. Power can be defined as the ability of actors to compel others to 
change (Barnett and Duvall 2005). Connectors sometimes facilitate the learning process by 
serving as acting examples of acceptable behavior. However, because others look to them for 
direction, their actions can have the potential for a harmful impact. Highly connected nodes can 
have a negative effect when differential social positioning gives some individuals in a network 
the ability to unilaterally set the agenda. In essence, connectors can become sites of power when 
they choose which storylines rise to the surface. Interviews with individuals working on the 
Montana side of the border indicate that resource extraction can dominate the discourse in some 
communities. One conservation leader spoke to a conservative pro-extraction mindset he had 
observed in Northern Montana,  
So politically, and the Flathead values are very conservative and you know, “let’s just 
rape the Earth if we could” because they’ve done it in the past in terms of logging. The 
idea of getting our population on side withdrawing energy resources in the United States, 
I mean, give me a break, that’s not going to happen because energy is king.  
These and other storylines could creep into the process. Once a storyline becomes dominant, it 




A predisposition for a particular set of ideas42 can result when dominant narratives 
eclipse other storylines. Connectors can chose which stories to recount, and therefore have the 
potential to set the agenda. “Discourse coalitions” can form when influential individuals and 
groups endorse a particular narrative over another (Hajer and Wagenaar 2003). More attention is 
warranted to look at how this process can happen.  Hyperconnected nodes, rather than being 
connectors, may be controlling which discourses make the agenda or which pieces of 
information and resources are passed along. The ability to choose which storylines rise to the 
surface potentially places connectors in positions of power. Deciding which topics are open for 
discussion is a form of agenda setting. The choices made about narratives are essentially choices 
about defining problems. In other words, stories determine whether problems are defined as 
problems to begin with. Furthermore, deciding how the stories are told can have a significant 
impact on the solutions that are proposed (Hajer and Wagenaar 2003). 
From the evidence gathered at the Roundtable, this did not seem to be the case. Members 
of the Roundtable are pre-emptively considering the challenges to building a truly collaborative 
network. As one participant put it,  
To build a regional neighborhood, we’re going to think very hard about who’s not at the 
table, who doesn’t have their interest or the capacity to be there. This is very time-
intensive work and how can we have conversation with them that are—we just might call 
them up or have coffee or meet them in the field. 
 
Even though participants in the Roundtable seem to be genuinely aware of and concerned about 
the challenges related to exclusion and the exercise of power, it would be hasty to assume that 
every thing is going entirely as planned. In that case, further investigation might consider the 
ways that individuals are chosen to speak at the Roundtable, the sources of program funding, 
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which organizations are not taking part, or the types of narratives that are passed along. The 
highly connected, or influential nodes, may have the ability to limit or select which options for 
solving problems are on the table. 
Ultimately, though, in the Crown case, the ability to complete projects by utilizing ties 
with other individuals and organizations strengthens the network by bridging a gap. This is 
reinforced in the literature. The broker becomes a quasi-institution herself, as her ties between 
actors serve to bridge “structural holes” (Burt 2004, 2005) or gaps in accountability between 
actors. One possible interpretation is that accountability is founded upon the reputation and 
social standing of key individuals within the network. From participant observation at the 
Roundtable it became clear that certain individuals were well liked and respected. Their ability to 
bring participants together around a common agenda for conservation speaks volumes. The 
notion of reputation as a form of accountability is addressed in the next section.  
 
6.4 Recasting Redress as Reward  
	  
The Crown Roundtable has created a favorable set of conditions for the formation of a 
transnational public and a space for individuals to directly engage with one another across 
borders. At the front end of the project, I had a suspicion that the horizontal nature of authority in 
the relationships between actors would complicate the ability to view accountability in terms of a 
power relationship based upon the ability to punish an actor in the case of failure to meet 
expectations (Newell 2006). In the Roundtable, and in the context of NG more generally, classic 
oversight such as administrative procedures and judicial review (McCubbins, Noll, and 
Weingast, 1987) are absent because of the reticence to cede decision-making authority vis-à-vis 




public land managers I interviewed, is what made it possible for them to participate without 
overstepping their own agencies’ legal constraints, missions or mandates.  
So then, under a non-binding governance arrangement, how is it possible that individuals 
can be held to account? As the project progressed, I saw that redress, was eclipsed by another 
“R-word,” reward. Because the logic of NG fundamentally relies on collaboration, the 
governance arrangement delivers well on rewards, but not on the ability to punish other 
participants. Let us leave that for traditional, hierarchical arrangements. What is necessary, then, 
is a move toward incorporating informal rules as well as positive patterns of behavioral 
reinforcement. With an expanded view of principal-agent theory, for James Fearon (1999, 55 
emphasis added) the notion of accountability is less rigid: 
We say that one person, A, is accountable to another, B, if two conditions are met. First, 
there is an understanding that A is obliged to act in some way on behalf of B. Second, B 
is empowered by some formal institutional or perhaps informal rules to sanction or 
reward A for her activities or performance in this capacity. 
 
Important to note, and somewhat surprisingly for this principal-agent (P-A) theorist, informal 
rules can stand in place for formal institutions. Additionally, we can expand beyond redress or 
sanction to include rewards as pathways to bind behaviors to expectations. This definition is 
consistent with P-A theory in its focus on the relationship between actors, surrounding behaviors 
and expectations, and also with governance at the international level, where formal institutions 
are often not in place. This is the case in the Roundtable where the agents are acting as 
principals.  
One of the critiques of NG is that it lacks mechanisms to convey dissatisfaction or deal 
with conflict. Polodny and Page (1998, 59) point out that a network “lack[s] a legitimate 
organizational authority to arbitrate and resolve disputes that may arise during the exchange.” 




because authority is diffuse in NG, as long as each participant is perceived as able to hold other 
entities to account, we can still see patterns of responsiveness. There are multiple ways that 
individuals can do this. Redress looks different in a collaborative setting, but there are 
mechanisms to convey dissatisfaction. For example, individuals may choose to withhold 
information, or sever a working relationship. As one interviewee put it,  
So, we are exchanging inside information that we have with our contacts, you know 
Canadian federal government, B.C. provincial government, we are exchanging 
information on our contacts in state government, Senate, U.S. Congress and it all stays—
there’s no public discourse about what we talk about in our meetings, it’s all, we all 
understand that the meetings are for our information only and there’s some information 
that’s absolutely taboo to go out of the group because it would compromise relationships. 
So that’s how we function, as a coalition… so if someone violates “the oath,” or violates 
information or whatever, you can be severely reprimanded. Or you can even be—it hasn’t 
happened—but, you know the consequences are that you burn yourself if you violate that 
trust. 
Accountability in NG is based on peer-to-peer relationships and thus is more about reputations 
than formal sanctioning. Maintaining these reputations can be a form of reward itself (Benner, 
Reinicke, and Witte 2004). 
Though there are mechanisms for conveying dissatisfaction, interviewees often pointed 
more toward the positive reasons for participating. In other words, the rewards worked as 
stronger enticement to participate than any fear of negative consequences. Not only are 
participants coming back year after year to the Roundtable, but they are following through on 
their commitments to one another. They do this because they genuinely care about the issues, get 
along with each other, and enjoy being part of the Roundtable. The positive response that came 
from being in the network outweighed anything else. One interviewee put it this way,  
Yeah, so we have good working relationships with a lot of people, with a lot of 
bureaucrats and they are on the side—so we’ve got everything kind of lined up to where 
we just need the powers that be to agree with protecting the internationally significant 




In this sense, it became clear that participation is more about the rewards that stem from personal 
connections than punishment from not following formal rules. The rewards are related to 
exchange of information and the perpetuation or continuity of a relationship. This ability to focus 
on the positive reasons for being in the network was a common thread in comments from 
participants.  
Social networks are not impersonal institutions (Bodin and Prell 2011); they link actors 
up in ways that are quite compelling. As friendships are formed, individuals may feel a stronger 
sense of obligation to one another. Even budding friendships that make up “weak ties” can form 
a basis for obligation across borders. As an NGO representative on the U.S. side of the Crown 
put it, participants form bonds when they see that they have similar goals.  He stated, “down 
south of the border we’re trying to support our Canadian friends in achieving what we both want 
to achieve which is more security for wildlife, more security for landscapes at a large scale.” 
This component of wanting to help new and old friends, to share pertinent resources with those 
who are pursuing a common cause, suggests that actors in NG are bound together in a way that is 
based on positive inducements. Participants willingly take on obligations to one another because 
they find it to be rewarding.  
Another motivating factor that kept people drawn to the Roundtable was feeling like they 
had a space to express their opinions. For example, one interviewee referred to this notion as 
giving people a space “to tell their stores.” As the interviewee wove a story himself, explaining, 
So a lot of the issues we’re dealing with in resource or conservation management—
there’s a lot of science: water, wildlife, for farming, for forestry—and all of that’s 
technical, but just because we know the right thing to do doesn’t mean we do it and 
there’s a lot of acrimony, controversy over these issues at sort of an abstract level. The 
biggest challenge facing the conservation community is our record of being able to 
communicate well, because people are not moved by facts or science. How many people, 




born in Kenya but they don’t believe in [the anthropogenic causes of] climate change—
especially in this region? What are we going to do with another scientific report? How do 
you start to move the dialogue—bring people together around a common conservation 
vision? You do it by telling a story. You tell stories about real people. You have people 
tell their own stories, you put a Montana face, you have people tell their own stories on 
conservation as opposed to mission statements or the latest scientific reports. That’s not 
what moves the community dialogue. 
 
This suggests that beyond receiving information, rewards are also based on having a place to 
express opinions, tell stories, and being heard. This is a strong inducement to participate.  
The desire to be heard and recognized is a strong motivator. At the Roundtable 
conference, sometimes the question and comment period would go on longer than the panel or 
presentation that preceded it. From the artists to the forests products industry representative, 
many participants seemed to want a venue for sharing the reasons they felt strongly about 
protecting the landscape. They would often begin their statements by describing the natural 
features of the environment where they lived and what kinds of wildlife or forested ecosystem 
they were surrounded by. It was clear that this space for storytelling (both to tell stories and to 
hear other stories) was an important motivator to attend the Roundtables. Sharing narratives can 
contribute toward more clearly defining conservation goals and the meaning of resilience 
(Goldstein et al. 2013), and it is also rewarding for participants.  
Whether they referred to the annual Roundtable as a time to catch up with people they 
enjoyed seeing, or feeling proud to have done the work that linked their organization up with 
something larger than their own group, a repeating theme was that at the end of the day 
participants genuinely enjoyed being a part of the Roundtable. From year to year, the themes of 
the conferences may have been forgotten, but participants remembered the people they met and 




in the process is two-fold: participants form positive relationships and also gain access to 
information and resources with which they might not otherwise be able to link up.  
The evidence from the Crown Roundtable suggests there is a host of incentives and more 
subtle forms of obligation in networked governance. This fits with the latest findings in social 
network research, which suggest that there is a pre-emptive component of accountability. In 
social networks, individuals interact over time, adjusting their decisions in subtle ways to reflect 
what they learn from one another (Pentland 2014). In many ways, the influence of social learning 
in networked processes is not directly measurable with SNA, which is where it became important 
to use interview data43 to uncover the ways that individuals learn from and influence each other, 
and perhaps ultimately shift the ways they make decisions. Reward is a form of obligation that 
keeps individuals coming back to the Roundtable; because participants genuinely enjoy taking 
part in the Roundtable, they continue to come back and also follow through on common goals. 
However, accountability in NG goes beyond rewards. It is layered onto and intertwined with 
other forms. 
 
6.5 The Broadened and Layered Nature of Accountability 
	  
The notion that social-relational accountability is layered with other types—namely, 
more formal mechanisms—is supported in the literature as “pluralistic accountability:” which is 
based on actors, processes and outcomes (Benner, Reinicke, and Witte 2004). It has also been 
called ‘meta-governance’ (Sørensen and Torfing 2005). Whatever we call it, it is important to 
recognize the layering of accountability mechanisms, because, as (Newman 2004, 20) puts it, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




“network governance is not the only game in town: hierarchy and markets continue to pervade 
the governance regimes of modern states, and managers are faced with the task of resolving the 
tensions and dilemmas that are produced as multiple regimes of power intersect, collide and 
conflict.”  
Some have claimed there is a need for “both traditional and new forms” of accountability 
(Bovens 2007). The new forms, here, by implication, are relational and informal. Hierarchy has 
been referred to as an ‘old mode’ of governance reliant upon command-and-control regulations 
and chains of delegation. This is a confusing distinction, as voluntary arrangements, or ‘new 
modes’ of governance, often continue to operate in tandem with or alongside hierarchies. 
Bäckstrand et al. (2010) claim, “the rise of new modes of governance is in many instances based 
on the continued operation of traditional regulatory policies” (Bäckstrand et al 2010, 29). So it 
may not be accurate to refer to new and old modes, as a move to NG does not necessitate phasing 
out hierarchical mechanisms for answerability and redress. 
Networked governance solutions are so important because they allow states to fulfill their 
obligations to their domestic population. As Habermas puts it, “Whereas internal state 
sovereignty is no longer restricted to simply maintaining law and order but also includes the 
effective protection of the civil rights of citizens, ‘external sovereignty’ today calls for the ability 
to cooperate with partners as much as the capacity to defend itself against external enemies” 
(Habermas 2010, 270).  
This begs the question, what is the relationship between sovereignty and accountability? 
Sovereignty, or the sole right of a government to rule its territory free from outside intervention, 
is conferred upon states with peaceful, acquiescent populations. The consent of the governed is 




protection from environmental harms, whether they emanate from a local or transnational source. 
The state, then must be accountable to its population when it comes to dealing with 
environmental threats; if it fails to do so, it has lost some of the claim to sovereignty. Therefore, 
given the transboundary nature of the threat of forest landscape degradation, it only makes sense 
that an accountable state will be part of the NG process. However, the state’s ability to remain 
accountable is only made possible through the involvement of civil society. 
Singleton’s (2002, 56) multi-community study implicates the absence of linkages 
between local and distant stakeholders with failures in collaborative governance arrangements.  
For her, these linkages are “the mechanisms for political accountability between ‘upstream’ and 
‘downstream’ resources users and between the providers and the beneficiaries of environmental 
preservation.” Even though they are incredibly important, these layered institutions that are 
nested within global civil society can be difficult to map or measure. In global civil society, as 
Keane (2003) puts it,  
…actors are not mute, empirical bits and bytes of data. Linked to territories but not 
restricted to territory, caught up in a vast variety of overlapping and interlocking 
institutions and webs of group affiliations, these actors talk, think, interpret, question, 
negotiate, comply, innovate, resist. Their recalcitrance in the face of classification is a 
basic feature of global civil society, which is never a fixed entity, but always a temporary 
assembly, subject to reshuffling and reassembly. 
 
Keane goes on to note that standardized measures, such as the number of INGOs registered 
within a country do not adequately measure civil society. Similarly, Anheier and Katz (2005) 
note that when studying global civil society, it is important to avoid the trap of “methodological 






6.5.1 Layering: Relying on Different Types of Accountability  
	  
Another key application of SNA is the ability to focus in on particular areas of interest 
within the network (Anheier and Katz 2005). Here, honing in on a sub-set of the network and 
altering the visualization to configure the edges and nodes in space so that it became possible to 
see the relational pattern between nodes. Two noteworthy arrangements emerged—the ‘broker’ 
and the ‘linked hierarchy’ arrangements. Figure 6.5 depicts a subset of the Crown Roundtable, 
shows how some nodes are related to others in unique ways, even within the same network. 
 
	  
Figure 6.5 Borrowing from other forms of accountability—hierarchical and market logics:  
‘broker’ and ‘linked hierarchy’ subsets. 
 
First, the fan-like pattern suggests a brokerage function by one node, much as a supplier 
in a market. Brokerage allows for a balance between centralized and decentralized control 
(Huppé, Creech, and Knoblauch 2012), drawing participants into the process in a voluntary way, 
linking them to the network through social ties and not binding obligations. One particular 
individual who emerged as a broker worked in provincial government, showing the continued 
importance of state agencies in NG. This finding is consistent with Ostrom's (2010) argument for 




networks do not replace the traditional forms of accountability found in hierarchically-ordered 
bureaucracies (Kettle 2000). Second, the adjoining circular pattern, which links a chain back 
around, turns the traditional notion of hierarchy on itself. It borrows from hierarchy that 
individuals respond to others in along a line; however, when each node is linked in a larger 
network, no single node has ultimate sway over others—a distinct contrast with hierarchy.  
It is important to acknowledge the guiding role of agencies and state institutions. 
However, it is a different approach than outright management. The argument for social-relational 
accountability points to the altered role of the governors once drawn into civil society. Because 
the arrangements are layered within the space of a transnational public that is rooted in civil 
society, the role of public officials is changed from overseer to peer. Brokers may be based 
within state agencies, but in the networked setting are acting as peers rather than governors. In 
other words, public officials step outside their formal roles when they engage in NG as members 
of civil society. Once public officials become engaged in the network, they are part of the 
transnational public.  
When we map accountability in networked governance, we see that patterns emerge. 
While it is true that authority is diffuse and fragmented, this complexity does not preclude our 
ability to map and understand accountability. As shown above, relational accountability can look 
different depending on the nodes we choose. Fan-like patterns might suggest a brokerage 
function by one node, much as a supplier in a market. Circular patterns link a chain back upon 
itself, turning the traditional notion of hierarchy on itself when no one node has ultimate sway 
over others, because each node is linked in a larger network.  
Touting the promise of NG is not to suggest that networked modes of governance are 




patterns we learn the benefit of conscientious institutional design in terms of establishing a clear 
division of labor or a rules-based set of interactions. In both, actors know what is expected of 
them and others, and accountability comes more clearly into focus. In terms of setting out a clear 
division of labor, actors operate with a clear set of expectations for behavior, goals, and products. 
Another benefit of rules-based interactions is that, ideally, repercussions are set out in advance if 
expectations are not met. The benefits of conscientious design that borrows from hierarchical 
patterns then, in networks, include bolstering accountability through expectations and 
repercussions.  
Market-based patterns of governance also have advantages in terms of accountability. 
They can empower even small shareholders, especially when they link together to make 
purchasing decisions. Market governance is also advantageous in terms of being voluntary and 
flexible, allowing actors to hold others accountable in different ways depending on the needs of 
the day. While expectations are much more fluid than in hierarchies, the repercussions remain 
relatively clear—bad choices usually lead to financial losses. In a setting based on incentives and 
exchange, accountability is based on compensation or fulfillment of contracts or duties. If a 
supplier falls short or goods are deemed inadequate, the client or customer uses money as a form 
of punishment or reward. Stakeholders, through their financial investment can push and pull 
levers, making demands of corporations. Currency is a way that we can track the fulfillment or 
negation of obligations.44  
While some problems are becoming so complex as to require high levels of social capital 
to solve them, the reality is that we have not come far enough in terms of true cooperation and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  





collaboration. There are still instances in which litigation is needed, or the heavy hand of a 
management agency is required. This constitutional basis of accountability is built upon the 
performance of elected ministers (Newman 2004). Alternately, there are instances when market 
transactions are required to secure ecological outcomes—such as conservation easements or 
certification programs. The transactional basis of accountability adds economic incentives to 
abide by standards. The types of accountability found in both hierarchical and market logics still 
matter a great deal in the case of the Crown Roundtable. This fits with what the literature 
suggests—that the dispersed authority in NG naturally lends itself to multiple forms of 
accountability (Bäckstrand 2006b; Jedd and Bixler 2015; Newell 2005; Newman 2004; Zelli and 
van Asselt 2011b).   
 
6.5.2 Broadened Answerability: Working with Traditional Forms of Accountability 
	  
Effectively dealing with global problems, requires engaging in transnational governance 
(Biermann et al. 2012; Jordan 2008). However, formal, treaty-level agreements are either absent 
or slow-coming in terms of addressing environmental concerns. This has certainly been the case 
in the Crown of the Continent landscape. This section addresses how individuals within the 
network can use their social relations to access forms of accountability outside of the network. In 
the province of British Columbia (BC), Canada, the conservation practitioners I spoke with 
expressed frustration with stream contamination in forested areas as a result of coal mining 
operations. Particularly high levels of Selenium run-off from metallurgical coal mining were 
found in the Elk River Valley. The mining company refused to respond to NGOs’ requests to 




agencies did not have regulatory oversight, and were therefore ineffective at curbing threats to 
water quality.  
However, the NGOs in British Columbia were able to work with US federal agencies in 
Montana to enforce regulations on water quality in streams flowing into US territory. Let us 
examine how this plays out in the instance of the 2010 agreement. To achieve a moratorium on 
mining activities in the Elk River Valley, the 2010 MOU between Montana and British 
Columbia would never have been reached without layered (or additional) accountability of the 
use or threat of legal action based on federal water quality standards in the United States. It is 
precisely the diffuse nature of authority that implicates a broader host of actors as being 
equipped to call attention to and request redress for mistakes.  
 Two elements conspired against international cooperation: citizen opposition, and 
individual agency mandates. First, interviews revealed competing ideologies and visions for the 
Crown landscape, ranging from preservation to pro-development. The radio programming in 
rural northern Montana was peppered with talk shows about pulling the U.S. out of the United 
Nations. Some residents of rural Montana, according to one community organizer, are so 
opposed to any type of intervention that they also oppose federal management, let alone 
international visioning. These competing visions reinforce the notion that it would be difficult to 
reach a treaty-level agreement between the U.S. and Canada.  
Made up of many independent rural communities and swaths of private land, the 
landscape hosts a variety of political leanings, some of which are less amenable to linking up 
across borders. One interviewee mentioned the formation of a militia cell around Kalispell in 
Gallatin County, Montana, with the supposed aim of “multiple use.” However, there was also a 




threat posed by international environmental cooperation. Another interviewee relayed the story 
of a focus group where the prevailing sentiment from private landowners was one of disinterest 
in linking up at the larger level. He explained,  “Part of the attitude was, if we start talking about 
ecosystems, the Crown of the Continent ecosystem, all these—we’ve got them on both sides of 
the border—these black helicopter type people that think the United Nations is going to come 
and get them.” This isolationist sentiment was echoed on the local talk radio that I listened to as I 
drove around the park or between communities in northern Montana. Several other interviewees 
mentioned that private landowners were wary of landscape-wide conservation efforts not only 
because they perceived them as placing limits on future development activities, but their existent 
ranching livelihoods.  
Second, interviewees tended to suggest that the MOU was a more realistic option because 
it still allows agencies to pursue their mandates. Two agencies named in the MOU have mission 
statements that clash with one another. British Columbia’s Ministry of Environment’s mission is 
energy development, which conflicts at times with the U.S. Park Service’s mission to protect 
lands and natural resources. One interviewee explained that residents on the landscape are fearful 
of treaties, equating them with “big government.” Another interviewee in elaborating the 
differences between a treaty and an MOU, pointed out that a treaty is a legal document with 
formally appointed obligations and commitments, whereas an MOU is more of a “handshake 
agreement” that is symbolic of working toward a shared vision for the landscape. 
Because it is unclear where the decision-making authority lies, networked arrangements 
can be ambiguous when it comes to seeking recompense for wrongdoing. Sometimes networked 
mechanisms are simply inappropriate or incapable of producing redress; in these cases traditional 




compensation for riverbed contamination due to mining activities is often achieved through 
traditional hierarchical mechanisms—namely, the United States’ court system for enforcement of 
environmental legislation.  
In some ways the informal role of the network is layered on top of or underneath 
traditional governance, and in other ways it looks more like “texturing,” as both informal ties and 
binding agreements continue to shape outcomes in tandem. Without the broadened and diffuse 
pattern of authority and the relationships spanning beyond the Elk River valley community, civil 
society alone would have been ineffective in holding the mining company accountable for its 
actions. As one participant, an NGO leader, told me,  
because the political process is so much different in Canada than it is in the United States 
and Canadian politicians respond so much differently to pressure than American 
politicians do and I, as [Organization Name], don’t have a lot to do with the Canadian 
politicians. I don’t have anything to do with them except sit with my team members from 
Canada and listen to them and provide moral support. But there have been things in the 
past where they’ll say, “ What we really need”—well, before we got the MOU—“we 
really need to find a way to engage the government.” 
In this sense, for accountability, the network is layered over the backbone of traditional 
hierarchical mechanisms. The sine qua non of this layered pattern of accountability, though, is 
the NG arrangement that allowed activists in British Columbia to access the United States’ 
regulatory system.  That is to suggest, the formal mechanisms (the MOUs) would not have been 
possible without the informal interactions of the Roundtable actors. 
In the face of local opposition, formal mechanisms might stall out at the international 
level, but there are other approaches to linking up across borders, including memoranda of 
understanding (Slaughter 2001). Memoranda of Understanding (MOU) are agreements made 
outside of legislative channels between two or more parties. They place commitments in writing 
between subnational political units (e.g. states or provinces) but do not obligate a national 




MOU has been an important component of relations between the state of Montana and the 
province of British Columbia. This agreement, signed in 2010 by Governor Brian Schweitzer of 
Montana and the Premier Gordon Campbell of British Columbia, titled “Memorandum of 
Understanding and Cooperation on Environmental Protection, Climate Action and Energy,” 
illustrates the type of layered accountability in the Crown.  
In addition to the MOU, the ongoing efforts of agencies continue to play an important 
role. In many of the interviews, participants reiterated that management jurisdictions are still 
retained, and that this is a necessary component for effective landscape-scale governance. 
Jurisdictional boundaries must be maintained to some extent, in order for entities to perceive that 
it is not an abrogation of their own missions to collaborate with others. As one U.S. federal 
agency manager put it, “from a Crown Manager's perspective, we've recognized for all of us to 
achieve our mandates, and the CMP doesn't manage, they agencies do. That's kind of a basic 
understanding.”  
These individual management directives are built upon a solid institutional capacity that 
allows work to be done. Without it, agencies would falter in their efforts to remain accountable 
to the general public. Collaborative potential cannot be bought at the expense of institutional 
capacity. In fact, some of the NGO representatives expressed a strong desire for management 
agencies to take a firmer position on protection mechanisms, and the ultimate goal of a couple of 
community mobilization projects was to establish park designation, wilderness, or management 
boundaries at the federal or provincial level. Park designation or protected status would lend the 
type of hierarchical accountability not found in NG. Particularly related to land use, where many 
different users are accessing space and resources, it is still necessary to have more centralized 




NGO director explained, designated protected status in interior British Columbia, where a “piece 
of the pie” is missing from Glacier-Waterton International Peace Park, would send a clear 
message that certain activities (mining and other forms of potentially harmful resource 
extraction) are not allowed. The backing of the province and the international community would, 
as he suggested, be more effective than the informal, social ties found within the Roundtable.	  
Because networks depend so heavily on the social relationships of which they are 
comprised, accountability largely hinges on the maintenance of these relationships. This type of 
accountability can be parsed out as “professional/peer accountability,” which hinges on adhering 
to a code of conduct (Benner, Reinicke, and Witte 2004), set of norms, or maintaining an 
appropriate identity. This type of accountability is based on the logic of appropriateness, rather 
than the logic of consequences grounded in a rational calculation of costs and benefits.45 
Evidence from the Crown Roundtable reinforces what the literature on transnational 
accountability suggests. Though it builds on Kant’s belief that IR is contingent upon more than 
state interactions, Michael Mason’s notion of a transnational accountability offers a modified 
accountability that depends less upon legal code and more on the moral obligations that people 
have to each other.  Kant suggested the ultimate aim in international affairs would be a legal 
backbone, “a constitution allowing the greatest possible human freedom in accordance with laws 
which ensure that the freedom of each can coexist with the freedom of all others.” Mason’s 
notion of transnational accountability is such that it recognizes the importance of a legal 
framework, but he explicitly expresses the desire to see it come about as a result of civic 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45	  March & Olsen (1998) lay out the “logic of consequences,” which is the rationale of homo economicus and the 
“logic of appropriateness,” which is the rationale of homo sociologicus. Homo economicus, motivated by the logic 
of consequences, assesses choices based on strategic cost-benefit analyses and makes decisions based on what will 
most efficiently deliver the desired ends. On the other hand, homo sociologicus abides by the logic of 




cosmopolitanism rather than as an institutional process driven by neoliberal instrumentalism 
(Mason 2008). NG is a logical pathway to establishing a set of consistent principles about 
responsibilities that cross borders, even if the principles are not yet codified by international law. 
In other words, as civil society actors design solutions for transboundary problems, we see 
governance innovations that may eventually reach more formal levels of agreement. 
 
6.6 Concluding Thoughts and Future Directions 
	  
The fragmentation of authority that has been suggested to complicate accountability may 
actually be an advantage. The current configuration of the global forest governance landscape is 
such that governing authority is spread over a broad range of mechanisms, borrowing from 
hierarchical, market, and network logics. With regard to NG, answerability is only possible 
where a broad host of actors is granted governing authority; in effect, when principals become 
governing agents. That is to say, the same diffusion of authority that implicates a shift away from 
hierarchical mechanisms for accountability also reconfigures the ability to demand redress. The 
ability to demand redress in NG only comes with the diffusion of authority. If a rank order is 
established, as in a hierarchy, accountability can only ever be uni-directional. However, in a 
“flattened” governance scheme, relationships link actors together in a way that allows 
individuals to hold one another to account on the basis of social obligations. These ties allow 
individuals to interact as collaborators, equaling capable of holding one another to account.  
Transnational NG has perhaps been somewhat unfairly critiqued for not being 
accountable. Though participants may come and go freely and do not have binding legal duties to 
one another, informal obligations stand in their place. The Crown Roundtable fosters a network 




deeper than the surface-level legal arrangements. Evidence from the case of the Crown 
Roundtable suggests that it is possible to find forms of accountability even at the scope and scale 
of conservation in a transnational landscape. Where individuals link up across borders, a new 
space is created with its own democratic potential. This notion of a transnational civil society is 
at the core of maintaining the linkages for accountability in the Crown of the Continent.  
The analysis of the Crown Roundtable suggests that NG may only pose an accountability 
challenge to the strict pluralist notion of democracy. With broadened answerability, we see that 
NG results in net gains in accountability. Network analysis demonstrates that there are multiple 
and overlapping ties between members of the network. These linkages emerge in the absence of 
any codified or legally binding arrangements. The obligations do not rest on elections, currency, 
or legal agreements.46 The analysis supports previous findings in other social networks studies 
that found connectors are important individuals for bringing different communities together and 
for getting work done (Makoto-Su, Mark, and Sutton 2007). 
The analysis suggests that the accountability deficit in NG is a false problem. Social 
networks, even across large landscapes, have the potential to foster civic engagement. Evidence 
from the Crown network demonstrates there are clear linkages between natural resource 
agencies, conservation groups, and concerned citizens. Networked forest governance is not a 
backroom dealing where agency officials make decisions behind closed doors. Members of civil 
society are equal participants. In the case of the Roundtable, civil society is a vibrant component. 
In fact, concerned individuals and NGOs make up the largest portion of participants. This brings 
the governed into the governing process, which may ultimately enhance its legitimacy. This is 
explored in the following chapter. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  





Furthermore, accountability in the NG setting is layered on top of traditional modes—
potentially strengthening them in the process. In this sense, for accountability, the network is 
layered over the backbone of traditional hierarchical mechanisms. The sine qua non of this 
layered pattern of accountability is the NG arrangement that allows network participants to 
access traditional modes of accountability across jurisdictional lines. In this sense, the 
interconnectedness of the network allows traditional modalities to be expanded and broadened 
over the whole landscape, where they were previously partitioned.  This type of external 
accountability is different from the previous two types in sections 6.3 and 6.4, which have more 
to do with how individuals inside the network honor their obligations to one another.  
More investigation is warranted on how connectors might exercise their role. In some 
cases, they may bridge gaps between individuals and sub-communities that are not connected. In 
other cases they may serve along pathways for passing along information and sharing resources. 
However, connectors might not always be neutral facilitators. In some instances it may be 
worthwhile to consider whether and how they make choices about the storylines that become 
important, what type of information and which resources they pass on. Further investigation is 
warranted in the Crown Roundtable to look at how these dynamics may play out. This would 
contribute to an understanding of how actors may use their different positions and social 
capacities to achieve their goals. 
It is also important to look further consider how networked forest governance layers with 
state-based governance. Starting from the proposition that citizens hold governments to account 
for their international commitments, future work should more closely examine how the insertion 




analysis project that surveys members of civil society that are not directly involved in the Crown 
Roundtable might show linkage patterns between those who are inside the network and those 

























CHAPTER SEVEN: Concluding Thoughts on Democratic Design for Networked Forest 
Governance 
 
“Reason does not itself work instinctively,  
for it requires trial, practice and instruction 
 to enable it to progress gradually from 
one stage of insight to the next.” 
–Immanuel Kant47 
 
“It is not what one does, but how one does it that matters most.” 
-Stephen Chan, The Zen of International Relations 
 
7.1 Networked Governance and the Crown Roundtable 
	  
In this concluding chapter, I argue that both the accountability deficit and the legitimacy 
trade-off are false problems when we look toward transboundary space as one rich in 
deliberation. NG ideally brings civil society together with conservation practitioners in a way 
that allows them to engage one another as equals, regardless of their home political jurisdictions. 
Solutions require the involvement of actors across sectors and scales of organization. In the 
absence of a legally binding treaty regarding forest management, the Crown Roundtable has 
emerged as an informal networked governance arrangement to address conservation needs. I 
have argued that the social ties between the individuals in the Crown Roundtable form the 
backbone for accountability and legitimacy in this instance of networked governance. Beyond 
the inclusion of multiple actors across multiple scales, success entails having reflexivity and 
discursiveness built into the process.  
The chapter begins with a general discussion on the contribution of a networked 
governance framework to the study of global forest governance, and more broadly, the study of 
global environmental governance. It then moves into a discussion of the ways in which a joint 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




commitment to deliberation and cosmopolitanism is reflexive and discursive. I conclude with 
considerations for shaping NG processes to be more democratic, filling a gap in the literature 
where it tends to focus on higher-level theory in place of practical recommendations. 
Hierarchical modes of governing can fall short because governments often “have not used 
their exclusive responsibilities, like land use planning and law enforcement, which are crucial in 
forest biodiversity conservation” (Visseren-Hamakers and Glasbergen 2007, 416). Whether 
forests management itself precludes top-down chain of command or the state’s sole authority is 
eroding under globalization, the trend remains that forest management public-private 
partnerships are increasingly a fill-in-the gap measure when governments are unable or unwilling 
to enforce regulation (Visseren-Hamakers and Glasbergen 2007). Since governments have not 
taken a proactive role in setting rules either at the domestic or international level, it is 
increasingly common to see networked arrangements in which the state is only one of a host of 
actors in a multi-centric governance context. 
 
7.2 Challenges in Networked Governance 
	  
A focus on networked governance reveals insights along empirical and normative 
dimensions. First, the empirical trend toward inclusion of a broader swath of actors shows the 
importance of civil society in global environmental governance. Non-governmental 
organizations enmeshed in a voluntary scheme across borders where formal political 
arrangements are lacking can fill gaps in governance. If democracy is the “main legitimating 
principle of government” as Dryzek (1999) claims, and a vibrant civil society is a major 
component of democracy, it follows that legitimacy in transboundary governance rests on the 




Roundtable shows, informal arrangements based on social networks can provide channels for 
cooperation and communication, holding actors and organizations accountable across national 
and sub-national jurisdictions. These networked arrangements merit our attention, especially at 
the international level with regard to environmental challenges where formal treaties may be 
undesirable or infeasible.  
 
7.2.1 Accountability Deficit? 
	  
As shown in chapters two and four, the advantages of NG also potentially set it up for 
some unique challenges. The traditional chain-of-command found in hierarchical authority is 
lacking. This could pose several challenges: without a clear principal-agent relationship, the 
social demands may not have any way of being transmitted up to the level of decision-making. 
As Anne-Marie Slaughter (1997, 197) explains, “Critics [of networked governance] contend that 
government institutions engaged in policy coordination with their foreign counterparts will be 
barely visible, much less accountable, to voters still largely tied to national territory.” It certainly 
seems anathema to liberal democracy to accept decisions made by rule-makers not elected by or 
drawn from a state’s own citizen base.  
Anne-Marie Slaughter (2001, 348) borrows from Stephen Toope, who claims networks 
“are sites of power, and potentially of exclusion and inequality… Indeed, as typically 
subterranean creatures, operating outside the realm of public scrutiny, governance networks may 
be even less accountable than some states.” Indeed purely state-populated “Networks are based 
on flexible and functional peer relationships. Their very informality and clubishness, however, 
invite exclusion and make monitoring and participation by non-state actors and other government 
officials often difficult” (Raustiala 2002, 24). This characterization, however, does not take into 




  Furthermore, decision-making is complicated by the fact that governors in networks do 
not respond to only one contingent, nor does any one actor hold a high degree of influence to 
push others toward efficient and timely solutions. These problems stem largely from a lack of 
centralized control. Especially at the large landscape scale, covering a very large amount of 
forested (and unforested) land, there is a lack of a clear principal, electorate, or consistent 
constituency—or overly broad and perhaps too large a constituency.  
Van Kersbergen and van Waarden (2004) express trepidation that the traditional checks 
and balances of government could become obsolete in networked governance. They explain that 
the state, as the primary organ designed to maintain order, is uniquely positioned; by implication 
other actors might not be up to the task, especially when in a networked configuration. 
“Governability – the capacity to solve urgent societal problems – often required a certain 
centralization and concentration of political power. Basic examples are the protection of man 
against man – the problem of social order, of criminality, civil war and war – the protection of 
man against nature – the problem of material and economic survival – and the protection of 
nature against man – the problem of the environment” (VanKersbergen and VanWaarden 
2004).48 At the same time, we know that in today’s globalized world the state’s duties have been 
passed along to other entities: above, below, and around national governments. So to some 
degree functional differentiation is a necessary component of global governance as it simply may 
not be possible to have a centralized unitary governing body at the supranational level. The 
Roundtable provides a way to bridge the need for a transnational approach to managing forests 
with the realistic assessment that the level of agreement found in a treaty might be unattainable. 
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7.2.2 Obstacles to Legitimate Governance 
	  
Placing governance in the transnational context poses some challenges. If problems cross 
borders is it also possible that transboundary governance can be accepted as adequately 
addressing them in a way that is responsive to a transboundary population. This is a population, 
in the case of the Crown of the Continent, that for one, may not even recognize itself as being 
knit together, and secondly, may not realistically be able to achieve entirely inclusive 
participation. These are not small challenges.  
In the absence of a legal basis, is there a substituting role that broad participation plays, 
when it is drawn from across borders? Can actors’ presence at the table be deemed enough to 
justify the decisions made? The answer is yes and no. I argue that the process of participation, as 
the fundamental requirement, must take on particular deliberative qualities in order to confer 
legitimacy in NG. That is to say, the fact that participation is entirely open and includes a large 
portion of civil society matters quite a bit in the Roundtable case. However, simply having civil 
society organizations at the table is not enough. In a transboundary space, since it is not possible 
to have entirely inclusive participation, the nature of the interactions that individuals have 
becomes even more important.  
 One potential challenge here is that high levels of participation (inclusiveness) can slow 
the decision-making process and push real policymaking back in favor of building the processes 
around inclusion. Adding many voices can imply adding just as many perspectives. In cases 
where there is not much overlap of opinion, each voice can represent a significantly different 
policy direction. When these competing demands must be balanced, especially in the case of 
consensus-based governance, decisions can come to a screeching halt altogether. If legitimacy is 




decision-making and the paralysis that sometimes comes along with consensus-building becomes 
very real.  
Bernauer et al. (2013) pose the question, “is there a democracy-civil society paradox in 
global environmental governance?” They entertain the notion that in some settings, namely more 
autocratic regimes where democratic development may not have progressed very far, the 
participation of civil society can result in higher levels of ratification for environmental treaties.49  
It is not clear, though, that in highly democratic settings, the mere presence of civil society will 
result in higher levels of international environmental cooperation. The authors explain, “The 
impact of ENGOs on international cooperation is generally positive but is likely to decrease or 
even disappear at high levels of democracy” (Bernauer et al. 2013, 104). 
This suggests that there is something outside of the mere presence of civil society that 
brings about improved environmental governance. There may be particularized benefits of 
bringing civil society into governance arrangements. Strengthening ENGOs in less democratic 
countries can help quite a bit in terms of counteracting the generally negative effect that 
autocracy has (purportedly) on international cooperation.50 However, the benefits of having civil 
society’s involvement may lie closer to the process in which this is done.  
This was evident in the case of the Crown Roundtable. The list of participants is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 Here it is possibly helpful to consider political development in tandem with economic development. The two have 
been linked for various purposes including to show how economic development may be a prerequisite of political 
development, or how economic development may lead to peace within and between countries (Gartzke 2007; Lipset 
1959). Though Bernauer et al. (2013) do not explicitly make this connection between economic and political 
development, their paper presents a thought-provoking analysis that prompts reconsideration of the factors affecting 
ratification of environmental treaties.  
50 The authors recognize the counterintuitive nature of this argument, since democracy is usually thought of being 
concordant both with a more active civil society and with increased levels of international cooperation in the form of 
civic engagement and not corporate investment. There is much fodder here for the political economist. The 
intervening variable of economic development suggests that corporate influence taints the waters of civil society. In 
the case of the Roundtable, though, very few member organizations are corporate entities; therefore, the study does 




impressive, and draws upon a wide variety of types of community groups and organizations. 
From the individuals working as self-employed artists, to the community college administrators, 
environmental lawyers, tribal leaders, and NGO directors, there is a broad swath of civic 
engagement. However, without conscientiously crafting an environment at the Roundtable where 
all interests can be equally heard and represented, the mere presence of these civil organizations 
may not be enough. The forms these interactions take on can become particularly important in a 
networked arrangement. One participant emphasized that looking at the rules for interaction was 
an important part of his participation, 
so the collaborative processes and the coalition processes are driven by the goals and 
what you need to accomplish but, you know, when you’re talking about the US and 
Canada you just really have to think about “what are the rules here? And what are the 
rules there? What can the US do to influence BC? Is there anything that BC can do to 
influence the US?” And then just weigh those opportunities, create the opportunities and 
move forward. 
 
As the statement reflects, the process design makes a difference from the perspective of civil 
society actors.  
Traditional electoral models of legitimacy that focus on the free and fair elections of 
representatives at the state and federal level are warranted in pointing to the importance of open 
elections and the added legitimacy that representative democracy brings, but in terms of a full 
deliberative democratic system of governance, there are some shortcomings. First, the electoral 
cycle imposes a certain short-sightedness for immediate policy items. Election cycles bound the 
amount of time available for solving a problem. For both the limitations imposed by the electoral 
cycle and population numbers at the transboundary scale, it is both undesireable and simply 
infeasible to have elected officials be the sole decisionmakers at the landscape scale. In terms of 
legitimacy, this means that we are moving away from a notion that elections make a policy 




balance votes by economic might, population size, or otherwise, it seems fruitless to pin 
legitimacy onto representation across borders. But what does this mean for legitimacy? Are there 
alternative channels for legitimizing transboundary governance?  
Legitimacy, as a normative component of governance, does not speak directly to 
environmental outcomes—such as a net increase or decrease in forest cover—nor does it directly 
stipulate which management practices are to take place. Performance-based standards for 
evaluating governance are important because they allow for short-term evaluation and also 
provide for an honest look at how well arrangements address social demands. Environmental 
problems are often so complex that resolving them is a very long-term endeavor; for some, 
indeed, their resolution will take lifetimes. Anthropogenic climate change, for example, is the 
result of industrial activity over centuries of human impact. The problem of excess greenhouse 
gases in the atmosphere was not created in the short term, nor is it likely the solutions will pop 
up in the short-term time frame. A focus on the sociological basis of legitimacy allows us to look 
at how well arrangements address social demands, which often require a longer period of time to 
articulate. Building trust and a shared identity into the process can help it become more 
responsive over time.  
Paying attention to social demands on governance, we see that ethical concerns rise to the 
top. In terms of equity and fairness, solutions to environmental problems should not impose 
unduly harsh or unfair demands on those who are not to blame for their creation: this is 
especially clear in the developing countries that are now forced to carefully consider their 
industrial trajectory given what we know about atmospheric science and greenhouse gas 




demands on governance are not restricted to equity and fairness. They are also closely bound up 
with notions of legitimacy.  
Even for those populations with the knowledge and means to reduce emissions, there are 
thresholds of what is deemed acceptable. For example, rigorous treaty-based binding emissions 
reduction targets seem to evade states where incentive-based market schemes might seem to 
make it easier for emitters to behave in more environmentally-friendly ways. The governance 
options we choose have quite a bit to do with their perceived legitimacy. Certain modes are 
simply deemed inappropriate and no amount of environmental effectiveness (or objective 
outcomes) will convince a governed population otherwise. However, just as the accountability 
deficit is a false problem, the legitimacy trade-off is also a source of unneeded worry. 
Legitimacy in governance is possible at the supra-state level, with the transboundary landscape 
as a deliberative space characterized by civic cosmopolitanism. This notion is explored in the 
following section.  
 
7.3 Creating More Accountable and Legitimate Networked Forest Governance 
	  
In natural resource management around the world, for example, the term “conservation” 
has varying connotations. Some are distrustful because they see it as park designation, or 
cordoning people from areas where they pursue their livelihoods (Igoe 2014). Conservation, 
then, has become a notion that some suggest is meaningless without contestation. In other words, 
seeing conservation as a set of technical interventions is a fruitless exercise (Igoe 2014). Instead, 
we should continuously define and redefine its meaning.  
Just as we should mindfully consider how we define concepts, and be reflexive in 




unconditionally accepted, but continuously shaped by active participations who are 
simultaneously abiding by rules but also acting as agents of change.51 Here, it is useful to 
examine how various arrangements are legitimated, and to contrast the sociological with a 
normative basis in order to highlight the importance of deliberative qualities in the former. 
 
7.3.1 Transboundary Deliberation as a Reflexive and Discursive Practice 
 
In The Zen of International Relations, Chan, Mandaville, and Bleiker (2001, 232) suggest 
that “It is not what one does, but how one does it that matters most.” Applied to transboundary 
networked governance, this points to the trial-and-error required. Stitching disparate jurisdictions 
into a single geography is not an easy task. Individuals and organizations must be willing to 
participate, but on the basis of being open to deliberation—trusting that others will do the same. 
This requires some amount of courage as it means that actions taken in one jurisdiction are no 
longer subject to scrutiny from within narrow borders but answerable to larger audiences. 
Assisting the process of trust-building, as shown in the previous chapter, are a common identity 
and shared norms. These qualities, together, are part of a broader trend toward democratizing 
international relations and global governance. Deliberation is a process in which participants are 
committed to sharing the same table regardless of their differences; it is a fundamental building 
block in this process. 
The process of deliberation alone, however, is not sufficient. We should not forget the 
importance of the discursive framing in governance networks. Storytelling either in terms of 
public political accounts about societal problems, moral values and common futures, or 
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  The sociological basis of legitimacy is not unique to NG. The state’s governing authority can also be examined as 




regarding the propagation of ‘best practice’, can be used deliberately to influence the policy-
making processes within governance networks (Sørensen and Torfing 2005, 204). Therefore, a 
deliberative setting should allow for the co-existence of multiple, overlapping, and even 
competing discourses. While not all individuals or organizations may be given a seat at the table, 
discourses can stand in their place. 
Bound up in this notion is discursive representation, which allows governance to retain 
the qualities of democracy at the global level where it is not possible to represent individuals or 
even all organizations, but it is possible to represent broader perspectives. Giving space to 
discourses as perspectives (or worldviews) allows for representation, through albeit 
unconventional means. Dryzek (2010) sees networked governance as the most appropriate 
channel for discursive representation. Going back to the importance of rhetoric, informal 
arrangements allow for a more spontaneous form of expression than formal hierarchical 
arrangements.  
Discursive legitimacy according to Dryzek (2010, 191) fits in the transnational context, in 
fact, as he claims, “far better than most alternative conceptions of democratic legitimacy, which 
are tied to a constitutional structure and set of accepted rules that do not exist at the global level.” 
Here he uses the notion of meta-consensus, which is essentially the general agreement that, 
because collective constitutional rules are not available as they are in the domestic context, 
competing discourses or values will be seen as equally valuable. Whether an opinion ultimately 
transfers itself from a discussion phase to a decision-making context, meta-consensus allows for 
its validation and recognition. Where Dryzek differs with the findings in the case of the Crown 
Roundtable is that he focuses on the value of rhetoric and discursive representation. Rhetoric is 




‘empowered space’ (2010). The way civil society speaks and writes about issues is a vehicle or 
mechanism for expressing demands to decision makers. In the case of toxic runoff from mining 
operations in British Columbia, civil groups linked up across borders. Their powerful stories 
made the campaign successful. 
Cosmopolitan citizenship is a form of “universal citizenship that can bind all members of 
humanity together” (Brown and Held 2010). Along with Habermasian thought, it focuses on the 
well-being of the individual and not of the sovereign state. Under the aegis of “shared risk” it is 
imperative that notions of citizenship extend beyond state borders (Mason 2005), which are 
particularly arbitrary in the case of conserving forested landscapes. Sovereignty, then, should be 
contingent in the transboundary landscape when it impedes ecological connectivity. It has been 
suggested the regional or ecosystem level is the most appropriate for the types of public-private 
partnerships that address forest ecosystems (Visseren-Hamakers and Glasbergen 2007).  
A cosmopolitan approach does not merely require more citizen participation. Instead, it is 
important to pay attention to the quality of participation. So rather than bringing more actors on 
board, it is important to consider the terms of their involvement when drawing participants into a 
process. In fact, increased citizen involvement does not necessarily lead to better outcomes. 
Increased citizen participation did not result in higher levels of treaty ratification (Bernauer et al. 
2013). While they entertain the notion that in some settings, namely more autocratic regimes, 
where democratic development has not progressed too far—possibly in tandem with economic 
development (though the authors do not explicitly make this connection)—the participation of 






that in highly democratic settings, the mere presence of civil society will result in treaty 
ratification, the proxy for international cooperation.52  
Conceiving of civil society outside the traditional bounds of political communities, 
especially outside of the state avoids nationalism and statism, there are two barriers to making 
transnational governance democratic. It is possible to simultaneously embrace sovereignty and to 
recognize that it must continually be reevaluated and reendowed. It is not a given. Mary Kaldor 
(2003) expresses this notion as “contingent sovereignty.” Contingent sovereignty implies that 
transboundary concerns must be addressed, and that legitimacy is not only endowed from the 
domestic population. In other words, the state must earn the right to remain autonomous or 
immune from external intervention. It borrows from the idea that “…states will continue to be 
the juridical repository of sovereignty, although sovereignty will be much more conditional than 
before—increasingly dependent on both domestic content and international respect” (Kaldor 
2003). The implication of moving toward a global system or even global society and away from 
episodic engagements, with continual and more lasting arrangements53 constructed around 
shared norms, identities, and visions is that empirical sovereignty54 will depend on the state’s 
ability to govern.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 There are however, particularized benefits of civil society in that strengthening ENGOs in less democratic 
countries can help quite a bit in terms of counteracting the generally negative effect that autocracy has (purportedly) 
on international cooperation. The authors recognize the counterintuitive nature of this argument, since democracy is 
usually thought of being concordant both with a more active civil society and with increased levels of international 
cooperation in the form of civic engagement and not corporate investment. There is much fodder here for the 
political economist. The intervening variable of economic development suggests that corporate influence taints the 
waters of civil society. In the case of the Roundtable, though, very few member organizations are corporate entities; 
therefore, the study does not borrow from the IPE literature. 
53 Though admittedly, these budding arrangements are complex and layered—and sometimes fleeting.  
54 Juridical sovereignty, or constitutional sovereignty, means that no other state has legal authority within its borders 
(R. Jackson and Sorensen 2010). Empirical sovereignty refers to the development of national unity and popular 
support for the state; it is “the extent to which states have developed efficient political institutions, a solid economic 




Thinking in the liberal Kantian tradition, the quality of democracy can be conferred based 
on the will of or the “ethos of a people,” regardless of the political borders that bound or transect 
the group (Habermas 2010). This means that transboundary governance can be freed from the 
boundaries of the state, bound instead to the will of the people, even if formal mechanisms are 
not in place to elect leaders, pass referenda, or appoint legislators to enact binding policy. In 
order to adequately free governance from political borders that transect a space, however, social 
capital is needed in order to build the levels of trust for true democratic engagement. Together 
with trust, a concordant component is the shared norm of retained autonomy. The norm of 
autonomy and the multiple, simultaneous identities it engenders strengthens deliberation 
immensely. If individuals are able to maintain their collective and disparate identities, they may 
be more receptive to seeing others’ perspectives as valid because they can relate to the 
challenges and struggles in other areas of conservation.  
Transboundary networks form the basis of deliberative democracy at the supra-state 
level. They are the hardware of the voluntary governance logic, to Dryzek’s (1999) “software” – 
or the coding that stipulates the non-binding nature of arrangements in an anarchic international 
system. As Bäckstrand (2010, 30) puts it, “Networks are interesting from the perspective of 
deliberative democracy because relations between actors in networks rely on communication, 
exchange of information, and on trustful and cooperative attitudes, which can provide arenas for 
deliberation.” In this sense, the transboundary network is incredibly important for adding a 
deliberative quality to international relations.  
Habermas calls bringing this democratic quality above the state creating a “global 
domestic politics.” The global-domestic linkage here refers to bringing the quality of democracy 




and entities—including world organizations and transnational networks—are recognized (Jurgen 
Habermas 2010).55 The argument for transnational democracy is not that traditional institutions 
are possible or even desirable above the state, but that legitimate governance does not always 
have to depend upon elections. Instead, if a deliberative space is created, political borders do not 
matter so much as the engagement of citizens with one another. The social relationships that 
cross borders, then, legitimate the governance process when decision-makers are accountable to 
one another in ways that move outside the scope of state-based mechanisms.  
Reputations as linkages of trust. The notion of a reputation brings together components of 
accountability and legitimacy. Reputations assume that there is a linkage between individuals, 
but also depend upon a sense of trust between them. This fits with the notion of social capital. 
Broadly speaking, social capital is a defining feature of NG (Huppé, Creech, and Knoblauch 
2012). Social relational features lend legitimacy and accountability to all sorts of networks; they 
are not unique to environmental conservation governance networks. Other types of networks also 
rely on trust. For example, “collaborative consumption” networks are becoming popular. It is 
now possible to link up with other individuals who loan, rent or trade the use of their cars, power 
drills, and even their homes. Online peer networks link individuals up who need the use of 
various items with those who have them. Someone may loan out her lawn mower to a neighbor 
one day, and the next week she might borrow a shovel or step ladder from another neighbor. The 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 It might be easy to confuse these three levels with Kenneth Waltz’s three “images” of world politics, but this is a 
dangerous mistake. Waltz used the notion of an image much like a snapshot. The levels of politics—man, the state, 
and war (the international system)—simply allow the neo-realist to distill the unit of analysis. However, 
Habermasian global-domestic politics is an approach that identifies “arenas” instead of images. For Habermas, these 
three overlapping spaces are where contestation and deliberation take place; in this sense, for Habermas, there is 
process or “work” involved in politics. For Waltz, outcomes are pre-determined based on capabilities and material 
resources. “Governance” would be a foreign concept because it is too messy, and deviates from—and often 




peer-to-peer model works because participants not only know that their favors will be returned, 
but that they can trust their items will not be mistreated.  
Trust is built into the system by keeping track of peer reputation. NG is successful in 
these cases because social capital is readily measured and displayed on user profiles, allowing 
others to trust that their items and homes will be used wisely because reputations have been 
established over time. One’s reputation, then, is “a new form of social currency that could 
become as powerful as our credit cards” (Botsman 2010, 15:30). 
 
7.3.2 Reflexive Governance for Complexity 
	  
Albert-László Barabasi (2002, 6) suggests we are “close to knowing just about everything 
there is to know about the pieces” or the constituent components of the world around us. This 
means very little about our progress toward understanding whole systems, though. As Barabasi 
succinctly puts it, “Riding reductionism, we run into the hard wall of complexity. We have 
learned that nature is not a well-designed puzzle with only one way to put it back together” 
(Barabasi 2002, 6). He suggests that natural systems are complex, and so, too, should our 
approach be to understanding them. 
The complexity inherent in natural systems is sometimes masked. It is often easy in the 
pursuit of scientific knowledge, to limit our scope to one particular problem. Once we master our 
understanding of a small corner of the world, we can easily slip into complacence, fooling 
ourselves that we understand the whole of it. The desire to state claims with confidence about 
how the world works, to espouse generalities that transfer from one system to another, is a 
dangerous tendency that can pervade governance efforts as well. Hierarchical arrangements are 




time. This approach has historically failed in forest governance, because communities’ needs can 
change over time, and people depend on forested landscapes for so much more than timber 
resources.  
Reflexivity, then, is the necessary mindset to embrace complexity. In governing natural 
systems, we need to be careful not to make generalizations or assumptions that what works in 
one place will work in another. With regard to setting rules for forest management, whether they 
pertain to timber harvest, energy development on forested lands or the movement of wildlife 
across a landscape, it is important to avoid universalism. Instead, a commitment to the process of 
working with other individuals and organizations across a landscape is what will move 
governance toward higher democratic standards. Rules in global forest governance can provide a 
basis for the types of evidence that are deemed acceptable but rules should not set unflinching 
management protocols.  
Reflexive governance is a process of continual self-examination and mid-course 
adjustments. It is related to the capacity of a structure or process to change in light of scrutinizing 
successes and failures (Dryzek 2014). This implies that making networked governance 
democratically accountable and legitimate is a slow process and does not happen overnight. This 
notion is supported by the analysis presented here as well as in the literature. In one study on 
protected area landscape governance, Lockwood (2010) found that identifying best management 
principles is an iterative process, requiring back-and-forth vetting. In the case of protected area 
governance, the Lockwood study started with the first step of drafting management principles 
with an expert panel. Next, input and feedback from land managers, ‘key informants,’ and others 




combination thereof. These draft principles, once vetted by those working in the field, were then 
used to evaluate actual governance practices in protected areas.  
In a study offering lessons for institutional design in networked settings, Agranoff (2006) 
shows management practices come about as the result of mutual learning and adjustment. 
Because networks themselves are comprised of individuals and organizations, they are not 
usually the site of decision-making, but rather, where agreements are reached (Ibid). Shared 
authority generally leads to consensus-based decision-making, which hinges far less on 
procedural rules and more on ongoing discussions. The loosely coupled organizational structure 
inherent in NG provides benefits in terms of social learning (Stankey, McCool, and Clark 2003).  
Mutual learning through the exchange of ideas and negotiation around sensitive issue areas are 
key to the process, which Newell et al. (2002) also reinforce. Mutual learning in the case of the 
Crown Roundtable meant that individuals, by sharing their experiences, could learn how to better 
move forward. This process proceeded in fits and starts, with some backtracking as mistakes 
were corrected. 
 
7.3.3 Moving from Pluralist to Deliberative Democracy 
	  
One of the defining elements of democracy is pluralism, or the inclusion of a broad range 
of interests in the policy making process. Pluralism requires broad participation. As participation 
levels increase, according to this logic, so do levels of legitimacy. Pluralist notions of democracy 
at the domestic level point toward the multiple, diverse, and sometimes competing interests 
surrounding environmental issues. Governance under traditional perspectives is often conceived 
of as formal public policy, which should be the “outcome of competing interests in the 




the state as a neutral actor that houses the space for the pursuit of a suite of goals and interests. 
The state remains capable of being the neutral space insofar as decisions and policies are set 
forward by elected officials and carried out by impartial resource managers.  
It is noteworthy that Robert Dahl and Charles Lindblom, two founders of the pluralist 
school of democratic governance, both tended to focus on domestic politics, which may explain 
some of their reticence to scale the notion up to the international level. It seems pluralists, 
conceiving of legitimacy in terms of participation, are disinterested in transnational democracy 
altogether. In fact, Dahl (2010) stated, of civic participation at the international level, “I see no 
reason to clothe international organizations in the mantle of democracy simply in order to 
provide them with greater legitimacy” (Dahl 2010).  
It is often assumed that broad participation brings legitimacy automatically—that simply 
having broad participation does not mean all participants view each other as appropriate and/or 
capable sources of decision-making authority. Mere participation should not be equated with 
legitimacy. Simply bringing actors to the table does not always mean they will view each other 
as equally equipped to address challenges. For example, actors in any governance setting will 
“size” each other up, making judgments about their capabilities. This carries from the town hall, 
city council, to the domestic courtroom, to international negotiations. Participation in a process 
does not automatically mean that actors perceive one other, let alone the process, as appropriate 
governors or arenas for governance. Conceiving of legitimacy as mere participation obscures its 
deliberative qualities. 
What does it mean to bring deliberation into democratic processes? Deliberation is 
“debate and discussion aimed at producing reasonable, well-informed opinions in which 




made by fellow participants” (Chambers 2003, 309). If we insert deliberation into a democratic 
system, we see that participation in the form of voting is not in itself a deliberative practice. 
Instead, deliberative practices require back-and-forth engagement between parties that are 
willing and able to revise their positions depending on the demands of the situation or the needs 
of their peers. It is the commitment to a process rather than any particular set of values. Any a 
priori requirement for agreement comes from the need for continued engagement.  
As John Dryzek (2010, 15) puts it, “the key goal of deliberation is to produce meta-
consensus that structures continued dispute.” Meta-consensus is “agreement on the legitimacy of 
contested values, on the validity of disputed judgments, on the acceptability and structure of 
competing preferences, and on the applicability of contested discourses” (Dryzek 2010, 15). In 
this sense consensus does not mean that participants must all agree on outcomes; instead, 
reaching meta-consensus means that participants agree that others’ preferences are worthwhile 
additions to the governance process.  
Deliberative democracy “focuses on the communicative processes of opinion and will-
formation that precede voting” –consent becomes more important insofar as it involves a richer 
justification of policies than in an aggregative model of democracy (Chambers 2003, 308). To 
say that the deliberative model replaces the aggregative model implies that the quality of 
participation matters more than the numbers (or even types) of participants.   
Conflict: creating space for disagreement. We should not always agree with one another. 
This sentiment is wittily stated in a quote from Bill Bishop’s The Big Sort: “I hope not to be 
exiled to some place where the vast majority agrees with me,” said one Republican in South 
Austin. This particular individual who found himself (understandably) out of place within his 




honest desire to work toward bettering his community. However, as Bishop points out, this is 
increasingly becoming the exception. Cities and regions of the country are sorted along 
ideological lines, a trend that has been documented by political scientists for some time. 
Similarly, if American media outlets are any indicator, what suffices for political debate now 
looks more like token personalities peppered into primetime “news” programs as foils for 
delivering the polarized networks’ biased messages; print journalism is not immune either with 
its op-ed contributors selected based on keeping readers sedate and subscribing.  
We cannot afford to ignore differences for the sake of finding common ground—place is 
about shared and contested meanings (Yung, Freimund, and Belsky 2003). Identities can be 
created through a wide range of processes ranging from collaboration to contestation. But in the 
end, land management that is not only ecologically sound but “socially acceptable” will have the 
greatest staying power (Yung, Freimund, and Belsky 2003). Identities that are co-created will 
likely be more durable. 
In order to ensure networks do not simply deliver self-affirming information we must 
encourage diverse perspectives,56 not just diverse membership sectors. In other words, pluralism 
in membership base is not enough to constitute the deliberative basis of legitimacy in NG; 
instead discursive pluralism, or the recognition of competing narratives is what ultimately 
brought about acceptance in the Roundtable. The fora allowed participants to express themselves 
freely without fear of punishment. Furthermore, in the Roundtable participants did not gloss over 
or skirt contentious topics.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56	  Agonistic democracy is another approach that points to the permanence of conflict in political life. I feel much of 
what is articulated in NG supports this approach. That conflict is inevitable is not to suggest that differences of 
opinion need result in violent fighting or that disagreements will destroy governance mechanisms, but that it is 




Embracing irony. Consideration of non-state interests increases legitimacy, but may slow 
down or hinder environmental protection (Newig and Fritsch 2009), but engaging in the 
process—even where one recognizes that the outcome may result in failure—is critical to 
maintaining the deliberative quality of transboundary governance. This is the “irony” of reflexive 
governance that Bob Jessop (2003, 163) outlines: “the ironist adopts a satisficing approach. She 
accepts incompleteness and failure as essential features of social life but continues to act as if 
completeness and success were possible.”   
 
7.4 Design Principles for Democratic Networked Governance 
 
Through its altered forms of accountability and the social basis of acceptance that 
legitimates the process, networked forest governance harnesses the inherent desire that people 
have to protect and improve the places they live in and do good by the people they call friends. 
The Roundtable has engendered some of the best attributes governance theory suggests of NG. 
However, I recognize that this may not be true for other networked arrangements and it also may 
not be true for the Roundtable as the years progress. Part of the value and contribution in this 
project, then, is to offer concrete and practical suggestions on institutional design for NG. It is 
my hope that by elaborating on the components of the process that serve the Roundtable well, I 
can highlight the ways that other collaborative networked arrangements can reach their potential.  
 
7.4.1 Face-to-Face Interaction 
	  
From the literature on collaborative governance all the way to networked governance, 




Newig and Fritsch 2009). Indeed, the major shift toward networked global governance hinged in 
large part on its broader inclusion and participation base.  
In order to be participatory, individuals must take part in conversations with each other. 
One participant noted: 
So I realized that as long as this issue was framed as US versus Canada we were never 
going to get results. After I spent some time in Fernie, I realized, ‘My gosh, we have so 
much in common. But we don’t know each other. We have the Elk Valley and the 
Flathead valley, communities like Whitefish and Fernie—we are ignorant of each other. 
In the face of ignorance comes suspicion and distrust and raw emotions like nationalism 
and jingoism.’ We had to change that dynamic, and the best way to do it was to get to 
know each other.  
 
Much of what participants told me echoed this sentiment—that without knowing each other it 
would be difficult to link up at the landscape level. The type of communication is informational 
and not demanding, largely because decision making often still resides within individual 
jurisdictions. One research scientist put it this way, “So it’s complicated, and that’s where the 
relationship part of it comes in because we can all talk frankly about it when we’re just sitting 
around having a chat, but ultimately, you know, that decision would be carried out at the highest 
levels of government.”  
The sense of obligation stemming from face-to-face participation enhances the 
democratic quality of governance. Communication is just one of multiple components of fully 
collaborative or democratic NG. This type of accountability gets us further toward the patterns 
observed in the Roundtable, but what is the optimal number of participants and is NG possible in 
a meaningful way at the global level? This is a question that scholars of international relations 
and global governance have weighed in on. Some say that global-level democracy is simply not 
possible; therefore, binding arrangements are not desirable. Others, such as Eckersley and 




The crux of the matter is probably, however, that the decisions made must be more about 
collaborative visioning and identity than specific management protocols. There is a danger in 
simply bringing as many individuals and organizations on board as possible.  
Therefore, a suggestion for the Crown Roundtable, or networked processes more 
generally, is that it is wise to look for areas of overlap, where shared goals and visions live. It is 
easy to make a list of all organizations and individuals working in the landscape. This is 
essentially an exercise in directory-making. It is even possible to sort organizations by 
issue/resource, region, or sector. However, directory making is not reaching the full potential of 
shared visioning. The shared visioning space is crucial for collective goal setting. Figure 7.1 
below maps the range of weak collaboration to full deliberative engagement along the axes of 
meeting format and activity type. Meeting in person, face-to-face, lends to the deliberative 
process and ultimately results in strong or ‘thick’ notions of legitimacy and accountability, where 
actors are bound to one another because they build the same process together. 
Figure 7.1 The Pathway toward Full Deliberative Engagement, Mapped on the  









7.4.2 Iterative Engagement 
	  
Iterative interactions in networked processes should ideally take place over the span of 
many years. The slow food movement has reminded us to take the time to enjoy the fruits of our 
agricultural and culinary work, and to do so with good company (Petrini 2007). In recent years, 
other “slow” movements have included slow money, slow gardening and even slow wine.57 The 
more politically-relevant version has been Slow Democracy, in which Susan Clark and Woden 
Teachout (2012) build on their backgrounds in community organization and democracy 
scholarship to document examples of participatory democracy around the United States arguing 
that local citizen engagement, when paired with new communication technology, can bring about 
changes in governance needed to address today’s challenges in areas from community forest 
management to local school redistricting.  
 Slow collaboration. Broadened participation takes time. High levels of participation 
(inclusiveness) can slow the decision-making process and push real policymaking back in favor 
of building the processes around inclusion. Adding many voices can imply adding just as many 
perspectives. In cases where there is not much overlap of opinion, each voice can represent a 
significantly different policy direction. When these competing demands much be balanced, 
especially in the case of consensus-based governance, decisions can come to a screeching halt 
altogether. If legitimacy is process-based—built upon the notion of inclusiveness—then the 
trade-off between efficiency in decision-making and the paralysis that sometimes comes along 
with consensus-building becomes very real. However, the old adage that one must sometimes go 
slow to go fast applies here. The governance process is not enhanced if increased participation is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




the sole goal without considering the time it takes for collaborative visioning. As Dryzek (2013, 
234) puts it, “Any shift from government to governance does not necessarily yield better results 
if governance is dominated by the same old actors committed to the same old imperatives.”  
If improving the governance process takes time, one can imagine that achieving 
outcomes is time-intensive as well. Indeed, even amongst those in the field of conservation, 
individuals who work daily on issues surrounding wildlife and natural resource management 
sometimes struggle to adopt recommended practices. “Did I tell you a bear came and ate all my 
chickens?” I heard one conservationist say to another, while I’m sitting at my temporary desk at 
the NGO office in Fernie, British Columbia. Just after having a lunch interview with the director 
about “Bear Aware” program, it seemed that those running the program do not always follow 
their own advice. They were keeping major attractants (the chickens) in their own yards. This 
vignette demonstrates that achieving goals at the community level, let alone the landscape level, 
is slow-moving and it comes in fits and starts.  
When new pieces of knowledge are revealed, or new best practices exposed, it takes time 
for them to catch on. “Coking” and metallurgical coal mining in the Elk Valley (Fernie, B.C.) 
gives it the nickname the “slow valley” in reference to the 2-3 day process of baking coal to 
produce a high quality, high-C content product that can be used to make steel—the metallurgical 
character of the coal found in the Elk Valley. The process involves using airless high-heat ovens 
to “drive off the liquid and gaseous volatiles.” Another participant stressed that doing 
transboundary collaborative conservation is “slow, but these processes with many players take 
time.”  
Multi-day events. On the shorter time frame, roundtable or conferencing events that bring 




participants to sit at the same table without rushing through an agenda. Some land managers are 
accustomed to seeing one another, and disgruntled groups in a dispute resolution setting where 
arbitration or dialogue is facilitated (Kemmis and McKinney 2011). Structured and guided 
interaction is valuable in many cases, but is not necessarily conducive to fostering the type of 
deliberative engagement necessary to make NG work well. Networking events that take place 
over the course of multiple days allow participants to interact in an unstructured setting where 
informal conversations in hallways and lunch tables helps people get to know each other as peers 
who face similar challenges and are motivated by common rewards.  
 
7.4.3 Collective experiences 
	  
 Experiential learning is valuable not only for showing participants new places and ideas, 
but for creating a shared learning experience that draws individuals together (Cheng and Daniels 
2003). Field trips during the Crown Roundtable involved group transportation, which gave 
participants time to get to know each other while traveling through the landscape. In fact, on the 
bus to a field excursion to an old-growth cottonwood forest outside of Fernie, B.C., I got the 
chance to talk to an individual who had been too busy during the conference to meet for a formal 
interview. If we had not talked on the bus, it is possible that I may not have had the opportunity 




The democratic deficit is a false problem in NG. The openness and flexibility inherent in 
the informal nature of networked arrangements offers a large degree of flexibility while also 




otherwise be involved in making decisions at the large landscape level. While this might seem 
like a departure from the ways we may be accustomed to holding each other to standards at the 
domestic level, NG offers incredible promise for conservation in the transboundary context. 
Even though there are few formal rules in the case of the Crown Roundtable, there is evidence 
that individuals feel a strong sense of obligation toward one another; they share information and 
resources with one another, facilitated by leading individuals who are connectors, rewarding 
each other for linking up across the landscape. Furthermore, the whole process is perceived as 
acceptable, characterized by a common identity, a set of shared norms about conservation, and a 
strong sense of trust. All of this lends to the ability of this instance of NG to achieve outcomes 
for sustainability. 
Approaches that emphasize deliberative democracy and civic cosmopolitan help us see 
these newer forms of accountability and legitimacy in NG. In light of the lessons learned in this 
case, I have offered some design recommendations for enhancing the democratic quality of NG. 
Namely, it is important that we move beyond a pluralist vision of democracy toward a 
deliberative one. Under a model of deliberative democracy, it becomes possible to reflexively 
consider it is what we are seeking to govern and the best way to achieve the outcomes we want. 
Three major institutional design principles emerge. To sum up, deliberative and reflexive 
governance should involve face-to-face interaction; it should take place over multiple sessions (it 
may be “slow” to come about), and it should create spaces where participants can share 
experiences together. These three elements help to bring about an NG process where individuals 







7.5.1 Future directions  
	  
Many of the benefits of networked arrangements come from their informal and non-
binding nature. This same informality can also implicate a tendency to change or shift as the 
needs of the day may call for new approaches. Governance arrangements should be dynamic in 
order to account for these changes. Furthermore, because organizations are not required to 
participate, they may choose to opt out at any point. In fact, evidence from the Crown 
Roundtable supports this. In the first four years of the Roundtable, there was some variation from 
one year to the next in terms of participation numbers. Some participants attended in the first 
years or two, but were unable to in subsequent years, while new participants joined in for the 
first time in the third and fourth annual Roundtables.  
There is a need to better understand the structure of networked arrangements as certain 
network structural characteristics may be tied to better outcomes. Carlsson and Sandstrom (2008) 
suggest that particular measures—including density, centrality, and heterogeneity—may be tied 
to performance. Jedd and Bixler (2015) examine two of these features (density and centrality) in 
collaborative arrangements on the Crown landscape. However, further investigation is warranted 
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